2.12.3. Security trends

In July 2025, a robbery on the Damascus-Sweida highway allegedly driven by competition over smuggling routes, lead to retaliatory kidnappings and clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin fighters, escalating into the widely reported violence in Sweida governorate.1149 This unrest led to significant displacement towards Dar’a governorate,1150 particularly of Bedouin people.1151 In October 2025, an eastern Dar’a-based journalist reportedly noted that the events intensified blood feuds and killings among clans displaced to Dar’a.1152 For further information on the July 2025 events, see section 2.13. Sweida governorate.

In September 2025, significant mutual conflicts and tensions among the local armed groups in Dar’a governorate were reported.1153 In a December 2025 report, researcher Abdullah Al-Jabassini described violence in Dar’a as episodic and often localised, fuelled by uncollected weapons and the resilience of armed networks.1154 Not all cities and towns were equally affected. For instance, as of October 2025, Inkhil saw improved security under the transitional government.1155 Despite a remarkable decline in violence in the governorate since December 2024, Al-Jabassini noted that sporadic killings, abductions and localised armed clashes had occurred. Between December 2024 and mid-November 2025, the source documented the killing of at least 120 civilians, former oppositions members and transitional government and 40^th Division forces. He noted that the perpetrators' identities remained unknown in most cases, making it difficult to identify the motives. Al-Jabassini also recorded 75 incidents involving lethal weapon misuse and indiscriminate gunfire, resulting in 50 fatalities, including children. Furthermore, he documented 35 incidents of interpersonal disputes escalating into armed confrontations resulting in fatalities, as well as 49 localised clashes, including tribal clashes and clashes sometimes involving transitional government forces. The latter resulted in over 50 fatalities.1156 As of May 2026, Etana Syria noted that particularly areas connected to organised crime networks in western Dar’a were still affected by active abduction and extortion networks. Throughout April, the source reported targeted killings in Inkhil, Izra’ and Khirbet Ghazaleh, as well as several attempted killings, including those of civilians, former opposition members and local affiliates.1157

Al-Jabassini explained that the Israeli state has maintained a ‘strategic foothold’ in southern Syria since December 2024, shaping the region’s security environment through interventions including a continuous presence, ground incursions, precision air strikes and ‘limited forward deployments’.1158 In the reporting period, Dar’a governorate, particularly its western parts,1159 saw the second-highest concentration of Israeli incidents after Quneitra.1160 Western Dar’a1161 was reportedly one of the areas in the country where Israel expanded its operations and presence during the reference period1162 which witnessed Israeli airstrikes,1163 and ground operations in the governorate,1164 focusing on military sites1165 and suspected arms convoys.1166 In March 2026, military sites in Izra’ were reportedly attacked by Israeli airstrikes in a first attack against the transitional government in months, with no reported casualties.1167 Ground operations by the Israeli army sometimes also involved house searches,1168 checkpoints, artillery shelling,1169 road closures, or the use of armed drones.1170 The UNCOI reported that Israeli operations led to civilian casualties, displaced civilians and damaged and destructed property. Arrests, detention, and fundamental freedom restrictions were also reported. Some of the arrested were reportedly released hours or days later, while others remained in detention for months.1171

Amid the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict hundreds of projectiles coming from Iran on their way to targets in Israeli occupied Golan and Israel were reportedly intercepted in Syrian airspace.1172 This also led to drone and missile debris fall across Dar’a governorate,1173 particularly in early-March 2026. Multiple drones were downed over or close to populated areas, including Inkhil, Izra’, and Nawa cities, resulting in limited civilian harm.1174

In January 2026, the transitional government reportedly carried out nearly daily raids in south-west Syria, including Dar’a governorate, arresting security commanders of the former regime, individuals involved in abduction operations, and Hezbollah affiliates.1175