1.2.2. Al-Shabaab control areas, presence, and influence

Table of contents

Al-Shabaab maintained a stable and intact leadership structure in the reference period. Its overarching organisational structure consists of 18 senior leaders, seven of whom belong to Hawiye subclans. Ahmed Diriye (aka Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah) continues to serve as the group’s emir. According to the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia, as of late 2025, no substantial degradation could be observed in the group’s ability to conduct attacks.75

Control. Al-Shabaab operates its command centre in Jilib (Middle Jubba)76 and maintains control77 and/or a heavy presence across large swathes of south-central Somalia, particularly Galmudug, Hiraan and the southern regions, occupying important supply routes across the these parts of Somalia.78 Most rural areas79 and many smaller towns in these regions were under the group’s control.80 Sources estimated that the group controlled around 30 % of the country’s territory81 and numerous district capitals, while it exercised co-governance in other areas nominally controlled by the FGS.82 As it shifted its strategy in 2025 from hit-and-run attacks towards seeking to hold its positions and conquered lands,83 the group made several territorial gains in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle,84 exploiting security vacuums.85 These gains further extended to coastal areas northeast of Mogadishu (Nuur Dugle village and areas around Warsheikh).86

Presence and influence. Al-Shabaab maintains operational capabilities87 and exerts influence in areas that lie well beyond its immediate realm of control.88 In areas marked by political leadership disputes and weak state governance,89 including in rural parts of Jubbaland, Bay and Lower Shabelle,90 the group asserts itself as an alternative authority,91 providing civilians security as well as services such as administration of justice92 and even environmental protection.93 Amongst others, the group maintains a sustained presence in Bakool and Gedo’s border regions with Ethiopia and Kenya94 and has reinforced its siege of Ceel Dheere (Galgaduud region)95 after its failed September 2025 attack on the town.96 Sources also pointed to Al-Shabaab presence in the Galgala mountains97 (Bari region)98 and Al-Madow mountains (Sanaag region).99 A further group of fighters whose degree of association with Al-Shabaab, if any, was subject to controversy,100 operated in southern parts of the NES under the command of Abdi Madobe.101

Al-Shabaab activities continued to be reported in Mogadishu,102 including in the form of extortion, deadly suicide attacks on military installations103 and a complex attack on the NISA-linked Godka Jilicow prison.104 At the same time, Samira Gaid, a Mogadishu-based security analyst, held that Al-Shabaab was ‘not interested in taking Mogadishu’.105

For further information on Al-Shabaab’s territorial control across Somalia, see the control maps in section 1.2.1. Territorial control maps depicting the situation at the beginning (31 March 2025, Map 2) and at the end of the reference period (31 March 2026, Map 3). For more information on checkpoints and routes controlled by the group, see section 1.5. Checkpoints and road security in Somalia below. Additional information on Al-Shabaab as a military and political organisation, including the group’s outreach, can be consulted in the EASO COI Report Somalia: Actors (July 2021).106 For information on Al-Shabaab’s financial capacity and sources of revenue, see section 1.10 on Individuals who have to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab or other groups and militias in the EUAA COI Report Somalia: Country Focus (May 2025). For details about Al-Shabaab operations, see the regional chapters of this report.107

  • 75

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 5, 6, 8

  • 76

    AUSSOM, Joint AUSSOM–SNAF operation captures senior Al-Shabaab commander, 2 April 2026, url; UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. para. 7

  • 77

    PolGeoNow, Somalia Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 March 2026, n.a.

  • 78

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 7

  • 79

    PolGeoNow, Somalia Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 March 2026, n.a.; Guardian (The), ‘The fear was immense’: al-Shabaab exploits fragmented politics to reclaim land in Somalia, 4 October 2025, url

  • 80

    Guardian (The), ‘The fear was immense’: al-Shabaab exploits fragmented politics to reclaim land in Somalia, 4 October 2025, url

  • 81

    Bryden, M., Somalia at Risk of Becoming a Jihadist State [Map], Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 17 November 2025, url, p. 1; PolGeoNow, Somalia Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 March 2026, n.a.

  • 82

    Kluijver, R., Al-Shabab’s shadow state: Why Somalia’s militants are winning legitimacy, TNH, 25 September 2025, url

  • 83

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 29

  • 84

    UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2025/613, 30 September 2025, url, para. 13

  • 85

    ISS, Disunity in Somalia is al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon, 28 July 2025, url

  • 86

    CTP, Chad Tensions Strain RSF Supply Lines; African DRC Peace Efforts; Fano Merger: Africa File, January 22, 2026, 22 January 2026, url

  • 87

    Elmi, A.A., Somalia’s 2026 election risks a legitimacy crisis, Al Jazeera, 19 December 2025, url

  • 88

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 7; Kluijver, R., Al-Shabab’s shadow state: Why Somalia’s militants are winning legitimacy, TNH, 25 September 2025, url

  • 89

    ISS, Disunity in Somalia is al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon, 28 July 2025, url

  • 90

    KEDISA, The Influence of Al-Shabaab in East Africa and Its Implications for Regional Stability, 10 September 2025, url

  • 91

    ISS, Disunity in Somalia is al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon, 28 July 2025, url

  • 92

    Kluijver, R., Al-Shabab’s shadow state: Why Somalia’s militants are winning legitimacy, TNH, 25 September 2025, url; ISS, Disunity in Somalia is al-Shabaab’s greatest weapon, 28 July 2025, url

  • 93

    Kluijver, R., Al-Shabab’s shadow state: Why Somalia’s militants are winning legitimacy, TNH, 25 September 2025, url

  • 94

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 17

  • 95

    CTP, Chad Tensions Strain RSF Supply Lines; African DRC Peace Efforts; Fano Merger: Africa File, January 22, 2026, 22 January 2026, url

  • 96

    UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2025/613, 30 September 2025, url, para. 13

  • 97

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 51

  • 98

    Hiiraan Online, Al-Shabab defector denies combat involvement as Puntland court proceeds with case, 5 December 2024, url

  • 99

    PolGeoNow, Somalia Supplement: Is there an Al Shabaab presence in SSC-Khatumo?, 19 June 2025, url

  • 100

    PolGeoNow, Somalia Supplement: Is there an Al Shabaab presence in SSC-Khatumo?, 19 June 2025, url

  • 101

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 51; Somali Digest (The), Al-Shabab Shielded by Mogadishu-Backed Faction in Al-Madow, 27 August 2025, url

  • 102

    UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/2025/613, 30 September 2025, url, para. 14; CTP, Chad Tensions Strain RSF Supply Lines; African DRC Peace Efforts; Fano Merger: Africa File, January 22, 2026, 22 January 2026, url

  • 103

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 15, 54

  • 104

    UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), S/2025/777, 28 November 2025, url, para. 16; BBC, Al-Shabab militants dress as soldiers to storm Somali jail, 5 October 2025, url

  • 105

    Guardian (The), ‘The fear was immense’: al-Shabaab exploits fragmented politics to reclaim land in Somalia, 4 October 2025, url

  • 106

    EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 58-67

  • 107

    EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Country Focus, May 2025, url, pp. 93-94