1.3. Impact of the security situation on civilian population

According to IOM, as of 30 July 2026, there were an estimated 8.6 million IDPs recorded across all 18 states in Sudan,370 which represents a decrease of about 2.6 million IDPs since March 2025.371 According to UNHCR, as of 6 July 2026, the total number of persons displaced by the conflict amounted to 11.4 million people. Of these, 4.6 million were displaced into neighbouring countries, while 6.6 million were internally displaced.372 As of 28 July 2026, IOM recorded about 4.9 million returnees across 9 states, of whom 82 % (4 million) were IDP returnees and 18 % (900 000) returnees from abroad.373 About 50 % of returnees and 55 % of IDPs were children under the age of 18.374

As of August 2025, IDPs were the most vulnerable group in terms of shelter in Sudan as even after years of conflict, many remained in temporary or inadequate housing. More precisely, 30 % of IDPs lived in makeshift shelters, 10 % in tents, and only 24 % in solid houses.375 The international humanitarian organisation Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reported, in April 2026, that displaced families within and outside Sudan had experienced major losses, including lost personal belongings, homes and livelihoods. Moreover, 66 % of respondents displaced to Chad, South Sudan and within Sudan had lost contact with family members entirely, without knowledge about their conditions or whereabouts.376 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated in February 2026 that many IDPs had been extorted, affected by sexual violence, kidnapped, and trafficked while fleeing. Moreover, older persons and persons with disabilities were often unable to leave in time and were therefore left behind in conflict-affected areas.377 Large numbers of IDPs, especially in East and North Darfur, reportedly lived under conditions that ‘significantly increase health and protection risks’, as shelters were partly unsafe or collapsed, overcrowded, inadequate regarding privacy, or poorly ventilated.378

As of July 2026, 47 % of IDPs originated from North and South Darfur, particularly El Fasher (15 %). 19 % of IDPs had their origins in Khartoum state. The main destinations for IDPs were North, South and Central Darfur. 91 % of IDPs from Khartoum left their state, whereas most IDPs from across the Darfur region were primarily displaced within the broader Darfur region.379

Figure 4: Sudan, IDPs’ States of Origin and Displacement, as of 30 July 2026. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data380

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, North Darfur was the primary state of origin of IDPs (2 063 450), followed by South Darfur (1 985 088) and Khartoum (1 668 122). South Darfur was the state hosting the most IDPs (1 765 738), followed by North Darfur (1 672 222) and Central Darfur (993 352).381

Figure 5: Sudan, IDPs’ movement by state, as of 30 July 2026. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data382

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, of the 2 063 450 IDPs from North Darfur, 1 579 288 were internally displaced within North Darfur, and 484 162 to other states. Of the 1 985 088 IDPs from South Darfur, 1 656 578 were internally displaced within South Darfur, and 328 510 to other states. 683 528 IDPs originating from Central Darfur were internally displaced within the state, and 73 576 to other states. Of the 1 668 122 IDPs from Khartoum, 150 591 were internally displaced within Khartoum, and 1 517 531 to other states.383

According to IOM estimates, about 4.6 million people were displaced from Sudan to neighbouring countries since April 2023.384 About 1.5 million (33 %) crossed into Egypt, 1.4 million (30 %) into South Sudan, 1.3 million (29 %) into Chad, 184 100 (4 %) into Ethiopia, 158 700 (3 %) into Libya, and 44 500 (1 %) into the CAR.385 African Security Analysis (ASA)386 reported in June 2026 that intercommunal violence was a driver of displacement for families from Central and South Darfur, who crossed the border into Chad.387

As of July 2026, IOM reported return movements to areas of Sudan involving about 4 032 500 IDP returnees and 896 500 returnees from abroad.388 Between January 2024 and June 2026, IOM monitored inflows from neighbouring countries amounting to about 954 000 individuals. Of these, 464 400 returned from Egypt at Argeen border crossing and 305 200 at Ashkeet; 125 900 from Chad at Um Dukhun border crossing, 54 200 at Adekonk, and 900 at Al-Tina; 2 000 from Ethiopia at Gallabat/Metema border crossing; and 1 300 from Eritrea at Al-Laffa border crossing.389 The principal state of origin of IDPs who returned to areas of Sudan was Khartoum, followed by Al Jazirah, River Nile, Central Darfur, Northern, and West Darfur.390

The source indicates that data on cross-border movement from Sudan to neighbouring countries is collected from various sources: Chad (IOM, UNHCR); Egypt (Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Ethiopia (IOM). Data on cross-border movement valid as of: Chad (6 July 2026); Egypt (14 July 2026), and Ethiopia (31 December 2025). Due to high mobility and the fluidity of the situation, these estimates may not capture all movements and could be subject to underreporting. These estimates represent cumulative movements from Sudan to neighbouring countries since 15 April 2023. 392

Food insecurity in Sudan was among the most critical worldwide,393 as farms were contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)394 or devastated by the conflict, and markets and infrastructure were damaged across multiple areas,395 and supply chains interrupted.396 The destruction of agricultural equipment and robbing of warehouses by RSF further constrained food supply.397 The conflict in the Middle East is intensifying the hunger crisis further, as it has disrupted supply chains398 such as global oil and fertilizer supplies. Consequently, prices of food have risen sharply in Sudan.399

According to UN Women, food insecurity in Sudan affected women and girls disproportionally.400 National hunger totals were alarming and female-headed households (FHHs) were three times more at risk of extreme hunger than male-headed households. In 2025, extreme hunger in FHHs has reportedly nearly doubled. Less than 2 % of FHHs could sustain themselves with sufficient food.401

In the first half of 2026, ‘severe’ food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) remained high – affecting nearly 19.5 million people in Sudan – even though the harvest had only just taken place.402 IPC described the food security situation as ‘extremely fragile and volatile’, although, with regard to areas previously classified as IPC Phase 5, data available did not allow for disaggregation for the February to May 2026 IPC reporting period. Between May and September 2025, the number of highly food insecure people had decreased by 3.4 million people due to improved conditions in Khartoum, Al Jazirah and Sennar states, whereas active conflict and restricted access exacerbated food insecurity in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. As of September 2025, 98 % of the nationwide total facing food insecurity classified as IPC Phase 5 lived in these areas.403

From 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, an officially declared famine has been reported for parts of Darfur (including El Fasher)404 and Kordofan (including the Western Nuba Mountains405 and Kadugli)406. A risk of famine has been reported for areas in the Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan regions (including the Nuba Mountains, Nyala, and Dilling)407 as well as for Al Jazirah, and Khartoum states.408 According to the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC)409 and Insecurity Insight, in mid-2025, famine was declared in 10 areas and 17 areas were at risk of famine.410 Reportedly, famine conditions were particularly severe in El Fasher411 in North Darfur, and Kadugli412 and probably Dilling (lack of data prevents IPC classification of this area)413 in South Kordofan, due to sieges imposed.414 According to IPC, as of June 2026, food insecurity was reaching critical levels in Al-Tina and Kadugli in North Darfur, Al-Sunut in West Kordofan, and Al-Buram in South Darfur, with a heightened risk of death among children under the age of five.415

In a UNICEF assessment in North Darfur’s Um Baru in December 2025, 18 % of children assessed suffered from life-threatening Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), 35 % from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM). These were among the highest recorded malnutrition rates in the world.416

Water systems were destroyed in the conflict, resulting, as of May 2026, in an estimated 17 million people without access to safe drinking water.417 As reported in April 2026, the conflict exacerbated the already ‘severe and compounding challenges’ of Sudan’s water systems. Damaged and poorly maintained water delivery systems have become inoperable, and water pumping stations suffered from fuel shortages418 or weak and unstable electricity supplies419. By contrast, for most rural communities, water supply came from hand pumps and protected wells.420 UNOCHA reported in February 2026 that lack of clean water and basic hygiene was among the biggest challenges for the communities consulted. More than 27 million people in Sudan needed WASH assistance, and FFHs had a 40 % higher risk of extreme water deprivation. Existing water services came under ‘immense strain’ especially in areas hosting large numbers of IDPs. People were exposed to unsafe water and high risks of related outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, dengue and malaria, in return, conflict, and urban areas.421

The WHO reported in January 2026 that more than 20 million people in Sudan required health assistance, but ongoing fighting, mass displacement, increasingly deadly attacks on health care, lack of medical supplies, and shortages of funding and health personnel have severely damaged the country’s health system.422

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 94 attacks on health care facilities and their vicinity in Sudan, 66 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and 14 by the SAF. These attacks resulted in the destruction of 10 health facilities and damaged 55 more.423 12 aerial attacks on health care were recorded between January and March 2026.424 As of January 2026, about 37 % of all health facilities were non-functional425 due to damage sustained since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, and millions of people lacked access to essential and life-saving health services.426

According to SHCC and Insecurity Insight, the conflict had a severe impact on the availability of medical supplies and contributed to critical shortages or non-availability of essential commodities, medicines, and vaccines.427 Domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing had effectively halted,428 manufacturers had supplies confiscated, damaged or seized, and transportation challenges delayed the arrival of medicines and equipment. Estimates suggested that 60 % of required medical supplies were lacking.429 According to MSF president Javid Abdelmoneim, medicines for HIV, tuberculosis and malaria are scarcely available in many places.430 The Iran war has further obstructed supply of essential goods, such as therapeutic food, intravenous solutions, medicines, and malaria nets from MSF’s stock in Dubai.431

Access to healthcare was reportedly particularly challenging for displaced women and girls. Many pregnant IDP women and girls could not access antenatal care and safe delivery support. Some were forced to give birth at home432 or on the road,433 had no or untrained help, no sterile equipment and no medical supervision. When unable to provide documents necessary for free treatment, these women and girls often avoid medical follow-ups to avoid high fees. Without birth certificates, many newborns in displacement cannot access medical services and vaccination programmes.434

According to OHCHR, adequate medical services were inaccessible for most victims of sexual violence within the critical 72- to 120-hour window for post-exposure medical interventions.435 Reported reasons were non-functioning or absent health facilities, the security situation, restrictions on movement,436 fear that medical settings could be controlled by perpetrators,437 lack of medical supplies, and unaffordable cost of transport.438 Gang rape reportedly caused the most severe of medical complications. Injuries and infections resulting from rape remained mostly untreated even in hospitals in displacement settings, due to the lack of capacities.439 Moreover, survivors of sexual violence were often stigmatised by their families and communities.440

In Darfur, remoteness, difficult terrain, vast distances, and costs for transport made access to MSF healthcare facilities reportedly ‘extremely challenging’.441 During the takeover of El Fasher in October 2025, when only one hospital was operational in the town and medical supplies diminished, wounds had reportedly to be cleaned with water and salt, and rape survivors could not be treated timely and adequately.442 Also in Tawila, where people from El Fasher and Zamzam were displaced to, health services buckled,443 leaving more than 70 % of households without healthcare, as of September 2026.444

As of January 2026, outbreaks of cholera were reported in all 18 states, malaria in 16, and dengue in 14 states. Disease outbreaks were fuelled by poor living conditions, overcrowded displacement sites, disrupted water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health services, and a breakdown of routine immunisation.445 Responses to disease outbreaks were reportedly further constrained by armed attacks on hospitals and medical staff446 – such as during a cholera outbreak in Central Darfur in August 2025447 – as well as by drone attacks – such as in El Obeid in July 2026.448 As reported on 8 August 2025, limited access to healthcare and medical supplies during a deadly cholera outbreak in Darfur resulted in over 4 300 cases and 113 deaths.449 The Sudanese Ministry of Health reportedly withheld information on accurate numbers of infections from local NGOs during the cholera outbreak in summer 2025.450

According to SHCC and Insecurity Insight, in 2025, over half the population (about 25 million) depended on humanitarian assistance. However, humanitarian aid delivery was almost completely obstructed by fragmented authority of the two rival governments established by the SAF and the RSF, who reportedly interrupted aid delivery and services by attacking humanitarian agencies and their staff.451 Bureaucratic restrictions, checkpoints, blockades, and damaged infrastructure impeded aid deliveries.452

Access through the humanitarian El Obeid–Darfur and El Obeid–southern corridors were reportedly challenging.453 In 2026, the Al-Tina border crossing in North Darfur on the border with Chad remained closed,454 with no access activities reported there already since 2025.455 Therefore, humanitarian agencies had to rely on the intermittently closed Adré border crossing for accessing the Darfur and southern regions from Chad.456 Moreover, during rainy season, the routes from Chad and South Sudan were reportedly impassable.457 Administrative constraints further restricted humanitarian aid.458 For the first time since April 2023, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) accessed Sudan with humanitarian aid via flight connections from Jeddah in May 2026.459 In June 2026, the first inland flight from Port Sudan to Khartoum was operated by the ICRC.460

National NGOs and civil society organisations have suffered from limited resources, material and personnel losses, as well as a militarised environment. Mental health and psychosocial support services have been particularly limited. MSF concluded that humanitarian aid did not meet the level of needs.461 According to IOM, humanitarian operations in Sudan were ‘massively’ underfunded.462 Moreover, ‘significant funding shortfalls’ restrained the humanitarian response along the corridor from southwestern Sudan into eastern Chad.463

Warring parties have obstructed aid delivery and interrupted aid services by attacking humanitarian agencies and their staff.464 Obstructions to humanitarian aid included blocked convoys, checkpoint fees, armed interference at distribution sites, demands for beneficiary data, as well as delayed or465 pending visas.466 Accusations that humanitarian convoys were smuggling weapons, delayed aid approvals and heightened risks to humanitarian staff.467 Furthermore, aid convoys were attacked468 or looted469.

Particularly, RSF-held El Fasher had remained ‘largely inaccessible’ to humanitarian actors until January 2026, and reportedly locals trying to bring in food faced life-threatening risks.470 In SAF-controlled areas, including Khartoum,471 bureaucratic constraints hindered humanitarian access and timely response to humanitarian emergencies.472 As reported in June 2026, humanitarian operations had to be suspended in Central Darfur due to armed clashes.473

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) – a decentralised local humanitarian initiative – were set up in all 18 states in response to the lack of international aid. As of June 2026, more than 700 ERRs were operating, involving more than 26 000 volunteers, mostly doctors, teachers, and community organisers from a variety of social and political backgrounds.474 Their activities include meal distribution, the provision of healthcare, education, psychological support, and evacuation assistance, among others.475 Moreover, they run women’s response rooms and community kitchens (takaaya).476 Such community kitchens are organised voluntarily within communities across Sudan, and often operate alongside ERRs.477 Islamic Relief reported in April 2026 that almost 42 % of community kitchens in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, North Kordofan, North Darfur, Sennar, and Gedaref had closed in the previous six months due to underfunding and increased meal costs.478 Such local aid efforts rely on food sharing and contributions from host communities and diaspora networks.479

As stated by UNHCR in November 2025, escape routes became longer and more dangerous as IDPs tried to circumnavigate armed checkpoints in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.480 Refugees International interviewed newly arrived people displaced from Sudan, who reportedly described RSF checkpoints and roadblocks as ‘sites of terror’ and ‘extraction points’ where fighters extorted cash and other valuables from them. When unable to pay, people were reportedly stripped, beaten, humiliated, prevented from leaving, or even killed. As a consequence, families split up, left family members behind, or took riskier routes around the worst checkpoints.481 Checkpoints have also restricted movement of pastoralists in Eastern Sudan.482 Women in South Darfur reported to MSF they felt constrained to their homes as the risk of rape had become almost inevitable on roads, in markets, and across farmlands.483 Also in Kordofan’s territories under RSF’s and affiliated groups’ control, people reportedly had to pay multiple times at checkpoints along the roads to South Sudan.484

According to the UN Human Rights Council, survivors reported extreme danger as well as executions and continued killings on the road when leaving El Fasher after it had come under RSF control.485 The New Humanitarian (TNH) reported that RSF and affiliated groups’ fighters had looted, abducted, and killed people on the way.486 Evidence of numerous bodies of children, women, and men lying along the roads to Garni and Tawila was documented.487 El-Fasher was reportedly encircled by barriers, including checkpoints on roads leading out, making it ‘extraordinarily difficult’ for civilians to leave. According to Amnesty International, those who failed to escape were killed by RSF fighters.488