Somalia continues to face a ‘complex, multi-layered’ security landscape. According the Hiraal Institute, as of late 2025, relations between the FGS and the federal members states of Puntland and Jubbaland were in a state of ‘breakdown’,154 these two FMS essentially having left the federal governance system.155 Disputes over electoral reform escalated into violent clashes between Jubbaland and FGS forces in July and August 2025.156
Counter-Al-Sabaab operations continued to be conducted by the SNA, backed by community defence forces, AUSSOM and international partners.157 However, after making significant territorial gains against Al-Shabaab in previous years, the government’s offensive lost momentum and remained stagnant in 2025. As the FGS pursued its primary strategy of keeping Al-Shabaab out of urban centres, the group shifted its operational focus from urban to rural areas.158 The group exploited political fragmentation, weaknesses within the FGS forces and discontent among local clans as it launched its offensives in Hirshabelle159 and Lower Shabelle in early 2025.160 In late 2025/early 2026, however, US-backed airstrikes and expanding ground operations, aided by enhanced aerial surveillance, reportedly allowed the FGS to recapture some territories from Al-Shabaab, although independent verification was difficult due to lack of access.161
To counter the distinct insurgent threat posed by ISS, the Puntland Defence Forces, acting independently of the FGS, continued Operation Hilaac.162 As a result, the group’s strength and resources were degraded. However, it continued to operate mobile cells and hideouts.163 For further information on Operation Hilaac and ISS, see sections 1.1. Recent political and security developments and 1.2.3. Updated list of main actors. of this report. Other security challenges were linked to the conflict between Somaliland and SSC-Khatumo (SSC-K) in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn.164 Clan-related conflicts mainly occurred in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states and Gedo, Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions,165 often involving clashes over resources such as land166 and water.167
- 154
Hiraal Institute, Somalia Security Situation: Comprehensive Assessment, February 2026, url, p. 6
- 155
International Crisis Group, Seven Peace and Security Priorities for Africa in 2026, 9 February 2026, url, p. 18
- 156
International Crisis Group, Electoral Showdown in Somalia: Averting Another Round of Turmoil, 24 September 2025, url, p. 9
- 157
UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2025/613, 30 September 2025, url, para. 12
- 158
Hiraal Institute, Somalia Security Situation: Comprehensive Assessment, February 2026, url, pp. 2, 6-7
- 159
International Crisis Group, Helping Somalia Move Beyond a Shaky Status Quo, 16 October 2025, url, p. 3
- 160
UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 30
- 161
AP, Somalia renews its US-backed fight against al-Shabab militant group. Here is why it matters, 18 February 2026, url
- 162
Hiraal Institute, Somalia Security Situation: Comprehensive Assessment, February 2026, url, p. 2
- 163
UN Security Council, Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2026/44, 4 February 2026, url, para. 35-37
- 164
Hiraal Institute, Somalia Security Situation: Comprehensive Assessment, February 2026, url, pp. 25, 27
- 165
Kaab TV, Bloody Clan Conflicts Escalate in Southern and Central Somalia, 17 December 2025, url
- 166
RDI, Final Report to Conduct: Conflict Protection Sensitive Analysis in Somalia, NRC, 29 January 2026, url, p. 28; Abdullahi, S. and Takaindisa, J., Understanding conflicts between nomadic clans in Somalia’s Mudug region, CGIAR, 15 December 2025, url, p. 8
- 167
BBC, Actor in film warning of revenge killings shot dead in family feud, 19 April 2025, url