Upon assuming power, the transitional government announced the dissolution of the former regime’s army and security agencies,61 including the police force.62 At the same time, it initiated the formation of a new unified Syrian army through the integration of former opposition factions63 as well as building a new police force through rapid recruitment drives.64
Security operations are managed by both the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI).65 The MoD manages the Syrian Armed Forces66, and is tasked with overseeing conventional military operations.67 The December 2024 agreement to dissolve former opposition factions and integrate them into the MoD was framed as ending militia rule, but in practice groups were largely absorbed intact, retaining their command structures. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) described this arrangement as ‘reflagging’ rather than genuine dissolution. It has resulted in uneven discipline and weak command and control, with factions, particularly Turkish-backed SNA groups, remaining formally subordinate while maintaining significant autonomy.68 As of September 2025, the new Syrian army was estimated to comprise 20 active divisions; however, the transitional government’s aim of having 10 000 troops per division was assessed by ISW as unfeasible to sustain in the near term.69 HTS and SNA factions constitute much of the new Syrian army’s officer corps and manpower.70
On 30 January 2026, the transitional government and SDF agreed on the establishing of a new army division comprising three SDF brigades and a Kobane/Ayn al-Arab brigade within an unspecified division in Aleppo governorate,71 alongside additional brigades that would operate jointly across the northeast.72 In early May, it was announced that four SDF brigades had officially been integrated.73
The MoI oversees security forces tasked with law enforcement functions,74 including the civil police force75 and the General Security Service76 (GSS, known as Internal Security Forces - ISF from 25 May 2025),77 which was the main policing force of HTS in northwestern Syria, and since the overthrow of Assad became the transitional government’s gendarmerie.78 The MoI’s two armed branches, the GSS (ISF) and the civil police, are largely composed of Sunnis, primarily former opposition fighters and personnel who had served in the opposition administration in Idlib prior to Assad’s fall.79 The GSS (ISF) draws heavily from the former HTS forces in Idlib80 although it has also expanded with large numbers of new recruits.81 New recruits reportedly initially underwent two weeks of training.82 In early November 2025, an MoI spokesperson stated that ‘tens of thousands’ had joined the GSS (ISF), expanding it far beyond its original 8 000 personnel, though authorities indicated the force still needs to triple in size.83 As part of the agreement to integrate SDF-controlled civilian and military structures into the Syrian state, the SDF-affiliated internal security forces - Asayish are envisaged to join the MoI.84 In early June, authorities announced that more than 9 000 Asayish members, including 1 000 women, would undergo interviews as part of the process of integration into the state security forces in Hasaka governorate.85
Prominent HTS figures have been appointed as Minister of Defence,86 Minister of Interior and head of the General Intelligence Directorate.87
- 61
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 17
- 62
Reuters, Syria's new leaders turn to Islamic law in effort to rebuild Assad's police, 23 January 2025, url; Economist (The), The great pretender: how Ahmed al-Sharaa won Syria, 5 March 2025, url; AP, One week into a new Syria, rebels aim for normalcy and Syrians vow not to be silent again, 16 December 2024, url
- 63
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 17
- 64
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 17
- 65
Waters, G., The New Syrian Army: Structure and Commanders, Syria Revisited, 28 March 2025, url
- 66
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 18
- 67
Waters, G., Are Damascus' New Security Reforms a form of Federalism?, Syria Revisited, 18 May 2025, url
- 68
Tabler, Andrew J., Cutting Through the Fog of War (and Peace) in Syria, TWI, 10 February 2026, url
- 69
ISW, The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle, 14 November 2025, url, p. 27-28
- 70
ISW, The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle, 14 November 2025, url, p. 11
- 71
Bodette, M., The SDF-Damascus Deal and the Kurdish Question: Prospects for Peace, Kurdish Peace Institute, 9 February 2026, url
- 72
Reuters, Syrian government, Kurds agree integration deal, US hails 'historic milestone', 30 January 2026, url; Arab Centre Washington DC, The Shrinking Space for Kurdish Autonomy in Syria, 26 February 2026, url
- 73
Enab Baladi, Hamo: Four SDF Brigades Join Defense Ministry, 2 May 2026, url
- 74
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 18
- 75
Waters, G., Syria's Integration of Alawi Police, Syria Revisited, 3 February 2026, url
- 76
Al Jazeera, Syria’s challenges to rebuild its armed forces, 4 January 2026, url
- 77
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 18
- 78
ISW and CT, Iran Update, 16 April 2025, url; ISW, The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle, 14 November 2025, url, p. 30
- 79
Waters, G., Syria's Integration of Alawi Police, Syria Revisited, 3 February 2026, url
- 80
Tabler, Andrew J., Cutting Through the Fog of War (and Peace) in Syria, TWI, 10 February 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, 26 November 2025, url, p. 2
- 81
International Crisis Group, Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, 26 November 2025, url, p. 2
- 82
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/61-62), 12 March 2026, url, para 18
- 83
International Crisis Group, Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, 26 November 2025, url, p. 32
- 84
Bodette, M., The SDF-Damascus Deal and the Kurdish Question: Prospects for Peace, Kurdish Peace Institute, 9 February 2026, url
- 85
Enab Baladi, 9,000 Asayish Members Nominated for Integration, Including 1,000 Women, 5 June 2026, url; Rudaw, Damascus releases over 1,200 SDF-linked detainees, Asayish integration interviews on agenda: official, 3 June 2026, url
- 86
Rudaw, Syria's new cabinet draws criticism over controversial appointments, 30 March 2025, url; ISW, The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle, 14 November 2025, url, p. 41
- 87
New Arab (The), Former HTS leader Hussein Al-Salama tapped to head Syrian intelligence, 6 May 2025, url