1. General description of the security situation

As of August 2026, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), remained the country’s de facto leader.12 He appointed civilian technocrat, Kamil Idris, as prime minister in May 2025,13 thus filling a post that had been vacant since 2022 when the previous prime minister resigned and the military took full control of the country.14 A de facto cabinet was subsequently appointed that included several Islamist and allied figures.15

For much of 2025, the main political blocs in Sudan remained the SAF-aligned Democratic Bloc and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) self-proclaimed parallel government. This parallel government was formed in July 2025 on the basis of the Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis) of political parties and armed movements founded in February 2025.16

Meanwhile, in mid-2025, the Somoud alliance, a non-partisan coalition of neighbourhood pro-democracy groups, trade unions, women’s movements, and youth groups, emerged under the leadership of former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok.17 In a separate shift away from alignment with warring parties, a diverse grouping emerged and signed a nine-point political roadmap in Nairobi in December 2025.18 The roadmap, known as the Declaration of Principles for Building a New Sudan (Nairobi Declaration),19 was presented as a pro-peace initiative seeking a democratic transition, positioning civilian actors as a ‘third pole’ against the two main warring military parties. The signatories included the National Umma Party (NUP),20 an Islamic party21 that has experienced internal factionalism,22 including between groups aligned with either the SAF or the RSF.23 Other signatories were the centre-left reformist24 Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP), the armed group Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW), and civil society organisations.25

Since 2023, a number of efforts have been made to negotiate an end to the conflict, in which both main warring parties, the SAF and the RSF, have been accused of war crimes26 and serious violations against civilians,27 while the RSF, in particular, has been accused of genocide.28 In the past, peace efforts have been led by the African Union (AU), the regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland.29

More recent international peace efforts aiming for a power-sharing agreement, led by the Quadrilateral Mechanism (Quad),30 a group consisting of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE),31 similarly did not achieve tangible results. The Quad suffered structurally from the UAE and Egypt being both accused of enabling the warring parties while being expected to assume a key role in securing a ceasefire.32 In addition, by early 2026, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were allegedly supporting opposing sides of the conflict33 as Saudi Arabia pivoted away from neutrality towards actively supporting the SAF.34 Furthermore, the SAF rejected most efforts at mediation as these placed the RSF on equal terms with the SAF.35 Moreover, the Quad’s plans reportedly intended to exclude both warring parties from governing Sudan after the war.36 In September 2025, the Quad called for a three-month truce to lead to a permanent ceasefire, as well as humanitarian access, and the initiation of a political process for a transition towards civilian governance.37

By October 2025, SAF Commander Abdul-Fattah Al-Burhan yielded to international pressure and agreed to negotiations. Representatives of both warring sides engaged in indirect talks in Washington, D.C. At the same time, Al-Burhan continued to insist that any negotiated peace must lead to the RSF’s dissolution.38 The October talks ended without results, as on the ground the RSF captured El Fasher amid reports of serious acts of violence against civilians.39

Following this shift in military dynamics in the field, Egypt, a country firmly opposed to a partition of Sudan, scaled up its diplomatic efforts to end the war,40 alongside its military cooperation with the SAF.41 At a January 2026 meeting in Cairo, Egypt and the UN called on the SAF and RSF to allow a countrywide humanitarian truce.42 While the RSF verbally agreed to a roadmap starting with such a humanitarian truce, neither side responded officially, and Al-Burhan continued to condition his agreement to the plan on the RSF’s effective surrender.43

The SAF-aligned Democratic Bloc, for its part, comprising political parties and armed factions such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),44 held a first meeting in Khartoum in February 2026. At that meeting, it called for a comprehensive national dialogue and established committees to engage with political and civil society actors regarding the formation of a transitional legislative council and working towards a democratic transition.45

In April 2026, a conference in Berlin set out the ‘Berlin Principles for Sudan’.46 It was organized by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the African Union and the European Union with 55 states attending.47 The principles did not rule out the prospect of the SAF and RSF controlling the country’s future transition to peace. They also issued the strongest call to date for external backers of the warring parties to end their support to the SAF and RSF. However, the conference stopped short of explicitly naming the warring parties’ foreign backers and made no recommendations as to how arms supply channels should be disrupted.48

On the sidelines of the April 2026 Berlin conference, the Quintet, a group consisting of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), IGAD, League of Arab States (LAS), and the United Nations (UN), made initial engagement with Sudanese civilian actors. In late July/early August 2026, consultations were held between the Quintet and Sudanese parties and political blocs, including the NUP and the Democratic Bloc. These and ensuing talks aimed at setting in motion a political process, with an eventual transition to a civilian-led democratic government.49 However, the Somoud coalition boycotted these talks and the RSF-aligned Taasis alliance also remained absent.50

At the same time, in August 2026, Al-Burhan launched his own political initiative,51 consulting with representatives of political and civil society groups on preparing an intra-Sudanese dialogue conference.52 As Al-Burhan announced, criminal prosecution of participants facing charges was to be suspended for the duration of their involvement in national dialogue.53 These talks resulted in the formation of a preparatory committee for the proposed conference. In September 2026, Quintet representatives undertook a visit to Khartoum, where they met with Burhan, the preparatory committee, and political and civil society actors.54 The committee insisted that military factions would be barred from negotiations.55

On the other hand, the RSF in February 2025 struck a fragile accord with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu (SPLM-N-Al-Hilu). A new coalition, the Taasis, was formed,56 comprising, amongst others, armed groups from Darfur, the SPLM-N-Al-Hilu, and elements of the NUP.57 For further information on the emergence of the Taasis alliance, see section 1.1.2. Political Situation of the EUAA COI report Sudan: Country Focus (August 2026).

On 15 April 2025, the RSF declared a self-proclaimed Government of Peace and Unity as a rival government58 based on the Taasis alliance.59 On 30 August 2025, the RSF announced that the new government had been sworn in; RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), was appointed head of its fifteen-member Presidential Council60 and SPLM-N leader, Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, as his deputy.61 While the declared objective of the new formation was to create a decentralised political system,62 the International Crisis Group held that one of the new entity’s apparent primary aims was to broaden the RSF’s political appeal after the group’s major military defeats in early 2025.63 The new entity chose Nyala as its base.64 The new coalition was stricken by disputes over power-sharing,65 while political deadlock and the resignation of at least one member of the Taasis presidential council continued to impact on the alliance’s cohesion in 2026.66

The alternative government was rejected by multiple international actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US, the EU, the UN,67 and the AU.68 The move was viewed as a further impediment to the peace process and as an attempt by the RSF to seek legitimacy to control humanitarian aid distribution and enhance its access to weapons purchases.69