2.1.2. Resistance committees

Throughout the conflict, pro-democracy activists were systematically targeted. Retaliatory attacks in areas retaken by the opposing warring party and directed against pro-democracy activities and groups were described as a recurring pattern. In particular, the RSF ‘perceive[d] Resistance Committees (RC) and Emergency Resistance Rooms (ERRs) as posing a direct threat to their ability to govern areas under their control’. 255

The Resistance Committees (RC),256 originally formed in 2013 during a set of protests against the regime,257 represented Sudan’s pro-democracy grassroot movement.258 Consisting mainly of younger people from a variety of social and economic backgrounds,259 these RC played a key role in the 2019 revolution and later mobilised against the 2021 coup, becoming influential actors through their community-based activism. When the war erupted in 2023, RC shifted towards humanitarian efforts, creating ERRs.260

ERRs, whether newly established or reactivated in April 2023, volunteered to fill the gap left by a lack of state service provision and limited international presence following the evacuation of international staff from Khartoum.261 These initiatives are rooted in the Sudanese nafeer tradition,262 which calls for collective action to rescue the needy and rebuild in the face of crises.263 While some ERRs openly associate with the RCs, others avoid it given the political nature of the RCs. ERRs deliver food, water, emergency medical care, evacuations for thousands of people, and educational activities for children, and are funded by Sudanese diaspora and local groups.264 For additional information on the situation of aid workers see section 2.4.2.

Emergency Resistance Rooms (ERRs)

In Khartoum, security forces detained several ERR volunteers for carrying out relief activities without official permission.265 ACAPS noted in October 2025 that ‘these groups detained volunteers’ in parts of Khartoum, ‘while in Um Durman, they infiltrated some of the ERRs’ and distributed aid, ‘wearing military uniforms and carrying arms, leading to polarisation among the volunteers.’266 In 2025, targeting of ERRs and community kitchens volunteers has persisted, as the SAF view these local aid workers as political opponents and subject them to harassment and detention.267 In SAF-regained areas, ERRs must navigate suspicion of being associated with RCs. The security arm of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), known as ‘security cells’, investigate ERR members and their activities, threatening to suspend National/Local Non-Governmental Organisations (NNGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) partnering with ERRs.268 In August 2025, a volunteer in the Red Sea ERR was reportedly arrested in Port Sudan for providing humanitarian assistance to war-displaced communities.269 In Khartoum, ERRs’ volunteers reported ‘harassment by SAF-aligned Islamist militias’ operating through civil support groups (known as isnad madani), ‘through which fighters from the BBMB and other informal armed groups have taken on civilian roles in aid distribution and service provision in neighbourhoods and towns.’ 270In Khartoum, many ERR volunteers have fled due to reprisal attacks. In Southern Khartoum, as many as 80 % of the volunteers have fled the area. 271 For additional information on the situation of aid workers and healthcare personnel see section 2.4.2. and 2.4.3.