2.2. Individuals opposing or perceived to be opposing the Transitional Government

2.2.1. Political opposition

Upon taking power, the interim president issued a decree dissolving all political parties in Syria, including the Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party, the Arab Socialist Union, and historic leftist and nationalist parties.273 The transitional government does not formally criminalise political opposition274 and has not officially labelled individuals as political opponents.275 Although many political opponents remained in Syria, no framework exists for political party registration in areas controlled by the transitional government. Consequently, parties were unable to participate in the October 2025 indirect parliamentary elections276 or to operate as structured political opposition.277

The are no active political parties due to the absence of legislation regulating party activity278, which cannot be enacted while the legislative council, despite partially elected membership since November 2025, remains inactive.279 The General Secretariat for Political Affairs (GSPA) was established in March 2025 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates with the aim of managing political activities and restructuring the political landscape.280 According to analysts, the GSPA headed by Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani has filled the vacuum left by the Ba’ath Party281 by repurposing its assets and structures, raising concerns that it may act as a de facto successor, controlling the political sphere and key institutions under a new framework.282 In early May 2026, the GSPA was reportedly dissolved and its staff integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries.283

According to Bassam Alahmad, the co-founder and executive director of the NGO Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), there is no organised opposition political movement against the government. Rather, criticism and opposition are primarily expressed by individual activists, civil society organisations, and media outlets. In the source’s assessment, the transitional government regards members of minority communities who do not support the authorities, including Druze, Alawites, Kurds, and Christians, as political opponents. As evidence, the source mentioned the involvement of security forces in violations against Alawites in the coastal areas in March 2025, against Druze in Sweida in July 2025, and against Kurds during the government takeover of former SDF-controlled territories in January 2026.284 The source also referred to the alleged failure of security forces to prevent, and their reported participation in, attacks carried out by members of the Sunni community against Christians in Al-Suqaylabiyah (Hama governorate) in March 2026.285