In the aftermath of the collapse of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, the overall security situation across several of the country’s regions was described as fragile300 as the transitional government struggled to establish security in areas outside Damascus301 and to respond effectively to sectarian violence,302 kidnappings303 and looting.304 The year 2025 saw two large waves of killings, erupting in coastal and western central Syria in March (involving intense attacks by state-affiliated actors against Alawites), and in Sweida in July (involving clashes between Druze and Bedouins305 and armed interventions by Syrian government and Israeli forces).306 The UN estimated the number of fatalities arising from these two instances of mass violence at more than 1 400 (events of March 2025)307 and at least 1 700 (events of July 2025), respectively.308 While Assadist groups continued to operate in the coastal areas,309 they only claimed limited attacks during the rest of 2025.310 In Sweida, large-scale clashes declined after July 2025311 but sporadic clashes between Druze fighters and internal security forces continued312 into May 2026313 despite a ceasefire being in effect.314

Compared to the fragility315 and instability seen in the aftermath of the fall of Al-Assad,316 sources reporting during the current reference period (1 October 2025 to 31 May 2026) pointed to signs of stabilisation.317 According to the UN Secretary-General’s deputy special envoy for Syria, Claudio Cordone, March 2026 saw the lowest levels of direct conflict-related violence in 15 years.318 Nonetheless, significant challenges remained.319 There was a spike in Assadist insurgent activity in late February 2026 in Latakia,320 while communal tensions remained at heightened levels in areas such as Homs321 and Hama.322 ISIL was present in some parts of Syria, while numerous weapons were still in the hands of unidentified assailants. Crimes such as robberies323 and murders continued.324 Minorities continued to face security threats,325 including abductions, disappearance and violent and sexual abuse targeting Alawite women.326 However, the reference period did not witness any waves of large-scale killings comparable to those of March or July 2025.327 Julien Barnes-Dacey, director of the MENA programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), noted that the transitional government’s ‘professional responses to security incidents have prevented new cycles of escalation’ and that communal relations too appeared ‘to be slowly improving on the ground’.328

In the northeast, open hostilities between government and SDF forces/Kurdish residents were reported in early October 2025 in Aleppo city’s Kurdish-majority districts of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh.329 These were followed by major clashes between the government and the SDF in January 2026 that resulted between around 250 and more than 300 fatalities across Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Hasaka,330 most of them combatants.331 However, these clashes did not descend into a prolonged armed conflict332 or uncontrolled violence as seen on the coast in March 2025. According to Barnes-Dacey, this reflected a more carefully led government military campaign and enhanced mechanisms of control within state forces.333 Following this temporary spike in violence in January, levels soon reverted to a downward trend.334

Meanwhile, Sweida was ‘sealed off’ from the rest of Syria as residents rallied to support Druze religious leader Hikmat al-Hijri335 and his calls for full independence from Damascus.336 The governorate remained locked in stalemate, with neither side able or willing to bring about a fundamental shift in the military situation on the ground.337 In one of the most intense escalations since the July 2025 ceasefire agreement, clashes erupted after ISC forces and affiliated tribal militias ambushed National Guard members on 19 March 2026, leading to a buildup of forces from both sides, while Israel conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian military infrastructure.338

ISIL activity significantly declined in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024,339 largely due to intense aerial operations by the US-led Global Coalition against ISIL and reduced recruitment appeal.340 However, the group continued a low-level insurgency over the following months,341 mostly targeting the SDF over the second half of 2025.342 In the reference period, ISIL re-emerged as a force of destabilisation.343 Since late November 2025 the group has expanded its focus to targeting the government military forces344 at an increased pace after the government joined the Global Coalition against ISIL.345 ISIL’s activities intensified after ISIL spokesperson Abu Hudhayfa Al-Ansari on 21 February 2026 called for confronting the transitional government346 in what he declared a ‘new phase of operations’.347 Its pace of attacks subsequently eased in early March but then intensified again348 before seeing a significant decline since late March/early April 2026.349

As of April 2026, security issues in eastern Syria (Deir Ez-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka) were mainly linked to ISIL activity.350 The group Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah, which had claimed a deadly attack on a church in Damascus in June 2025,351 again targeted civilians as it attacked a mosque in Homs City in December 2025, killing at least eight people.352 Meanwhile, counterterrorism operations by the US-led Global Coalition against ISIL intensified in October353 and notably during Operation Hawkeye Strike, launched in December 2025, under which strikes continued at least into February 2026.354 Government-led operations further led to the arrest of hundreds of ISIL suspects and the dismantling of dozens of cells since mid-2025.355

The situation in southern Syria remained volatile in the face of Israel’s military intervention in the region.356 Over the year 2025, Israel conducted 15 artillery attacks and 830 air raids, according to Enab Baladi.357 These air strikes targeted sites in Damascus City, Rural Damascus, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Daraa, and Sweida.358 The pace of Israeli patrols and operations increased in December 2025 when the IDF launched daily ground incursions and surveillance flights across Quneitra and Dar’a, while intermittently shelling areas along the border strip.359 The first months of 2026 saw significant numbers of security incidents arising in the context of IDF activities,360 especially in March 2026, when the IDF conducted more than 321 military operations, including 121 aerial actions.361 In a new development linked to the 2026 Iran war and Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel, Hezbollah forces reportedly fired artillery shells at positions of the new Syrian army in March 2026. Such instability along the border with Lebanon was deemed a threat to cities like Damascus, Tartous, and Homs.362

  • 300

    UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Response Priorities (January to December 2025), 24 July 2025, url, p. 20

  • 301

    International Crisis Group, Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, 26 November 2025, url, pp. 4-5

  • 302

    SJAC, The Syrian Government Must Investigate the Targeting of Alawite Civilians in Homs, 13 May 2025, url

  • 303

    New York Times (The), As People Are Abducted on Unpatrolled Streets, Syrians Demand Better Protection, 10 March 2025; Davis, H., Sectarian Violence Simmers in Homs, New Lines Magazine, 10 March 2025, url

  • 304

    International Crisis Group, A Helping Hand for Post-Assad Syria, 22 May 2025, url

  • 305

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 36-37

  • 306

    UN Human Rights Council, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria, A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, url, para. 32-36

  • 307

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 37

  • 308

    UN Human Rights Council, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria, A/HRC/61/CRP.7, A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, url, para. 48

  • 309

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 20

  • 310

    ISW and CTP, Iran Update, December 30, 2025, 30 December 2025, url

  • 311

    Etana Syria, Brief: Uneasy calm in Suwayda, 27 October 2025, url

  • 312

    UN Human Rights Council, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria, A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, url, para. 52

  • 313

    SOHR, Military escalation | Violent clashes erupt between “National Guards” and government forces in Al-Suwaidaa, 9 May 2026, url; New Arab (The), Clashes erupt in Suweida between Syrian forces and Druze militia, 4 May 2026, url; Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in south-west Syria, 8 April 2026, url; Belgium, CGRS-CEDOCA, Syrië: Veiligheidssituatie (ACLED), 31 March 2026, url, p. 29; Enab Baladi, Four killed in clashes between Syrian Interior Ministry forces and Suwayda factions, 23 December 2025, url

  • 314

    SOHR, Ceasefire violations | Five civilians injured in indiscriminate bombardment on Al-Suwaidaa city, 4 May 2026, url; UN Human Rights Council, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law violations committed during the July 2025 violence in Suwayda, Syria, A/HRC/61/CRP.7, 27 March 2026, url, para. 52

    Enab Baladi, Four killed in clashes between Syrian Interior Ministry forces and Suwayda factions, 23 December 2025, url

  • 315

    UN News, ‘Syria simply cannot withstand another wave of instability,’ Security Council hears, 17 June 2025, url; Etana Syria, Syria Update #25: 26 May 2025, 26 May 2025, url

  • 316

    UN News, ‘Syria simply cannot withstand another wave of instability,’ Security Council hears, 17 June 2025, url; International Crisis Group, Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, 26 November 2025, url, p. 4

  • 317

    SOHR, Amid subsiding violence in SDF-controlled areas | Six murder crimes documented in April, 30 April 2026, url; Arab Weekly (The), On second year of transition, Syria advances cautiously towards stability, 18 February 2026, url; MEI, Syria is stabilizing, but US help remains vital, 13 February 2026, url

  • 318

    UN Office of the Special Envoy for Syria, Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Claudio Cordone - Briefing to the Security Council, 22 April 2026, url

  • 319

    Al Jazeera, As Syria marks 15 years since anti-Assad uprising, security issues remain, 15 March 2026, url; Arab Weekly (The), On second year of transition, Syria advances cautiously towards stability, 18 February 2026, url; MEI, Syria’s Path Toward Stabilization — and How the US Can Help, 17 February 2026, url

  • 320

    Al Jazeera, Syria faces twin battles as Assad loyalists and ISIL attack in west, east, 25 February 2026, url

  • 321

    Al Jazeera, As Syria marks 15 years since anti-Assad uprising, security issues remain, 15 March 2026, url; Barnes-Dacey, J., A year after Assad: The search for Syria’s future [Commentary], ECFR, 4 March 2026, url

  • 322

    Etana Syria, Brief: Sectarian unrest in Al- Suqaylabiyeh, 7 April 2026, url

  • 323

    Al Jazeera, As Syria marks 15 years since anti-Assad uprising, security issues remain, 15 March 2026, url

  • 324

    SOHR, Amid subsiding violence in SDF-controlled areas | Six murder crimes documented in April, 30 April 2026, url

  • 325

    Barnes-Dacey, J., A year after Assad: The search for Syria’s future [Commentary], ECFR, 4 March 2026, url; Etana Syria, Brief: Sectarian unrest in Al- Suqaylabiyeh, 7 April 2026, url

  • 326

    New York Times (The), In Syria, Kidnappings of Women and Girls Fuel a Minority Group’s Fears, 3 April 2026; MEE, Syrian government understating kidnappings of Alawite women: Report, 4 April 2026, url

  • 327

    SNHR, The Killing of 268 Civilians in the First Quarter of 2026 in Syria, including 43 Children, 27 Women, and 1 person due to torture was Documented, 1 April 2026, url, p. 3; SNHR, The Death of 3666 Individuals Including 328 Children and 312 Women, and 32 Deaths due to Torture Recorded in the year 2025 in Syria, 1 January 2026, url, p. 8; SNHR, The Death of 73 Civilians Including 12 Children and Six Women, and Two Deaths due to Torture Recorded in November 2025, 1 December 2025, url, p. 2; SNHR, The Death of 66 Civilians Including Nine Children and Seven Women, and Three Deaths due to Torture Recorded in October 2025, 1 November 2025, url, p. 2

  • 328

    Barnes-Dacey, J., A year after Assad: The search for Syria’s future [Commentary], ECFR, 4 March 2026, url

  • 329

    Etana Syria, Brief: Ceasefire pauses SDF-Damascus fighting, 14 October 2025, url

  • 330

    EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Data Export Tool, Syria, data covering 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2026, as of 9 June 2026, url; MEI, Syria is stabilizing, but US help remains vital, 13 February 2026, url

  • 331

    MEI, Syria is stabilizing, but US help remains vital, 13 February 2026, url

  • 332

    Arab Weekly (The), On second year of transition, Syria advances cautiously towards stability, 18 February 2026, url

  • 333

    Barnes-Dacey, J., A year after Assad: The search for Syria’s future [Commentary], ECFR, 4 March 2026, url

  • 334

    Arab Weekly (The), On second year of transition, Syria advances cautiously towards stability, 18 February 2026, url

  • 335

    Guardian (The), A year after fall of Assad, a divided Syria struggles to escape cycle of violence, 8 December 2025, url

  • 336

    Enab Baladi, Al-Hijri insists on independence with Israeli guarantees, 13 January 2026, url; New Arab (The), Protection or partition? The future of Suweida and Syria's Druze, 22 January 2026, url

  • 337

    Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in Suwayda, 17 April 2026, url

  • 338

    Etana Syria, Brief: Clashes in western Suwayda, 28 March 2026, url

  • 339

    MEI, ISIS is on the ropes in Syria. A successful transition in Damascus could deliver a knockout blow, 14 April 2025, url; Etana Syria, Brief: SDF Agreement Stalls as ISIS Regroups, 30 April 2025, url

  • 340

    Etana Syria, Brief: SDF Agreement Stalls as ISIS Regroups, 30 April 2025, url

  • 341

    TWI, The Islamic State Attacks the New Syrian Government, 19 May 2025, url

  • 342

    UN Security Council, Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, url, para. 54

  • 343

    Asharq Al-Awsat, ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria, 22 April 2026, url

  • 344

    UN Security Council Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, url, para. 54

  • 345

    Zelin, A., Where ISIS is still active today, NPR, 19 December 2025, url

  • 346

    Enab Baladi, Islamic State claims attack in Aleppo as assaults escalate, 7 March 2026, url

  • 347

    Reuters, Islamic State claims two attacks on Syrian army, announces ‘new phase’ of operations, 21 February 2026, url

  • 348

    Asharq Al-Awsat, ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria, 22 April 2026, url

  • 349

    MEI, The Collapse of ISIS in Syria, 8 June 2026, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria, 22 April 2026, url

  • 350

    Health Cluster and WHO, Syria: Health Sector Bulletin - April 2026, 2 May 2026, url, p. 2

  • 351

    Le Monde, Syria: Little-known jihadist group claims Damascus church attack, 24 June 2025, url

  • 352

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 100

  • 353

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 22, 100

  • 354

    US, CENTCOM, U.S. Forces Continue Strikes on ISIS Targets in Syria, 14 February 2026, url; US, CENTCOM, U.S., Partner Forces Strike ISIS Targets in Syria, 10 January 2026, url

  • 355

    SANA, Syrian security forces arrest 12 ISIS members in eastern Syria, 15 March 2026, url; AA, Syria arrests 'ISIS terrorist cell' in Damascus countryside, 13 January 2026, url; SANA, Syria arrests ISIS military leader in joint security operation, 9 January 2026, url; UN Security Council, Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, url, para. 50

  • 356

    Helmi, K., After Assad, a New Uncertainty in Syria’s South, TIMEP, 26 March 2026, url; Kurdistan24, Israel Strikes Military Targets in Southern Syria Amid Calls for Demilitarization, 26 February 2025, url

  • 357

    Enab Baladi, Israel destabilizes southern Syria through incursions and land grabs, 7 December 2025, url

  • 358

    SNHR, The Fifteenth Annual Report on Human Rights Situation in Syria 2025, 26 March 2026, url, p. 13

  • 359

    Etana Syria, Brief: Israeli operations continue in south-west Syria, 3 February 2026, url

  • 360

    SARI Global, Southern Syria Under Pressure: Israeli Operations, Civilian Dynamics, and Emerging Risk Trajectories, 2 April 2026, url, p. 2

  • 361

    MEE, Smart borders, military gates and land seizures: How Israel is encroaching in southern Syria, 5 May 2026, url

  • 362

    CSIS, The War with Iran Threatens Syria’s Recovery [Commentary], 12 March 2026, url