1.4.2. Capacity and effectiveness of the judiciary

According to several sources, the legal system has functioned poorly following the fall of Assad. Many judges who served under the previous regime were dismissed and replaced by new appointees, some of whom had worked in Idlib and were trained primarily in Islamic jurisprudence rather than Syrian civil law, and in some cases reportedly lacked formal law degrees.141 A lawyer in Damascus interviewed by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) assessed that, while the conduct of judges became more courteous and service-oriented, corruption and bribery remain widespread, reportedly driven in part by extremely low salaries that do not cover basic living costs.142

The authorities stated that the judiciary was operating nationwide despite ongoing challenges143 but it remained overstretched.144 The Ministry of Justice acknowledges a significant backlog of cases and slow judicial proceedings.145 For instance, in Homs, the central court reportedly handles nearly 2 000 administrative cases per month, including matters such as property transfers and civil status documentation while several sub-courts in the countryside remain damaged or only partially operational.146 Court infrastructure in cities such as Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor, Idlib and Homs suffered extensive damage or destruction during the conflict, while judicial and documentation records, including case files, judgments and property records, were disrupted, destroyed or looted across large parts of the country.147 The Ministry of Justice has been training a new cohort of judges and lawyers throughout the second half of 2025, with the first group expected to graduate in early 2026.148

Although some courts have resumed operations including criminal courts,149 many files remained suspended as of December 2025, particularly those related to smuggling or violations committed under the former regime.150

Detention without judicial warrants persists,151 and referral to the public prosecution remain subject to delay.152 Judicial, security and police entities continue to restrict visitation, attendance, and legal representation despite the political changes.153 At times, detainees are not informed of the reason for their arrest.154 In many instances, it is not possible for witnesses to determine whether an individual is formally arrested or merely held for further investigation and later release. Detainees often disappear into the prison system, with families unable to verify their location or well-being,155 while information on due process, detainees’ legal status, and the conduct of justice proceedings remains limited.156

A lawyer interviewed by the independent Syrian media organisation Enab Baladi claimed that detention during investigation can extend to three months with no clarity on procedures or legal fate. Lawyers are reportedly not permitted to attend interrogations conducted in security branches until detainees are transferred to court. They are also barred from obtaining power of attorney from detainees (especially those labelled as ‘remnants’ of former regime and held in military police and political security prisons) and denied visitation.157

  • 141

    Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: General Country of Origin Information Report on Syria, January 2026, url, p. 128; SE, Swedish Migration Agency, Syrien Säkerhet och skydd i områden under de facto-myndigheternas control [Syria Security and protection in areas under the control of the de facto authorities], 11 November 2025, url, p. 13

  • 142

    DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, December 2025, url, p. 89 [lawyer in Damascus]

  • 143

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url

  • 144

    Hamilton, R., Neistat, A., Transitional Justice in Syria: Domestic-Led Accountability Efforts Cannot Function in Isolation, Just Security, 30 March 2026, url

  • 145

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url

  • 146

    Waters, G., Why Syria’s government must turn inward in 2026, Atlantic Council, 29 January 2026, url

  • 147

    SNHR, email correspondence with EUAA, 26 May 2026

  • 148

    Waters, G., Why Syria’s government must turn inward in 2026, Atlantic Council, 29 January 2026, url

  • 149

    SJAC, A Roadmap for Transitional Justice in Syria – September 2025, 24 September 2025, url

  • 150

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url

  • 151

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 46; Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url;

  • 152

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url; SNHR, email correspondence with EUAA, 26 May 2026

  • 153

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url

  • 154

    DK, DIS, Syria, Situation of Certain Groups, December 2025, url, p. 98 [SNHR]; Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 46

  • 155

    Waters, G., Koontz, K., Syria’s Unclear Settlement Process Risks Fanning Discontent Among Ex-Regime Soldiers, 9 March 2026, New Lines Institute, url

  • 156

    SJAC, Introducing SJAC’s Arrests Tracker: Monitoring Detention and Criminal Justice Proceedings to Support Transitional Justice, 9 April 2026, url; SNHR, email correspondence with EUAA, 26 May 2026

  • 157

    Syrian Observer (The), Unlawful Detention in Transitional Syria: A System in Disarray, 22 December 2025, url