4.2.4. Sindh

Sindh province is located in southeastern Pakistan884 and shares internal borders with Balochistan to the west and north and Punjab to the northeast.885 Externally, the province shares borders with India to the east886 and the Arabian Sea to the south.887 Sindh is comprised of 6 divisions and 30 districts,888 with the port city889 of Karachi serving as provincial capital.890 The administrative division of Karachi had a population of 20.4 million, according to the 7th Population & Housing Census of Pakistan of 2023, whereas the total population of Sindh was 55.7 million.891

At least 16 distinct languages were spoken in the province. Sindhi was the predominant language, followed by Urdu, Pashto and Punjab.892 Other major indigenous languages – apart from Sindh - included Seraiki and Balochi.893 Regarding religious composition,894 approximately 90 % of Sindh’s population was Muslim, numbering about 50.1 million people, while 6.4 % was Hindu.895 According to another source, Sindh’s Hindu population was at 8.8 %, making Sindh the province with the highest proportion of Pakistan’s Hindu population.896 According to the 2023 census, 2.4 % of the population belonged to scheduled castes and around 1 % was Christian, while smaller proportions of Ahmadis, Sikhs, and Parsis were also recorded.897

Sindh plays a significant role in Pakistan’s economic development. Karachi, the country’s largest port city, serves as financial hub, generating substantial revenues. The province hosts textile units, sugar mills, pulp and paper mills, and processes edible oil. Sindh accounts for 44 % of total large-scale industrial capacity and has a well-developed agricultural base supported by the Indus irrigation system. In addition, the province has the Thar coalfield, one of the world’s largest coal reserves, with significant potential for power generation.898 Sindh is part of China’s CPEC initiative, including the development of energy infrastructure projects,899 and industrial hubs such as the Dhabeji Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Karachi’s ports.900

According to PICSS, the security situation in Sindh province in 2025 remained characterised by sporadic and low-level incidents, despite a slight increase in militant attacks compared to the previous year. While Karachi continued to be the district most affected by militant attacks, a limited number of attacks was also recorded across the country in Shikarpur, Qambar Shahdadkot, Jacobabad, Sukkur, Ghotki, Dadu, Hyderabad, and Badin districts.901 PIPS named the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), the Baloch insurgent groups BLF and BRG, as well as the religiously motivated groups TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) as the main armed groups involved in militant attacks across the province.902 In its 2025 report, PICSS also mentioned the presence of BLA and of actors linked to transnational networks such as Al Qaeda as well as the growing presence of the Iran-linked Al-Zainabiyoun Brigade.903

The SRA claimed responsibility for at least 15 attacks in 2024, targeting predominantly security forces, suspected collaborators with the state and infrastructure, according to PICSS. Nevertheless, the source described the SRA’s operational capabilities as limited compared to other militant groups operating in Pakistan.904 Similarly, in 2025, the group’s activities were characterised by infrequent small attacks against targets perceived as external and/or state-linked,905 such as Punjabi workers or National Logistics Corporation (NLC) oil tankers,906 claiming that the state was exploiting Sindh’s natural resources to the detriment of the local population,907 and Punjab’s advantage.908 PICSS noted, however, that SRA was not only a Sindh separatist group but, through its membership in BRAS, part of the larger network of Baloch insurgent groups. Given BRAS’ opposition to Chinese investment in the region, this alliance held the possibility of an extension of attacks on China-related infrastructure from Balochistan province into Sindh province, according to PICSS.909

Baloch insurgent groups were responsible for several attacks in Sindh province during the reference period, including BLF and BRG. BLF claimed responsibility for one attack in Karachi in 2025 (specifically, an attack on a police station in January 2025910), while BRG was linked to three attacks on railway tracks in Jacobabad and Shikarpur,911 including in June,912 October,913 and December 2025,914 as well as January 2026.915 BRG also claimed responsibility for attacks on oil pipelines running through Sindh,916 and attacks targeting police officers.917 PIPS noted that BRG’s claims of operations inside Sindh and its recruitment attempts in Karachi and Sindh province, indicated the group’s desire to extend the conflict into other provinces.918 In January 2026, the Sindh Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) reportedly seized a large quantity of explosives in Karachi and arrested several individuals allegedly associated with BLA.919 The Balochistan Pulse quoted security officials saying that Karachi was turning into a ‘fallback target’ for banned groups experiencing setbacks in Balochistan.920

The TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) groups were involved in eight attacks in Karachi in 2025, resulting in civilian casualties, according to PIPS,921 reflecting the TTP’s re-emergence in Karachi,922 and its increasing expansion into other provinces beyond its main base of KP.923 PICSS notes that the number of attacks did not identify Sindh as a primary theatre but showed the group’s intent to have a nationwide presence.924 Dawn noted in September 2025 that an ongoing investigation into the killings of police officers in Karachi in 2025 pointed to the presence of the TTP in the city.925

Sources also mentioned sectarian violence in Sindh province during the reference period,926 such as attacks on members of the Ahmadi minority,927 and the religiopolitical ASWJ group.928

In terms of state actors, media sources reported several arrests made by the Sindh CTD of suspected members of armed groups, including SRA,929 BLA,930 TTP,931 and the Zainabiyoun Brigade.932

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) noted in its state of human rights report for 2024 that enforced disappearances ‘continued unabated’ during 2024, with 44 new complaints recorded that year, according to official data.933 In its 2025 annual report, HRCP recorded 28 cases of enforced disappearance in Sindh.934 According to data by the Baloch civil rights movement BYC, 18 persons of Baloch descent were forcibly disappeared in Karachi in the period January - June 2025.935 Voice of Missing Persons of Sindh (VMPS) recorded 40 cases in the same period. According to a joint statement by several human rights organisations, among them BYC and VMPS, authorities ‘routinely’ used enforced disappearances to target dissidents and human rights defenders.936

Security incidents

PICSS recorded 34 militant attacks in 2025, compared to 24 in 2024. Karachi remained the district most affected by militant attacks, with 24 attacks recorded in 2025.937 In comparison, PIPS recorded 12 militant attacks in 2024 and 21 incidents in 2025, including 16 in Karachi.938

Ten people were killed and more than 30 injured when security forces opened fire on pro-Iranian protesters attacking the US consulate in Karachi in March 2026.939

At least seven people were injured and four coaches of the Jaffar Express passenger train derailed in an IED explosion near the Sultan Kot railway station in Shikarpur District in October 2025.940 The BRG reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was targeting soldiers travelling on the train and that some of them had been killed or injured. As of October 2025, that claim remained to be confirmed by the authorities, according to the Balochistan Post.941

Several Punjab settlers were reportedly injured in a shooting attack on a passenger train near Guddu Chowk in the Hussainabad area of Hyderabad district in April 2025. The SRA claimed responsibility for the attack.942

At least four people were killed and one injured in a shooting incident in the Faqira Goth area in Karachi in August 2025. TTP reportedly released a statement later the same day claiming responsibility for the attack.943

In April 2025, an Ahmadi man was reportedly killed by a group of Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) workers who were attacking an Ahmadi place of worship to prevent the community from holding Friday prayers. The Ahmadi man was filming the protest when the group turned against him and started beating him, leading to his death.944 TLP is a Sunni Muslim far-right political party known for violent protests focusing on (perceived) blasphemy.945 The party was banned in October 2025, following violent clashes between TLP followers and the police.946

From 1 November 2024 to 24 April 2026, ACLED reported 216 security incidents in Sindh: 28 were coded as battles, 25 as explosions/remote violence and 163 as incidents of violence against civilians.947 Karachi city registered the highest number of security incidents, the majority of which were recorded as violence against civilians (88).948

Figure 6: Evolution of security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in Sindh province between 1 November 2024 and 24 April 2026, based on ACLED data949

Fatalities

From 1 November 2024 to 24 April 2026 ACLED reported 137 fatalities.950

Civilian casualties

According to PICSS, 18 civilians were killed in militant incidents in 2025, and 11 injured. Most of these civilian victims were recorded in Karachi, with 14 dead and 7 injured.951 In comparison, in 2024, the number of civilian victims had been slightly lower, with 14 civilians killed and 23 injured, all in Karachi.952

Impact on infrastructure

Attacks on railway lines in Sindh province led to the derailment of several train coaches,953 and to a temporary suspension of railway operations due to damaged tracks.954 PICSS pointed to SRA’s tendency to attack ‘state-linked logistics’ such as NLC oil tankers,955 and damaging vehicles.956

Displacement and return

HRCP noted in January 2025 that many Hindu communities in Sindh province felt compelled to migrate abroad due to discrimination, violence, extortion by criminal gangs, and Hindu women’s vulnerability to abduction, forced conversion and underage marriage.957