Two broad political blocs have emerged since the beginning of the conflict in 2023: the Democratic Bloc, which grouped ‘parties and armed groups aligned with the SAF’, and Taasis (Arabic for Foundation), a coalition of political parties and armed movements supporting the RSF.56 The Democratic Bloc included the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Jafar al-Mirghani,57 the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Gibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led by Minni Minnawi.58 In February 2026, the alliance convened to discuss the formation of the transitional legislative council. 59 Taasis comprised 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N and other political and civil factions signatories of a founding charter signed in Nairobi in February 2025.60 In July 2025, Taasis formed a 15 members council61 and Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’aishi was appointed as prime minister.62
The complexity of the political landscape was deepened by the establishment of the RSF parallel government as a second coalition of allied forces alongside the one led by the Sudanese army. The RSF-led coalition brought together armed groups, ethnic factions and party offshoots while the Sudanese army led a front of armed movements, Islamists, and splinter factions from the FFC.63
Within the SAF-aligned front, sources reported the presence of ‘Islamist networks’, while SAF representatives denied any formal alliance with these actors. 64 However, ministerial appointments within Prime Minister Kamil Idris's cabinet were reported as being linked to the NCP and the Islamist Movement.65 For additional information on the new government see section 1.1.1 (a) Fragmented authority. Sources also reported that Islamist groups conducted coordinated messaging campaigns targeting political leaders and civilian organisations ‘accusing them of collaborating with the RSF against the SAF in pursuit of political power’.66 For additional information see section 1.3.3. (a) on Online propaganda and disinformation. Islamist actors were involved in aspects of popular mobilisation, including mobilisation along tribal lines67 and the recruitment of children.68 For additional information see section 2.2. Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups In Khartoum, fighters linked to the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion (BBMB) and other informal armed groups, operating through civil support structures (isnad madani), were involved in the harassment of Emergency Response Room (ERR) volunteers, reportedly contributing to their displacement from affected areas.69 For additional information see section 2.1.2. Resistance committees. In March 2026, the United States designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, notably the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the BBMB, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.70
The main civilian opposition bloc, Taqaddum (Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces), dissolved in February 2025, further reshaping the political landscape. 71 For additional information see section 2.1.1. Political party members and other perceived opponents on the situation of political opponents abroad. Members who chose to take political positions within the RSF-aligned parallel administration reorganised under Taasis, while those who rejected the parallel government formed a separate group called Sumoud (Arabic for Resilience/Perseverance).72 Sumoud brought together political parties and civil society organisations and it was ‘accused by the SAF of supporting the RSF’.73 In December 2025, civilian leaders, including the former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) leader, convened in Nairobi in the attempt to re-establish a civilian ‘third pole’ independent from the warring military parties.74 A declaration was signed ‘outlining shared principles to end the war and rebuild the country’. The Nairobi signatories included, among others, the SLM-AW, the Sudanese Congress Party, the Federal Gathering, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and the National Umma Party. Several civilian groups also signed the declaration including the Coordination of the Displaced and Refugees, the Darfur Bar Association, the Alliance of Civilian Forces for Eastern Sudan, and the Coordination of Professionals and Trade Unions. 75
- 56
Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, url
- 57
Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Democratic Block seeks to form transitional legislative council, 6 February 2026, url
- 58
Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Democratic Bloc split over unauthorized talks in Ethiopia, 16 February 2026, url
- 59
Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Democratic Block seeks to form transitional legislative council, 6 February 2026, url
- 60
Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s RSF, allies sign charter for parallel government, 23 February 2025, url; Dabanga, Charter for formation ‘parallel govt’ in Sudan signed in Nairobi, 24 February 2025, url
- 61
Sudan Times (The), TASIS will serve all Sudanese, not divide them, ex-minister says, 27 July 2025, url
- 62
Sudan Time (The), Who’s who in TASIS: The 15 figures shaping Sudan’s civilian govt, 26 July 2025, url
- 63
Arab Weekly (The), Sudan’s RSF-led coalition declares parallel government, deepening risk of partition, 28 July 2025, url; Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, url
- 64
Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, url
- 65
Sudan Post, Kamil Idris expands Port Sudan cabinet with five new Ministers, 16 July 2025, url; Ayin, Sudan Conflict Monitor #22, 21 August 2025, url; Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments 'give Sudan military absolute control', 26 February 2025, url
- 66
Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, url, p. 30; SWP, The Weaponization of Social Media in Sudan's War, 23 April 2026, url
- 67
Emirates Policy Center, 'Tribalization' of Sudan's conflict: incentives, restraints and potential trajectories, 22 November 2024, url; Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan's system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, url; Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, url; Eureporter, Khartoum: a ruined capital controlled by Sudan's Islamists, 4 September 2025, url;
- 68
Ayin Network and SHRH, Child Soldiers: widespread participation in Sudan's war, 10 August 2025, url, video from 08'00''
- 69
TIMEP, Sudan's Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, url; ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 url, p. 4
- 70
USDOS, Designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, 9 March 2026, url; Fikra Forum, Sanctions and Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood: Decoupling Burhan from Sudans Islamists and Iran, 17 April 2026, url
- 71
Al Jazeera, After splinter, can Sudan’s anti-war coalition reinvent itself?, 20 February 2025, url
- 72
Al Jazeera, After splinter, can Sudan’s anti-war coalition reinvent itself?, 20 February 2025, url
- 73
Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, url
- 74
Al Jazeera, War in Sudan: Humanitarian collapse, fighting, deadlock, December 2025, 31 December 2025, url; Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, url
- 75
Sudan Tribune, Sudan political groups, rebel faction sign anti-war declaration in Nairobi, 17 December 2025, url; Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, url