2.2.2. Territorial control and main armed actors

HTS initially became the dominant force in Idlib governorate in 2017526 and governed it through its political and administrative arm, the Syrian Salvation Government.527 HTS remained dominant in Idlib528 until it was dissolved in January 2025.529 Former members of the Salvation Government, as well as HTS members, were assigned important posts in the transitional government announced in March 2025.530

As of mid-December 2024, a map produced by ISW and CTP showed Idlib governorate as being controlled by HTS-led opposition forces.531 By 16 February 2026, the governorate was shown as being controlled by the Syrian Transitional Government.532 As of November 2025, the 64^th and 98^th divisions of the new Syrian Army were based in Idlib.533

During the reporting period, veteran foreign jihadi fighters continued to be present in Idlib.534 A group of about 50 jihadist foreign fighters known as Firqat al-Ghuraba and led by French national Omar Diaby, alias Omar Omsen, was living in a camp in Harim district,535 with their families.536 Reportedly, the camps of French foreign fighters had established a parallel policing system operating outside Syrian state authority, including trials and the issuing of sentences.537 The presence of Uzbek foreign fighters, which were described by an interior ministry official as operating in ‘mafia-like’ ways,538 was also reported.539

The Emirates Policy Center (EPC) reported on 30 December 2025 that, although Türkiye’s focus was shifting away from Idlib to the Kurdish conflict in Aleppo, the country maintained more than 20 000 military and security personnel in the northwest of Syria. Türkiye run bases and observation points in southern Idlib as well as major sites such as Al-Mastumah camp and the Taftanaz Airport in the northern part of the governorate.540 Deadly ISIL activity was recorded at the end of 2025541 and a security campaign against ISIL cells was launched on 8 November 2025 by the MoI in Idlib and other governorates.542