1.2.4. Administration of justice

In May 2025, the SAF-led government introduced new fees on 52 legal services and criminal litigation procedures offered by the public prosecution office.93 In June, ACJPS indicated a 78 % decrease in accessible legal services for displaced persons.94 The mandatory fees ranged from 1 000 Sudanese pounds (SDG) [approximately EUR 1.5] to 100 000 SDG [approximately EUR 142], covering a range of services including ‘filing a complaint to issuing arrest or release orders, exhumation requests and any directive issued by the prosecutor during investigations’. The new legal measures took effect in Sennar State, Northern State, and River Nile State between April and June 2025.95 The introduction of fees was criticised by both the Sudanese Lawyers' Union Steering Committee and the Sudanese Bar Association.96 Historically, criminal litigation was provided free of charge, and the introduction of new fees is seen by legal professionals and former officials as an interference with the independence and role of the Public Prosecution.97 Critics argued that it effectively commodified justice, undermining protection for victims and their property, and appeared to contravene the 2019 Transitional Constitution’s guarantees of access to justice (Art. 48), equality before law (Art. 53) and right to litigation (Art. 56).98 In June 2025, protests of lawyers held in Khartoum against the measure were reportedly met with ‘violent dispersal’ and 12 attorneys were arrested. 99

There was a growing use of anti-terrorism courts and summary trials.100 In August 2025, the Minister of Justice highlighted that the establishment of the Constitutional Court was expected to enable it to review applications from death row inmates with final sentences, potentially reducing the number of individuals awaiting execution.101 For additional information on death penalty see section 1.3.2. (h).

Following SAF advances in Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and North Kordofan, administrative measures were implemented and included the redeployment of prosecutors, the reactivation of prosecution offices, and the re-opening of police stations. The UN OHCHR noted that ‘these developments were overshadowed by widespread due process concerns, reports of torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and summary executions by both the RSF and the SAF, and their allied armed movements.’ It also noted that ‘conditions in SAF-controlled prisons—especially in Wad Madani— remained dire, amidst overcrowding, disease outbreaks and overall neglect contrary to international human rights law’.102

The UN OHCHR reported that, since April 2023, the National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and International Humanitarian Law reportedly received at least 120 000 complaints against the RSF and 300 against the SAF and affiliated forces. According to the Committee, more than 4 800 cases have been referred to the courts, many involving individuals prosecuted in absentia. 103 The COI report published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in December 2025 noted, based on consulted confidential sources, that ‘citizens were unable to turn to the Sudanese authorities if the perpetrators were SAF soldiers or were connected with the Sudanese security apparatus in some other way’.104

Administration of justice in RSF-controlled areas

According to Rights for Peace,105 ‘the RSF has established courts in areas under its control in Darfur, but there is no publicity on their functioning and legal basis.’106 According to a report by UN HRC released in January 2026, ‘no formal justice system was operational in RSF-controlled areas’. The same document reported the establishment of emergency courts directly linked to security forces, such as the one established in West Kordofan in August 2025, ‘composed of “the public prosecutor”, the legal adviser of the RSF and the director of the Military Police’. 107