1.2. Actors in conflict

1.2.1. Major state and non-state armed groups

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied forces

The SAF is the regular military forces of Sudan169 and comprises the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy170 as well as the Military Intelligence, the Central Reserve Police, and the Border Guards.171 According to Global Firepower, as of January 2026, the SAF had a total strength of 517 500, including 300 000 active personnel, 200 000 reservists, and 17 500 members of paramilitary forces. Among its main forces, the Army accounted for 485 500 and the Air Force for 13 000 personnel.172 As of mid-2026, the SAF remained under the command of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan,173 the country’s de facto head of state.174 As commander-in-chief, he has principal oversight of the SAF’s operations.175 The SAF, whose officer corps has traditionally been dominated by Arab elites from the Nile Valley,176 have maintained some measure of a centralised command chain,177 along with staff procedures and a traditional military doctrine centred on territorial defence.178 The headquarters of the SAF are located in Khartoum and operational commands oversee their forces across different regions.179

The SAF have regained control throughout central Sudan,180 recapturing Wad Madani in Al Jazirah state in January 2025 and Khartoum state in May 2025.181 SAF troops and allied Darfur Joint Forces maintained control of their stronghold in El Fasher until the city was overrun by the RSF in late October 2025.182 As of mid-2026, the SAF maintained control of most of the country’s northern, eastern and central regions.183

The SAF has made increasing use of drones (now a dominant feature of the overall conflict),184 including Turkish-manufactured drones and missiles (Bayraktar systems185 such as Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akinci drones186), Turkish-Pakistani made drones (YHIA-III), Iranian-made military drones (Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3),187 Pakistani Shapar drones,188 alongside commercially purchasable Chinese-made devices.189 This has allowed the SAF to project aerial power across several fronts at the same time.190 Reports from US officials alleged that the SAF had used chemical weapons on at least two occasions in 2024.191 A 2025 investigation by France 24 provided findings that appeared to corroborate the allegations in relation to two incidents in September 2024.192 Externally, the SAF are reportedly supported by Egypt193 and Türkiye, both providing diplomatic backing along with material assistance,194 as well as by Russia and Iran.195

The SAF are backed by dozens of militia groups within the country. With the expansion of the war in scale and scope, the SAF have shown a growing reliance on militias to pursue their military goals,196 including a number of Islamist armed groups.197 The most prominent Islamist militia is the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade,198 a Muslim Brotherhood-linked militia199 whose leaders were linked to Omar al-Bashir’s long-term regime200 (1989–2019).201 As of August 2026, the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade was commanded by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid202 (Mubashir Abu Zaid203). The brigade is known for its use of advanced weaponry.204 Its strength is unknown, with estimates ranging widely from around 1 500 fighters205 to between 20 000206 and 45 000 fighters. While its strongholds lie in eastern Sudan, the brigade is actively involved in combat in the three Kordofan states. The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade has resisted attempts to fully integrate under the SAF’s structures of command207 and has been accused by critics of independent conduct.208 In September 2025, the US government sanctioned the brigade due to its Islamist orientation and alleged links to Iran.209 In January 2026, the EU sanctioned seven individuals, ‘in view of the continued grave situation in Sudan’ including Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade commander Al-Misbah Abu Zaid.210

The Joint Forces, formed in April 2023,211 comprise Darfuri armed groups that had signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) of 2020.212 While initially taking a stance of non-alignment, some of these groups aligned with the SAF213 in November 2023214 and declared war on the RSF in early 2024.215 This formation included the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),216 each comprising around 35 000 fighters,217 as well as the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and groups linked to the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council (SLM-TC). Factions of the SLM-TC and the GSLF later split from the SAF alliance, initially adopting a neutral stance before aligning with the RSF.218 After the fall of El Fasher, Darfuri armed groups that had remained aligned with the SAF were deployed to other areas of Sudan.219 Most fighters composing the Joint Forces are ethnic Zaghawa.220

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North faction led by Malik Agar (SPLM‑N-Agar), known for its experienced battle‑hardened forces, has operated alongside the SAF across several fronts, including in Blue Nile and Khartoum states.221 Its second-in-command general, Hassan Adam al-Hassan, defected to the RSF-aligned Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis) in April 2026.222

The Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), operating in North Kordofan223 and Al Jazirah state with an estimated strength between 35 000 and 75 000 fighters, played a key role in the SAF’s recapture of areas in eastern Sudan,224 including Al Jazirah state (January/February 2025)225 and eventually Khartoum (March 2025).226 The SSF, formed in 2022 by former SAF officer Abu Aqla Keikel227 and drawing most of its fighters from Arab communities of Al Jazirah state,228 has, under Keikel’s leadership, changed allegiances at different stages of the war. The group defected to the RSF in August 2023 before re-aligning with the SAF in October 2024.229 Keikel has been placed under sanctions by the EU230 and the UK for violence against civilians.231

The Popular Resistance (Mustanfareen) is a more than 70 000-strong national militia constituting a substantial component of the SAF-aligned coalition. Its members are recruited from tribal communities and local militias in the country’s east and south232 and its cadres include individuals from various parts of Sudanese society, including activists who previously opposed Al-Burhan’s military rule.233 The Popular Resistance was formed following the SAF leader’s call for general mobilisation in June 2023.234 Their purpose lies in defending communities and key strategic areas. In El Fasher, they were actively involved in fighting alongside the SAF and the Joint Forces until the city’s defences collapsed.235 Its members have limited training, and their adherence to military orders has been inconsistent, with reports of armed intimidation of civilians at checkpoints, alongside criminal activity.236

The SAF alliance further encompasses armed tribal groups operating as community militias defending their own communities while also assisting the SAF. Notable examples are the Zaghawa Council, which contributed to the SAF’s defence of its former stronghold in North Darfur state, and the Dar al-Hamar militia from the Kordofan region, which also includes elements opposed to the SAF.237

Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

The paramilitary238 RSF, formally established in 2013, are a decentralised239 highly mobile force led by Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.240 Their ranks are dominated by ethnic Arabs chiefly stemming from the semi-nomadic Rizeigat tribe. The RSF are further supported by a non-Rizeigat241 core alliance of Arab tribal militias from Darfur and the Kordofans,242 as well as by formerly SAF-aligned Darfuri splinter groups243 (GSLF and SLM-TC).244 Other RSF-aligned non-Arab groups, such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North faction led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu (SPLM-N-Al-Hilu), operate in Blue Nile and South Kordofan as part of the RSF’s Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis).245 Moreover, the RSF draw on significant numbers of foreign combatants,246 including Colombian mercenaries247 and fighters from South Sudan, Chad, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Libya.248

Since the start of the war, the RSF has operated across multiple regions, including Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah state, and Kordofan.249 As of beginning of August 2026, the RSF controlled most of the Darfur region,250 where it has consolidated control following its capture of El Fasher,251 and parts of the Kordofan region (West Kordofan and parts of North and South Kordofan).252

The RSF have used small and light arms along with heavy weaponry, armoured vehicles, artillery (including rockets, mortars, and anti-tank guided missiles),253 as well as Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers.254 While lacking an air force,255 the group has made extensive use of drones,256 including surveillance drones, large-scale armed fixed-wing drones, suicide drones, and drones for dropping explosives. These have included Chinese-made CH-95 long-range drones supplied by the UAE,257 Chinese FH-95 drones and Wing Loong II drones, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL drones,258 and domestically produced Safrouq drones.259

The RSF further operate equipment for electronic warfare such as jamming systems and Starlink-based command terminals.260 It reportedly receive substantial funding and arms from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).261 Apart from the UAE, countries like Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya, and Uganda have been involved to various degrees in facilitating supplies for the RSF, providing diplomatic cover,262 and, in the case of Ethiopia, hosting a camp for the training of RSF fighters.263 In July 2026, a Sudanese court convicted Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and 15 senior RSF members in absentia of having committed genocide and crimes against humanity in El Geneina (West Darfur), including for the June 2023 killing of a regional governor.264

As of June 2026, there were signs of fracture and infighting both within the RSF’s core265 (including defections of several senior commanders266 and a senior RSF political figure)267 and within the RSF’s Taasis alliance with non-Arab groups in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.268

Since the start of the current conflict in April 2023, the tactics of warfare have shifted significantly. The initial stages were marked by artillery and infantry operations269 and the SAF’s reliance on its air power.270 However, as the war progressed, drones came to play an increasingly crucial role in operations of both the SAF and RSF, expanding conventional battlefields271 as they allowed strikes on targets located far from the base. By late 2025, an airfield in Nyala (South Darfur) served as the RSF’s main launch site for UAE-supplied long-range drones.272

Apart from drone strikes, the RSF have conducted large-scale ground offensives in North Darfur273 and used civilian housing to shield from SAF attacks and launch their own attacks.274 Since April 2023, RSF operations across the Darfur region have been reportedly marked by ‘pervasive’ and ‘consistent’ patterns of violence against civilians, ethnic targeting of non-Arab communities, such as ethnic Masalit in West Darfur’s El Geneina area, and tactics of siege in and around the city of El Fasher. Acts of violence attributed to the RSF include indiscriminate killing, torture, sexual violence, looting, and the destruction of civilian housing and infrastructure.275 Indiscriminate attacks in densely populated zones were also attributed to the SAF and aligned forces.276 The SAF and its aligned forces have also carried out reprisal killings of people suspected of having sided with the RSF in areas formerly held by the paramilitary group,277 including members of the Kanabi community278 and South Sudanese nationals.279

Both sides of the conflict have conducted systematic attacks on civilians.280 During their over 500-day siege of El Fasher,281 RSF elements burned nearby villages, towns and IDP camps, bombed populated areas on a near-daily basis282 using drones and heavy weaponry, and employed tactics of starvation and physical elimination of the city’s population, attacking IDP camps, medical facilities, food distribution systems, and water and electricity infrastructure.283 By maintaining its prolonged siege of El Fasher, the RSF and their allies used starvation as a means of war that led to multiple reports of civilian deaths.284 As the siege tightened, there were reports of widespread killings, including through indiscriminate gunfire and executions of civilians in homes and public areas,285 among them civilians who attempted to escape from the city.286 The conflict also saw the RSF employing long-term siege tactics around the Kordofan towns of Dilling,287 Kadugli,288 and imposing prolonged siege-like conditions on El Obeid,289 creating critical shortages in food290 and water.291

The war has seen sexual violence – including rape, gang rape and attempted rape, forced nudity, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and sexualised torture – used in a coordinated, recurrent, and systematic manner as a means of war.292 The RSF deliberately used sexual violence to subjugate women, girls, and communities293 as a tactic aimed at weakening anti-RSF forces, especially the Joint Forces.294 Such acts mostly targeted non-Arab women and girls and were reported across all zones that have been affected by the current conflict, including the Khartoum area, Al Jazirah, Kordofan, Zamzam, and El Fasher.295 While the RSF were identified as the main perpetrator of sexual violence, acts like rape and sexualised torture of female and male detainees were also attributed to members of the SAF, including in Blue Nile, White Nile, Khartoum, and Northern states.296

In July 2026, following the SAF’s advances in North Kordofan, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo reportedly ordered a shift in military tactics, urging his fighters to adhere to rules of combat and protect civilians.297 No information could be found on whether and to what degree these changes have been implemented.

After Al-Burhan’s call for general mobilisation in June 2023,298 the SAF used a variety of mobilisation techniques. According to confidential sources cited by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in certain areas, these included instilling fear in civilians by telling them that they would be killed by the RSF if they chose to not take up arms. In other cases, authorities used explicit coercion to recruit civilians, at times ordering community leaders and clan chiefs to supply a certain number of recruits.299 The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade continued to recruit minors, taking children from schools and transporting them to military training facilities.300

Though their ranks are dominated by ethnic Arab combatants, as the conflict progressed, the RSF came to recruit growing numbers of fighters from non-Arab militias in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains in Kordofan.301 The UN noted eyewitness reports that the RSF and aligned groups recruited significant numbers of children in the El Fasher area, deploying them as fighters, guards and for the purpose of intelligence gathering.302 The RSF have further recruited mercenaries from abroad.303

At the same time, the reference period saw increased mobilisation of civilians along tribal lines.304 Following losses resulting from military defeats in North Kordofan in mid-2026, RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, in what seemed a shift away from foreign mercenary recruitment, turned to calling for direct mobilisation of tribes in Darfur. A number of tribes heeded his call, including a Fur tribe pledging four combat brigades and a group of Arab tribes committing an 11-battalion force. The administration of Central Darfur state also announced a mobilisation, pledging 10 000 fighters to the RSF leadership.305

  • 169

    Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, url; Tounsel, C., Sudan’s civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, url

  • 170

    Global Firepower, 2026 Sudan Military Strength, last updated 22 January 2026, url; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 171

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 172

    Global Firepower, 2026 Sudan Military Strength, last updated 22 January 2026, url

  • 173

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 9; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 174

    Tounsel, C., Sudan’s civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, url

  • 175

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 9; Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, url

  • 176

    International Crisis Group, A Race against Time to Halt Sudan’s Collapse, 22 June 2023, url, p. 9; Sudan War Monitor, Introductory guide to Sudan's new civil war, 21 December 2023, url

  • 177

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 178

    Cann, A., Sudan’s Two Armies: A Comparative Analysis of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 1 June 2026, url

  • 179

    Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, url

  • 180

    ACLED, Fighting moves to Kordofan as Sudan’s east–west divide solidifies, 11 December 2025, url

  • 181

    UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, url, para. 10

  • 182

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, url, para. 12; ACLED, El Fasher and Kordofan: the strategic fronts in Sudan’s shifting war — Expert comment, 29 October 2025, url

  • 183

    Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, url

  • 184

    LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, url; ACLED, How has Sudan’s drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, url

  • 185

    ACLED, How has Sudan’s drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, url; Washington Post (The), A Turkish arms firm helped fuel Sudan's brutal civil war, records show, 9 March 2025

  • 186

    Soufan Center (The), War Without End: How Drone Warfare and Failed Diplomacy Are Fragmenting Sudan, 24 October 2025, url

  • 187

    ACLED, How has Sudan’s drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, url

  • 188

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan army receives Pakistani armoured vehicles and drones, military sources say, 6 August 2026, url

  • 189

    LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, url

  • 190

    ACLED, How has Sudan’s drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, url

  • 191

    MEE, US sanctions on Burhan spark Sudanese condemnation of UAE and Biden, 19 January 2025, url; New York Times (The), Sudan’s Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say, 16 January 2025, url; USDOS, Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons by Sudan Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 27750 [2025-11896], 27 June 2025, url

  • 192

    France24, Videos show the Sudanese army's use of chlorine gas as a weapon, 9 October 2025, url

  • 193

    BBC News, A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan, 13 November 2025, url

  • 194

    Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, url

  • 195

    DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, url

  • 196

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url;

  • 197

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Islamists tactical retreat creates dilemma for army generals, 11 August 2026, url

  • 198

    Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, url

  • 199

    Gunaratna, R., Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: Genesis, Evolution and Threat, Manara Magazine, 22 September 2026, url

  • 200

    Guardian (The), Militia aligned with Sudanese army accused of executing men in Khartoum, 19 December 2024, url

  • 201

    Reuters, Sudan's Bashir admits role in 1989 coup during trial, 21 December 2022, url

  • 202

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Islamists tactical retreat creates dilemma for army generals, 11 August 2026, url

  • 203

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url;

  • 204

    Ayin Network, Sudan’s army, Islamists, and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, 25 March 2025, url

  • 205

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url

  • 206

    Ayin Network, Sudan’s army, Islamists, and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, 25 March 2025, url

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    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 208

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url

  • 209

    USDOS, Sanctioning Sudanese Armed Group Leader and Islamist Militia with Links to Iran, 12 September 2025, url

  • 210

    Council of the EU, Sudan: Council sanctions seven individuals in view of the dramatic escalation of violence in the country, 29 January 2026, url

  • 211

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 9; ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, url

  • 212

    ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, url

  • 213

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, paras. 9-10

  • 214

    Sudan Tribune, Key Darfur groups join Sudanese army in its war against RSF paramilitary forces, 16 November 2023, url

  • 215

    Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, url

  • 216

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, paras. 9-10

  • 217

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 218

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, paras. 10, 12

  • 219

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 220

    Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, url

  • 221

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url

  • 222

    Horn Review, Sudan’s New Front in Blue Nile, 8 May 2026, url

  • 223

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army and allies recapture key North Kordofan towns, 25 July 2026, url; Dabanga, Battles rage in Sudan’s North Kordofan with both sides claiming victory, 19 November 2025, url

  • 224

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 225

    Ayin Network, From liberation to persecution: Sudan’s army recapture of Al-Jazeera State, 26 February 2025, url; Reuters, Celebrations in Sudan's Wad Madani as army takes over strategic city, 13 January 2025, url

  • 226

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 227

    HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, url; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 228

    HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, url

  • 229

    Elnour, M., Sudan War: Allegiances Shift and Civilians Suffer Regardless, TIMEP, 11 April 2025, url; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url; HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, url

  • 230

    Global Sanctions, EU sanctions Sudanese commanders and funders, 18 July 2025, url

  • 231

    UK, FCDO, UK Sanctions List: KAIKAL Abu Aqla Mohamed, last updated 5 February 2026, url

  • 232

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 233

    MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, url

  • 234

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url; MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, url

  • 235

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 13

  • 236

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url

  • 237

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 238

    Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, url; Sudan Now, Who are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)?, last updated July 2026, url

  • 239

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 240

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 14

  • 241

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 242

    ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, url

  • 243

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 244

    NL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, url, p. 26

  • 245

    ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, url; Ayin Network, RSF’s military alliances reshape the map of Sudan’s war, 21 March 2025, url

  • 246

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 15

  • 247

    Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, url; Sudan War Monitor, Why Colombian Mercenaries Are Fighting in Sudan, 16 August 2025, url

  • 248

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url

  • 249

    Sudan Now, Who are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)?, last updated July 2026, url

  • 250

    BBC News, Sudan army drone strike on court session kills 35, rights group says, 3 August 2026, url; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, url

  • 251

    Tounsel, C., Sudan’s civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, url

  • 252

    PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, url

  • 253

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 16

  • 254

    Amnesty International, Sudan: Advanced Chinese weaponry provided by UAE identified in breach of arms embargo – new investigation, 8 May 2025, url

  • 255

    Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, url

  • 256

    LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, url; Reuters, Sudan's RSF steps up deadly drone attacks on frontline cities, 24 September 2026, url

  • 257

    New York Times (The), The Secret Egyptian Air Base Behind Sudan’s Drone War, 5 February 2026, url

  • 258

    Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, url

  • 259

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s army, RSF escalate conflict with advanced drone warfare, 15 September 2025, url

  • 260

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 16

  • 261

    Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, url; FT, Sudan civil war atrocities cast spotlight on UAE, 4 November 2025, url; WSJ, How U.A.E. Arms Bolstered a Sudanese Militia Accused of Genocide: Gulf Arab state has funneled weapons, including Chinese-made drones, to rebel forces, 28 October 2025

  • 262

    Arab Weekly (The), Turkey is winning in Sudan. But for how long?, 10 June 2026, url

  • 263

    Reuters, Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say, 10 February 2026, url

  • 264

    Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, url; BBC News, Sudan’s paramilitary RSF chief sentenced to death over war crimes, 13 July 2026, url

  • 265

    ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, url

  • 266

    Elhag, A., RSF Defections: A Turning Point in Sudan’s War?, TWI, 21 May 2026, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Hit Sudan’s RSF … Has the Breakup Phase Begun?, 13 May 2026, url

  • 267

    Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, url

  • 268

    ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, url

  • 269

    LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, url

  • 270

    Ali, H. and Kurtz, G., Stopping the War in Sudan, SWP, 22 May 2023, url, p. 3

  • 271

    LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, url; ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall - August 2024, 23 August 2024, url

  • 272

    Le Monde, Sudan’s two warring sides continue to upgrade weaponry despite arms embargo, 24 October 2025, url

  • 273

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, para. 28

  • 274

    UN Human Rights Council, Domicide: Mass destruction of housing and civilian infrastructure in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine – Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, A/HCR/61/43/Add.3, 26 February 2026, url, para. 76

  • 275

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, url, para. 19-20

  • 276

    UN Human Rights Council, Domicide: Mass destruction of housing and civilian infrastructure in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine – Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, A/HCR/61/43/Add.3, 26 February 2026, url, para. 75

  • 277

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, para. 36-39

  • 278

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, para. 36; CIR, Kanabi settlements burn as violence spreads across Gezira, 31 January 2025, url

  • 279

    Sudans Post, 27 South Sudanese nationals killed by SAF-allied militias in Sudan’s Al Jazirah State, 16 January 2025, url

  • 280

    Amnesty International, Sudan: Three years on, warring parties intensify brutal war on civilians, 14 April 2026, url

  • 281

    MEE, Sudan's Rapid Support Forces: What to know about the paramilitary group, 5 November 2025, url; New Arab (The), Who are Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, accused of atrocities in Darfur?, 31 October 2025, url

  • 282

    Amnesty International, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces’ Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur [AFR 54/1116/2026], July 2026, url, pp. 6, 10

  • 283

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, url, para. 20, 25, 27

  • 284

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 85

  • 285

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, url, para. 44

  • 286

    AI, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces’ Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur, July 2026, url, p. 6; UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, url, paras. 44, 47

  • 287

    Al Jazeera, Sudan army says two-year RSF siege of key town broken, 27 January 2026, url; Sudan Tribune, Sudan army breaks Dilling siege for third time, enabling aid delivery, 19 May 2026, url

  • 288

    ASA, Sudan at the Threshold of Irreversibility, 5 February 2026, url; Humanitarian Action, Kadugli Operational Response Planning, 20 August 2025, url

  • 289

    United Nations in Sudan, Media Statement - Türk calls for strong action at the highest level to prevent atrocity crimes in Sudan, 3 July 2026, url

  • 290

    WFP, WFP warns El Obeid is becoming the new epicentre of Sudan's displacement and hunger crisis, 17 July 2026, url; Sudan Tribune, Sudan army breaks Dilling siege for third time, enabling aid delivery, 19 May 2026, url; UN News, Famine declared in two Sudanese cities cut off by war, fragile gains elsewhere, 4 November 2025, url

  • 291

    United Nations in Sudan, Media Statement - Türk calls for strong action at the highest level to prevent atrocity crimes in Sudan, 3 July 2026, url

  • 292

    OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, url, para. 12

  • 293

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, para. 59

  • 294

    OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, url, para. 24

  • 295

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, paras. 59-60, 64

  • 296

    UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, url, paras. 58, 66

  • 297

    AA, RSF commander orders tactics shift after Sudanese army advances in North Kordofan, 28 July 2026, url

  • 298

    Noon Post, Sudan’s War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, url; MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, url

  • 299

    Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, url, pp. 87-88

  • 300

    Arab Weekly (The), Sudan’s army-linked Islamist brigade accused of child recruitment, 6 July 2026, url

  • 301

    Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, url

  • 302

    UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, url, para. 17

  • 303

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, url

  • 304

    UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, url, para. 8

  • 305

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, url