Under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, civic space313 and media freedom were severely restricted in practice despite formal constitutional guarantees.314 Journalists in government-controlled areas were subjected to censorship, arbitrary detention, torture and deaths in custody, while media outlets were required to obtain approval from the MoI. Media ownership was closely linked to regime-affiliated actors. In areas controlled by other groups, local media reportedly faced pressure to align with dominant armed factions.315

The first months following the fall of Assad were described as a period of ‘permissive civic atmosphere’,316 during which civil society activity re-emerged and newly established independent media registered and opened offices across the country.317 This was also reflected in a pledge by the Minister of Information in January 2025 to work towards a ‘free press’,318 as well as in Article 13 of the Constitutional Declaration, which explicitly guarantees freedom of opinion, expression, information and publication.319 Freedom of the press was reported to have improved significantly, as the government ended pre-publication review requirements, lifted censorship measures, and suspended restrictive media laws inherited from the former government.320 Exiled Syrian journalists and foreign reporters were also able to return and report from within the country,321 including on abuses committed under the former regime.322

Following the violence in the coastal areas (March 2025) and Sweida (July 2025), authorities began to reassert control over civic space,323 particularly in relation to activities not aligned with their priorities.324 In February 2026, the Ministry of Information launched the Professional and Ethical Code of Conduct for the media sector, describing it as a comprehensive framework for regulating journalistic work. The code prompted criticism from journalists, who argued that professional codes of conduct should be developed by independent syndicates rather than by government bodies.325 Moreover, the gains achieved during the transition were undermined by limited structural and legislative reforms.326 The media sector continued to operate under repressive legal frameworks developed under the previous regime, which enabled extensive state control327 and remained in force.328 Protections guaranteed under the Constitutional Declaration were subject to broad restrictions on grounds such as public order, morality, and national security.329 At the same time, the collapse of the former regime created a legal vacuum and left civic space largely unregulated,330 exposing the media landscape to manipulation, whether through direct political exploitation or more informal pressure from emerging centres of power.331

Several confidential sources interviewed by the Netherlands MFA in September 2025 indicated that journalists were required to register with the Ministry of Information and were not always granted permission to report on certain events.332 Restrictions reportedly included denial of access to the Druze-controlled areas of Sweida.333 Journalists who had worked in the former HTS-controlled area of Idlib generally enjoyed greater access to information than other journalists.334 However, despite these constraints, Haid Haid assessed that freedom of expression for journalists has remained relatively noticeable throughout the period, although experiences may differ between Syrians and non-Syrians, since foreign journalists could face administrative restrictions, such as difficulties in obtaining visas. 335

Over the reference period there were reports of journalists being briefly detained by transitional government for ‘inciting sectarian strife’,336 criticising the attacks on the Alawite community, including the abduction of Alawite women and girls,337 or in the context of the government reasserting control over former SDF-controlled areas.338 One source also reported incidents in which journalists were arrested at checkpoints, subjected to ill-treatment, and released shortly thereafter without their families being informed of their whereabouts or being provided access to legal assistance. Such incidents were generally characterised by the authorities as isolated cases or misunderstandings. In many instances, the Ministry of Information reportedly intervened when journalists had been arrested by internal security forces.339 SNHR noted that short detentions of activists or journalists who criticised the government have been documented, consistent with the imposition of actual restrictions on opposition without reaching the threshold of formal criminalisation.340

In January 2026, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported on the arrest of three journalists in Aleppo following the reassertion of government control and restrictions on independent reporting. The journalists were eventually released after a couple of hours.341 Journalists Eva Maria Michelmann and Ahmed Polad, a German and a Kurdish-Turkish journalist working for an Istanbul-based News Agency and TV, were arrested in January 2026, during the takeover of Raqqa. In April, Syrian authorities confirmed that the German journalist was detained in Damascus, while, according to information shared by Free Media Union in northeast Syria, Polad is being held in a detention facility in the northern city of Aleppo.342 Authorities stated that the two journalists were found at an SDF security headquarters, had refused to identify themselves or disclose their professional role, and were not carrying official documentation.343

Several sources interviewed by DIS indicated that incidents of detention and harassment of journalists appeared to be isolated rather than systematic.344 Some detentions were attributed to the low professional standards of local security actors rather than to a coordinated government policy.345 Journalists who had previously worked for the former government's state media had not been subjected to kidnappings or targeted killings, although some had reportedly experienced verbal confrontations.346

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 45 journalists and media workers missing or believed to be held hostage under Assad rule remain unaccounted for. Although the new Syrian government has pledged to investigate their fate, as of December 2025, no information regarding their whereabouts has been made public.347

  • 313

    AI, The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025, 21 April 2026, url

  • 314

    RSF, Syria, n.d., url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Syria, 19 May 2025, url

  • 315

    RSF, Syria, n.d., url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Syria, 19 May 2025, url

  • 316

    Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 17

  • 317

    AI, The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025, 21 April 2026, url

  • 318

    RSF, RSF calls on Syria’s new authorities to adopt seven priority measures in line with their promises to safeguard press freedom, 7 January 2025, url; Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 15

  • 319

    Syria, Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic, 13 March 2025, url; HRW, Syria: Constitutional Declaration Risks Endangering Rights, 25 March 2025, url

  • 320

    CPJ, A Year After Assad’s Fall, Syrian Journalists Enjoy Freedom but also New Risks, 5 December 2025, url

  • 321

    Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 – Syria, 19 May 2025, url

  • 322

    RSF, Syria, n.d., url

  • 323

    Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 20

  • 324

    Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 17

  • 325

    Syrian Observer, Syria launches professional code of conduct for media sector, 16 February 2026, url

  • 326

    Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 15

  • 327

    SNHR, The Role of Journalism in the Transitional Justice Process in Syria after Years of Repression and Intimidation, 30 October 2025, url

  • 328

    AI, The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025, 21 April 2026, url; Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 15; Lugarit, Redefining Civic Boundaries, Exploring New Regula1ons and Challenges for NGO Registra1on in Post-Assad Syria, Policy Paper, Allaji O. A., Masri H., 8 April 2025, accessible through subscription, url

  • 329

    Al Majalla, Syria's civic space opens...but not for everyone, 19 February 2026, url

  • 330

    Arab Reform Initiative, Syria’s expanding but fragile civic space: Opportunities and risks in the Post-Assad’s transition, December 2025, url, p. 20

  • 331

    SNHR, The Role of Journalism in the Transitional Justice Process in Syria after Years of Repression and Intimidation, 30 October 2025, url, p. 8

  • 332

    Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, January 2026, url, p. 123

  • 333

    New York Times (The), After weeks of sectarian clashes in Syria, an uneasy truce takes hold, 6 August 2025, url; IFJ, Syria: One journalist killed, several attacked amid clashes in Sweida, 8 August 2025, url

  • 334

    Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, January 2026, url, p. 123

  • 335

    Haid Haid, online interview with EUAA, 28 April 2026

  • 336

    Syrian Observer (The), Damascus Solicitor orders release of Syrian journalist Iyad Sharbaji, 16 December 2025, url; Welat, Syrian Security Detains Journalist in Damascus After His Return from the United States, 15 December 2025, url

  • 337

    AI, The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025, 21 April 2026, url; New Arab (The), Syrian journalist Noor Suleiman released after arrest in Damascus, 30 July 2025, url

  • 338

    CPJ, Journalists detained, barred in Syria as government regains Aleppo areas, 12 January 2026, url

  • 339

    Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, January 2026, url, p. 123

  • 340

    SNHR, email correspondence with EUAA, 26 May 2026

  • 341

    CPJ, Journalists detained, barred in Syria as government regains Aleppo areas, 12 January 2026, url

  • 342

    CPJ, CPJ demands transparency as German reporter confirmed detained in Syria, 27 April 2026, url

  • 343

    AP, Syrian government confirms detention of missing German journalist, 30 April 2026, url

  • 344

    DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of certain groups, December 2025, url, p. 13

  • 345

    DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of certain groups, December 2025, url, p. 13

  • 346

    DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of certain groups, December 2025, url, p. 13

  • 347

    RSF, Portraits of 45 Syrian journalists held hostage or missing under Bashar al-Assad — and whose fates remain unknown, 8 December 2025, url