2. Treatment of specific profiles and groups of population

Since the onset of the war in 2023, the political landscape in Sudan is fragmented. Military interference has constrained the space for independent political organisations, while the fragmentation among political parties and limited coordination have further reduced their capacity.238 For additional information on political parties see section 1.1.2 Political situation.

Following the signing of the Nairobi declaration in December 2025,239 — see section 1.1.2 Political situation for additional information — ‘hundreds’ of individuals were detained in what Khalid Omer Yousif, former minister and leading figure of the FFC, described as a ‘new phase of repression’ against opponents of the war. In a December 2025 interview to the media outlet The National, he said arrests were ‘happening everywhere, in every state in Sudan’. Many of those arrested reportedly faced charges that could carry death penalty.240

Situation of political opponents abroad

From at least April 2024, the Sudanese authorities extended their crackdown on dissent targeting anti-war figures and political opponents living abroad. In 2024, Sudan’s prosecution opened a criminal case against the former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and 15 other Taqaddum leaders, many of whom were abroad, on charges including ‘inciting war against the state’ and ‘undermining constitutional order’, some punishable by death penalty.241 In January 2025, the state news agency SUNA published a public notice for fugitive defendants. The list of individuals included the former leaders of the Taqaddum Coordination Committee, activists, and journalists, considered fugitives under the 1991 Criminal Act and the Empowerment Removal Law.242 Some of the individuals on the list who have fled abroad reported to the UN Independent International FFM difficulties in the renewal of passports and difficulties in travelling.243 The authorities have reportedly refused to renew the passports of Sudanese opposition figures living abroad.244 In January 2026, an anti-terrorism court in Port Sudan launched proceedings against 201 defendants, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, with cases heard in person and in absentia.245

Since the coup of 25 October 2021, trade union activities have been suspended by decrees issued by the military authorities. In July 2025, authorities reportedly ordered the dissolution of the leadership of all trade unions and replaced them with ‘preparatory committees’, appointed by the Registrar General of Labour Organisations246 under Decision No. 9.247 Some observers commented that the decision did not outline a clear timeline or process for new union elections, and granted the Registrar undefined discretionary power.’248

Between April 2023 and July 2025, the Sudanese Professionals and Syndicates Coordination (SPSC) documented more than 290 serious violations against trade unionists and workers, including ‘arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment and denial of medical care, targeted killings of and attacks on workers employed in the health, transport and humanitarian sectors, gender-based violence (GBV) against women workers and unionists, threats and harassment leading to forced displacement, seizure and destruction of union offices, mass dismissals without due process in Khartoum and Western Sudan for alleged ‘collaboration’ with the RSF, withholding of salaries for a period of more than two years, forced labour, and bans on union activities’. According to the report this led to a ‘near-total paralysis of independent trade unions’.249

In 2024, sources indicated that the SAF's Military Intelligence Service (MIS) targeted people, often based on their presumed or real ethnic identity, for allegedly supporting the RSF,250 including Arab tribes from Kordofan251 and tribes from West Darfur.252

With the progressing of the conflict, reports received by UN OHCHR in 2025 raised additional concerns regarding the prosecution and sentencing by Sudanese courts in SAF-controlled areas of individuals originating from the Kordofan and Darfur regions, particularly on allegations of affiliation with the RSF.253 The ACHPR FFM noted that ‘civilians were also extrajudicially killed for being perceived to support the opposing side of the conflict while others, especially in the Darfur region were targeted and killed because of their ethnicity.’254 For more information on ethnic groups and individuals from Darfur and Kordofan see 2.5 Ethnic groups.