During the reporting period, Dar’a governorate appeared to be under the control of the Syrian Transitional Government,1123 although its authority and security presence were reportedly contested and not fully established.1124 Syria’s southern region has seen a broad proliferation of armed groups between 2018 and 2024,1125 and Dar’a governorate has a long history of militias and tribal networks engaging in smuggling of various goods.1126 The presence of numerous local armed groups reportedly constrained the transitional government's control, with territorial control in Dar’a described as ‘highly fragmented’ in January 2026. Some groups were nominally under the control of the MoD, but effectively ‘operated in a semi-autonomous manner’.1127 By mid-February 2026, anti-government Druze groups controlled areas in Sweida governorate along the south-eastern border of Dar’a governorate.1128 As of March 2026, local warlord Ahmad Al-Awda maintained a power base around Busra Al-Sham.1129 In mid-April 2025, the transitional government took over his Dar’a-based armed faction, the Eighth Brigade, in Busra Al-Sham, while his supporters remained active in the region.1130 He reportedly submitted himself to the authority of the transitional government’s MoD in February 2026, after which he left Busra Al-Sham for Damascus.1131 Additionally, numerous small armed groups, consisting of six to ten members, were reportedly operating in the Tafas area as of October 2025.1132
In February 2025, the transitional government established the 40th Division of the Syrian army1133 as the primary division for Dar’a governorate.1134 In October 2025, a new cohort of 250 Special Tasks Forces’ members reportedly graduated in the governorate. A member of the internal security forces in northern Dar’a indicated that these forces were still being developed, highlighting that the police force faced a shortage of qualified personnel.1135
The Israeli army, having advanced deep into the UN-monitored demilitarised zone separating the occupied Golan Heights and the Syrian-held territory in Quneitra since December 2024,1136 has established positions in western Dar’a governorate.1137 In an opinion piece published in May 2026, SNHR’s executive director Fadel Abdulghany noted that reports indicated the existence of 10 Israeli military bases in the Dar’a and Quneitra governorates by July 2025. Incursions into villages in these governorates continued until April 2026.1138 The transitional government maintained a presence on Dar’as roads connecting localities and large cities, reportedly giving locals the impression of strong security control. This control reportedly becomes weaker in the Al-Yarmouk Basin,1139, 1140 where the Israeli army’s military post near Ma'raya village, known as Al-Jazira barrack,1141 and regular patrols, have created a zone of constrained operational freedom and presence for the transitional government.1142 Since the onset of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran in late February 2026, Israeli forces had reportedly achieved significant aerial dominance over southern Syria, intercepting Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over Dar’a and Quneitra governorates. As part of enhanced security measures for Quneitra governorate, a first line of two internal security checkpoints was reportedly set up in western Dar'a governorate by transitional government forces.1143 Sources reported that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) conducted patrols in various cities in Dar’a during the reporting period,1144 entering Al-Sanamayn city in late December 2025 for the first time,1145 as part of their mandate to gather information from residents and assess Israeli incursions into the area.1146
The execution of an internal security forces member in Dar’a by ISIL in mid-September 2025 suggests a potential resurgence of ISIL in the South.1147 In February 2026, the UN Secretary General reported assassination attempts targeting Al-Sharaa in 2025 by Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah, a group identified as a front for ISIL, including in Dar’a governorate.1148
- 1123
ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url; Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, 30 January 2026, url, p. 48
- 1124
Al-Jabassini, A., Security Transformations in Southern Syria: Authority, armed networks, and foreign intervention, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 December 2025, url, p. 15
- 1125
Al-Jabassini, A., Security Transformations in Southern Syria: Authority, armed networks, and foreign intervention, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 December 2025, url, p. 17
- 1126
Rose, C., Illicit economies play big role in Syria’s post-Assad flashpoints, Al Majalla, 2 August 2025, url
- 1127
Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, 30 January 2026, url, p. 48
- 1128
ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url
- 1129
Belgium, CGRS-CEDOCA, Syrië: Veiligheidssituatie (ACLED), 31 March 2026, url, p. 30
- 1130
EUAA, Syria – Country Focus, July 2025, url, p. 180
- 1131
Syria TV, Former Eighth Brigade commander surrenders to military police as clan announces his banishment from Daraa, The Syrian Observer, 23 February 2026, url
- 1132
Syria Direct, In post-regime Daraa, insecurity overshadows the state, 30 October 2025, url
- 1133
Al-Jabassini, A., Security Transformations in Southern Syria: Authority, armed networks, and foreign intervention, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 December 2025, url, p. 16
- 1134
Waters, G., The New Syrian Army: Structure and Commanders, Syria Revisited, 28 March 2025, url
- 1135
Syria Direct, In post-regime Daraa, insecurity overshadows the state, 30 October 2025, url
- 1136
HRW, Syria: Israel Forcibly Displaces Villagers in Occupied South, 17 September 2025, url; TIMEP, After Assad, a New Uncertainty in Syria’s South, 26 March 2026, url
- 1137
Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, 30 January 2026, url, p. 49; Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in south-west Syria [Map], 25 May 2025, url
- 1138
Abdulghany, F., Israel’s Gradual Annexation of Southern Syria under the Pretext of Mine Removal [Blog], SNHR, 17 May 2026, url
- 1139
A river valley forming the western border of Dar’a governorate; TIMEP, After Assad, a New Uncertainty in Syria’s South, 26 March 2026, url
- 1140
Al-Jabassini, A., Security Transformations in Southern Syria: Authority, armed networks, and foreign intervention, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 December 2025, url, p. 15
- 1141
Daraa24, إسرائيل تواصل تعزيز وجودها في ثكنة الجزيرة غربي درعا [Israel continues reinforcing its presence in Al-Jazira barracks west of Daraa], 25 January 2025, url
- 1142
Al-Jabassini, A., Security Transformations in Southern Syria: Authority, armed networks, and foreign intervention, Arab Reform Initiative, 4 December 2025, url, p. 15
- 1143
Etana Syria, Brief: Impact of regional conflict on south Syria, 10 March 2026, url
- 1144
SOHR, UNDOF patrols inspect and monitor Israeli incursion routes in Daraa countryside, 10 May 2026, url; SOHR, Field mobilization | Patrol of UNDOF enters Al-Nasriya Village in Daraa, 28 April 2026, url; SOHR, Assessing Israeli violations | UNDOF forces visit village in Daraa countryside, 7 April 2026, url; Etana Syria, Brief: Israeli operations continue in south-west Syria, 3 February 2026, url
- 1145
Etana Syria, Brief: Israeli operations continue in south-west Syria, 3 February 2026, url
- 1146
SOHR, Assessing Israeli violations | UNDOF forces visit village in Daraa countryside, 7 April 2026, url
- 1147
Ultra Syria, Black Flags in Southern Syria: Who is helping ISIS Expand and Regroup?, The Syrian Observer, 10 October 2025, url; Etana Syria, Brief: Rising instability in south-west Syria, 8 October 2025, url
- 1148
UNSG, Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, S/2026/57, 2 February 2026, url, para. 10