4. Security situation

4.1. General description of the security situation

For information on the security situation between October 2023 and October 2024, see section 4 of the EUAA COI report: Pakistan – Country Focus (December 2024).

The three Pakistani think tanks, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) and the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) all reported a noticeable surge in militant violence493 in the reference period.494 According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI),495 Pakistan was the second-most terrorism-affected country of 163 countries in 2024496 and – for the first time since the index’s inception in 2007497 – the most terrorism-affected country in 2025.498 PICSS reported that the militancy reasserted itself as the number one driver of insecurity in 2025, with an increase in scale and lethality, as well as an intensified state response.499 For detailed information on the surge in militant violence since November 2024, including separatist and sectarian violence and involved actors, see section 4.1.1. Surge in militant violence since November 2024.

In March 2025, the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore (ISAS/NUS) reported that Pakistan was facing ‘an increasingly volatile security situation’, exacerbated by economic turmoil and ongoing political instability.500 Political scientist Amira Jadoon characterised this security challenge in an October 2025 commentary published by the Hudson Institute as being ‘of multi-front nature’.501 Sources noted that the security situation deteriorated significantly in 2025, marking it as one of the most violent years in nearly a decade.502 CRSS reported a 67 % increase in overall violence in 2024 followed by a 34 % increase in 2025 resulting from 1 272 violent incidents.503 PIPS recorded overall 785 conflict-related violence incidents in 2024, including 521 militant attacks and 158 anti-militant state security operations.504 In 2025, PIPS reported a total of 1 124 conflict-related incidents, a 43 % increase over 2024, including 699 militant attacks and 259 security operations. This rise is attributed to a surge in terrorist attacks, counter-terrorism operations, and increased abductions and border incidents.505 PICSS recorded a 29 % increase in violent incidents in 2025 (1 548 incidents) compared to 2024.506

PICSS saw a 75 % increase in overall fatalities (3 413),507 including 580 civilians,508 with 534 due to militant attacks and the rest from security operations, 2 138 militants, 667 members of the security forces as well as 28 members of pro-government armed militias (PGR).509 Compared to 2024 (468 civilian fatalities), this amounts to a 24 % rise and is the highest figure since 2015 (642 civilian fatalities). Similarly, civilian injuries rose by 40 % from 2024 (701) to 2025 (983).510 PIPS saw an increase of around 53 % in overall conflict-related fatalities in 2025 (2 985), compared to 2024 (1 950). The 2025 figure includes 488 civilian fatalities, equalling – contrary to the PICCS analysis – a decrease of 15 % compared to 577 civilians killed in 2024. Overall, 1 034 militancy-related fatalities in 2025, reflecting a 21 % increase compared to 2024, comprised 354 civilians and 437 security and law enforcement personnel.511 CRSS observed a decrease in civilian deaths by over 24 % (707 deaths) and of security personnel fatalities by over 5 % (650 deaths) in 2025 compared to 2024. Amid intensified security operations, 2025 was the year where civilian and security personnel deaths combined did not represent most overall fatalities and the highest number of militants (2060) was killed since 2015.512 According to PICSS, 2025 was also the year with the highest number of annual security personnel fatalities (667) since 2011, marking a 26 % rise since 2024 (528).513

CRSS reported November 2024 as the year’s deadliest month,514 while PICSS noted that March 2025 showed a surge in militant attacks and had the highest number of injuries. August exhibited the greatest attack frequency. The report noted a historical trend of reduced attacks in December, although the final quarter of 2025 did not show a consistent decline in violence.515 CRSS reported a significant drop in cross-border terrorist incidents of 9 % in November and nearly 17 % in December. The source linked this decline to the closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on 11 October 2025516

Violence mainly concentrated in Balochistan and KP517 provinces,518 with both accounting for more than 93 % of violent incidents and 96 % of all fatalities in 2025, according to CRSS,519 and the southern and tribal districts of KP particularly affected.520 KP saw the highest surge in violence. The province accounted for 63 % of violence-related incidents in the country and over 82 % of the net national rise of fatalities, marking a rise in violence of almost 44 % from 2024 to 2025. Balochistan province accounted for more than 30 % of countrywide violence-related incidents and recorded the highest number of overall fatalities in 2025 (956 fatalities or 28 % of overall fatalities).521 For detailed information regarding the security situation in the individual provinces, see section 4.2.1. Balochistan.

Pakistan’s claim that the Afghan de facto government harboured groups such as the TTP522 and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)523 were reportedly central to the ongoing tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban,524 which escalated in October 2025525 and again in late February 2026.526 As part of this new escalation, characterised as an ‘open war’,527 Pakistan carried out air and ground strikes targeting the Afghan Taliban and the TTP in Afghanistan, and the Taliban de facto government responded in turn.528 The UN reported serious impacts on civilian populations,529 including as a result of an airstrike in March on a drug rehabilitation facility in Kabul, which killed over 400 people, according to the Taliban de facto authorities.530 After a temporary ceasefire in mid-March 2026, as of the month’s end, exchanges of fire continued on both sides.531 However, PICSS reported ‘no major escalation’ thereafter.532

For detailed information on Pakistan’s relationship to its neighbouring countries, see section 2.2. Regional context.

For information on sectarian tensions in Kurram district during the reporting period, see section 4.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).