The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), commanded by Mazloum Abdi,135 had an estimated strength of around 100 000 fighters as of early and mid-2025.136 By late January 2026, its strength was estimated at between 50 000 and 80 000 fighters.137 Territorial control by the SDF changed significantly over the reference period as large parts of SDF-controlled territory were captured by the transitional government forces in early 2026.138
A previous agreement reached between the SDF and the transitional government on 10 March 2025,139 providing for the full integration of the SDF into state institutions,140 was followed up by several steps of de-escalation and reintegration in April and May 2025.141 However, SDF units continued to be involved in recurrent incidents in Aleppo city’s Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud neighbourhoods (notably in a spike in clashes in October 2025)142 and in hostilities with the former SNA and Turkish forces around Ain Al-Arab (Kobane), Manbij, and along the Euphrates axis.143
In November 2025, ISW and CTP mapped control of the SDF as still encompassing large swathes in the northern and northeastern Syria, including eastern Aleppo, around half of Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor east of the Euphrates, and nearly all of Hasaka.144 In a major shift in conflict dynamics during the reference period, a government military operation, launched soon after the March 2025 agreement expired in December 2025, led to the capture of swathes of previously SDF-held territory.145 By 18 January 2026, the SDF had lost around 80 % of the territory it had held at the beginning of the month.146 As of February 2026, parts of eastern Aleppo, the previously SDF-held territories in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor, and much of Hasaka were under transitional government control.147 Particularly in Deir Ez-Zor, a governorate which has long witnessed tensions between Arab tribes and the SDF, Arab tribal fighters played a pivotal role in the SDF’s territorial collapse.148 These included Arab defectors from the SDF’s ranks such as the Al-Sanadid militia of the prominent Shammar tribe.149 Thus, as of the end of January 2026, the SDF’s territorial control was reduced to the border town of Ain Al-Arab (Kobane) and its surrounding countryside,150 and areas in the Kurdish heartlands151 around the cities of Hasaka, Qamishli152 and Al-Malikiya153 (Derik).154 As of late March 2026, by and large, this remained the territorial status quo, although SDF military units retreated from Ain Al-Arab (Kobane) following negotiations with the transitional government in February.155 For further details on the government operation that led to these territorial changes, see section 1.2.1. Syrian transitional government security forces above.
A series of ceasefire agreements were announced between 18 and 30 January, largely halting the clashes.156 The United States, which had previously relied on the SDF as its main partner in Syria, did not intervene militarily as they shifted towards backing the transitional government.157 While in a first ‘hastily’ concluded ceasefire deal on 18 January, the SDF agreed to an integration protocol that obliged it to fully abandon158 its demand to join as a bloc retaining its internal structures,159 the 30 January permanent ceasefire agreement included elements of compromise with the Kurdish position. While granting the SDF less than what it had demanded,160 the new integration protocol involved the integration of the SDF into the government army as four newly established brigades consisting of SDF fighters.161 These included three brigades – the Hasaka Brigade, Qamishli Brigade, and Al-Malikiya Brigade162 – set to form a new government army division in the northeast,163 as well as an Ain Al-Arab (Kobane)-specific brigade due to operate as part of an existing Aleppo division of the army.164 Simultaneously, the ceasefire agreement provided for the withdrawal of military units of both the government and the SDF from their frontlines in Hasaka governorate and for backfilling these positions with internal security units.165 The agreement also provided for the entry of the MoI’s ISC into the cities of Hasaka and Qamishli for a ‘specific period’ with the declared aim of securing these areas and assuming control over civilian and governance institutions.166 At the same time, Kurdish internal security forces (Asayish)167 were to make preparations to join the ranks of the Syrian security forces168 as they were set to operate as small government units in Hasaka and Ain Al-Arab (Kobane).169 Meanwhile, Kurdish demands for integration of the SDF-affiliated170 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) into the new military structures have so far not been recognised by the government171 on grounds that the army lacks a female component, although YPJ members were allowed to join law enforcement units under the MoI.172
As of April 2026, negotiations continued on a more technical level, with core debates revolving around future command structures, the rank of SDF officers within the army, and the future status of the Asayish. The transitional government continued to pressure for a centralised integration of SDF units, while the SDF sought to retain some of its autonomous command architecture.173 In early May, Syrian authorities announced that the four brigades had officially been integrated.174
On 20 January 2026, control of the Al-Hol camp, housing detainees with alleged family ties to ISIL fighters, was transferred from the SDF to the transitional government175 under ‘chaotic circumstances’ that prompted many residents to leave the camp and UNHCR to announce its closure on 23 February.176 According to the authorities, at least 120 detainees escaped in the process. Meanwhile, Roj camp, another facility holding alleged ISIL family members, remained under SDF control177 and apparently operational, although as of May 2026 there were government plans to close it down.178
According to SNHR, between October 2025 and March 2026, SDF members were involved in the killing of 71 civilians. No information was provided regarding the victims' profiles or the circumstances surrounding the incidents.179 Amid the January 2026 clashes, the SDF and the government traded accusations of extrajudicial killings.180
- 135
Security Council Report, May 2026 Monthly Forecast – Syria, 1 May 2026, url
- 136
GS, Comprehensive Military Comparison of Armed Forces in Syria, 14 July 2025, url; Enab Baladi, Damascus – SDF negotiations await the “deal”, 30 January 2025, url
- 137
Al Jazeera, Syrian forces make gains against SDF: What it means for country’s Kurds, 21 January 2026, url
- 138
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 21, Annex I, p. 39
- 139
Amnesty International, The State of the World's Human Rights, 21 April 2026, url, p. 346
- 140
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 21
- 141
BBC Monitoring, Hundreds of Syrian SDF fighters leave Aleppo after deal, 10 April 2025, url; Al-Ahmed, S., The Damascus-SDF agreement two months on: Fragile progress or delayed collapse?, MEI, 9 May 2025, url
- 142
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, Annex I, pp. 40-41; Etana Syria, Brief: Ceasefire pauses SDF-Damascus fighting, 14 October 2025, url
- 143
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 90
- 144
ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria November 10, 2025 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 10 November 2025, url
- 145
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 21
- 146
Aftandilian, G., The Shrinking Space for Kurdish Autonomy in Syria, Arab Center Washington DC, 26 February 2026, url
- 147
ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url
- 148
Etana Syria, Brief: Raqqa, Deir Ezzor fall to interim authorities, 21 January 2026, url
- 149
IISS, Ceasefire in Syria: a challenging outlook, 18 February 2026, url
- 150
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, Annex II, p. 45; ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url; Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Progress & Challenges in SDF Integration, 28 March 2026, url
- 151
Rodgers, W.M., What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, Chatham House, 10 February 2026, url
- 152
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, Annex II, p. 45; ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url; Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Progress & Challenges in SDF Integration, 28 March 2026, url; Aftandilian, G., The Shrinking Space for Kurdish Autonomy in Syria, Arab Center Washington DC, 26 February 2026, url; Rodgers, W.M., What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, Chatham House, 10 February 2026, url
- 153
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, Annex II, pp. 44-45; ISW and CTP, Assessed Control of Terrain in Syria, February 16, 2026 at 2:00 PM ET [Map], 16 February 2026, url; Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Progress & Challenges in SDF Integration, 28 March 2026, url
- 154
SOHR, Al-Hasakah | The administration of Roj camp hands over four women and nine children of Australian nationality to Australian delegation, 25 April 2026, url
- 155
Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Progress & Challenges in SDF Integration, 28 March 2026, url
- 156
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 21
- 157
AP, A US shift marked Kurdish-led forces’ fall from power in Syria, 21 January 2026, url
- 158
Rodgers, W.M., What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, Chatham House, 10 February 2026, url
- 159
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 160
Rodgers, W.M., What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, Chatham House, 10 February 2026, url
- 161
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 162
Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Progress & Challenges in SDF Integration, 28 March 2026, url; ISW and CTP, Iran Update, February 17, 2026, 17 February 2026, url
- 163
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 164
Rodgers, W.M., What recent developments in Syria mean for the Kurds, Chatham House, 10 February 2026, url; ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 165
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, February 17, 2026, 17 February 2026, url
- 166
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 167
Etana Syria, ANALYSIS: Opportunities & challenges in integrating north-east Syria, 12 March 2026, url
- 168
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 30, 2026, 30 January 2026, url
- 169
IISS, Ceasefire in Syria: a challenging outlook, 18 February 2026, url
- 170
Enab Baladi, Despite government deal, YPJ refuses to lay down arms, 3 February 2026, url
- 171
Shafaq News, Kurdish women's force demands integration into Syria's new army, 1 June 2026, url; SOHR, For second consecutive day | Residents stage protest in Al-Hasakah, demanding YPJ integration into the Syrian army, 13 May 2026, url; Kurdish Peace Institute, YPJ Integration: What are the Obstacles, 26 February 2026, url
- 172
Shafaq News, Kurdish women's force demands integration into Syria's new army, 1 June 2026, url
- 173
Etana Syria, Brief: Recent developments in north-east Syria, 13 April 2026, url
- 174
Enab Baladi, Hamo: Four SDF Brigades Join Defense Ministry, 2 May 2026, url
- 175
HRW, Syria: Civilian Protection Lacking in Northeast Escalation, 25 January 2026, url
- 176
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/61/62, 12 March 2026, url, para. 98
- 177
HRW, Syria: Civilian Protection Lacking in Northeast Escalation, 25 January 2026, url
- 178
Arab News, Why Britain still wrestles with repatriating Daesh-linked families from detention camps in Syria, 18 May 2026, url
- 179
SNHR, The Killing of 268 Civilians in the First Quarter of 2026 in Syria, including 43 Children, 27 Women, and 1 person due to torture was Documented, 1 April 2026, url, p. 4; SNHR, The Death of 3666 Individuals Including 328 Children and 312 Women, and 32 Deaths due to Torture Recorded in the year 2025 in Syria, 1 January 2026, url, p. 9; SNHR, The Death of 73 Civilians Including 12 Children and Six Women, and Two Deaths due to Torture Recorded in November 2025, 1 December 2025, url, p. 2; SNHR, The Death of 66 Civilians Including Nine Children and Seven Women, and Three Deaths due to Torture Recorded in October 2025, 1 November 2025, url, p. 2
- 180
HRW, Syria: Civilian Protection Lacking in Northeast Escalation, 25 January 2026, url