3.1.1. Employment

In early 2026, crisis outcomes in Eastern Sudan and Khartoum were expected to persist due to reduced access to income-earning opportunities for both IDPs and the host community, resulting from conflict and displacement, widespread destruction of infrastructure, below-average stocks, and high food prices.652

Sudan's labour market has contracted sharply since April 2023, with unemployment rates skyrocketing,653 the economy collapsing, resources diverted to the conflict and an expanded informal sector replacing formal employment and resulting in the war economy taking over a previously struggling economy.654 

The Sudan Welfare Monitoring Survey, conducted in 2025 among 4 241 households in Blue Nile, White Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states indicated that employment levels among Sudanese increased between 2024 and 2025, particularly among men and those with a secondary or high school education. Persistent gender disparities continued to limit workforce participation among both Sudanese and refugee women.655

Refugees in Sudan, mostly originating from South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, largely worked in the informal sector outside camps – primarily in agriculture and small-scale trade. 656 Employment among refugees saw a slight decline between 2024 and 2025 due to barriers to employment outside refugee camps. Refugees with higher education were an exception, as they have experienced an increase in employment.657 The legal framework defined by the 2014 Asylum Regulation Act did not provide clarity on the procedures to obtain work permits. This, coupled with movement restrictions and security concerns, limited job opportunities. Additionally, regional disparities in law enforcement and administrative capacity constrained refugees’ access to formal work.658

Agricultural labour opportunities — normally a key income source during the harvest —remained scarce due to insecurity, leaving millions of households without viable livelihoods and increasingly dependent on extreme coping strategies, including begging for food.659

Public wage erosion and payment disruptions persisted in the country: the Ministry of Finance approved retroactive salary increases in the 2026 budget to begin in March 2026, but these had not been implemented by April 2026, deepening social pressure and reducing confidence in state payments.660

The World Bank indicated a rise in unemployment in the country from 2022 to 2024, resulting from ‘widespread business closures, economic uncertainty, and a sharp decline in stable job opportunities due to the severe impact of the conflict on the labour market’. Unemployment rates went from 32 % in 2022 to 46 % in 2023 and 47 % in 2024661 with 4.6 million jobs lost since the beginning of the conflict.662 The 2026 World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated an unemployment rate of 60.1% for 2025.663 More than half of the refugees interviewed by the Sudan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted in 2025 reported that they had not worked between May and July 2025, a slight increase compared to 12 months earlier. The share of refugees relying on food aid increased from 42 % to 45 %.664

According to economist Dr Abdel Halim Timan, as reported by Dabanga, the war has increased youth unemployment, due to the widespread disruption to education, particularly in western Sudan. This has deepened inequality and driven some young people towards recruitment by armed groups, increasing the risk of prolonged conflict.665

Increased prevalence of child labour is a concerning trend, particularly among households struggling with food security, in refugee communities, and among Sudanese families with lower education levels.666 Sudanese boys frequently engage in informal work, such as agriculture, herding, restaurant jobs, and street vending.667