Al-Shabaab continues to occupy major supply routes across South-Central Somalia.208 During its advances in 2025, the group set up new checkpoints in the outskirts of Mogadishu,209 notably along the Balcad–Mogadishu (north of the capital) and the Afgooye–Mogadishu road (north-west of the capital).210 As Al-Shabaab advanced to coastal areas northeast of Mogadishu in December 2025/January 2026, it allegedly restricted transit on a stretch of the coastal road running from the Mogadishu to Warsheikh and severed lines of communication between two district centres. By recapturing Nuur Dugle town, it further cut the main road linking Mogadishu with coastal areas of Middle Shabelle and Galgaduud.211 Meanwhile, a number of government security checkpoints were removed inside Mogadishu.212 Al-Shabaab was reported to levy fixed amounts of taxes at its roadblocks in the countryside, while travelers regularly had to pay variable bribes while passing through FGS checkpoints.213
- 208
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 7
- 209
Bryden, M., Somalia at Risk of Becoming a Jihadist State [Map], Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 17 November 2025, url, p. 1
- 210
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 30
- 211
CTP, Chad Tensions Strain RSF Supply Lines; African DRC Peace Efforts; Fano Merger: Africa File, January 22, 2026, 22 January 2026, url
- 212
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 16
- 213
Kluijver, R., Al-Shabab’s shadow state: Why Somalia’s militants are winning legitimacy, TNH, 25 September 2025, url