4.6. Religious minorities

This profile should be read in conjunction with Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

Ahmadis, or members of the Ahmadiyya community, are the followers of the messianic teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Despite Ahmadis’ self-identification as Muslims, they are not considered as such by the other branches and sects of Islam or the authorities. Ahmadis are perceived as ‘blasphemous unbelievers’ in Pakistan because they also recognise as a prophet Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and as such, it contradicts Mohammad being the final prophet for Muslims.

They are located primarily in Punjab, especially in the town of Chenab Nagar (previously known as Rabwah) where they constitute 95 % of the population. The actual number of Ahmadis is highly uncertain, due to their frequent preference for hiding their faith, but it is believed to be comprised between 160 000 and 600 000.

Detention for three-year term for distributing altered translations of the Quran, as well as blasphemy accusations and charges, have also taken place. For consequences on blasphemy accusations, refer to Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

The attacks against members of the Ahmadiyya community have been carried out by Islamic extremists such as Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated groups, political religious groups or groups reportedly connected to local religious and political actors, mob groups, Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), and Pakistani authorities.

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Ahmadis could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. More specifically, Ahmadiyya places of worship have been subjected to destruction, vandalisation, desecration, and sealing or seizure. There have also been several cases of damage to and desecration of graves, as well as disruption of funerals and attacks on cemeteries. The community is also subjected to societal threats, hate speech, discrimination, as well as systemic and structural barriers to participation in public and political life. For instance, Ahmadis have been prevented from using public graveyards and excluded from inheriting property from a Muslim relative under Sharia, Muslim personal law, and the Constitution. Textbooks either ignore or insult them. Ahmadis must hide their beliefs to go to school, get jobs, or even get identity documents.

• Visibility and nature of the religious practice: Ahmadis publicly exposing their faith by, for example, attending places of worships and/or cemeteries, and/or disseminating Ahmadi materials about their faith are at particular risk of persecution.

• Position within the community: applicants with a specific profile in the Ahmadiyya community such as being a leader of the community or acting as a representative of the community are also at particular risk since those elements substantiate the public expression of the faith.

• Home area: considering the lower number of attacks against Ahmadis in Chenab Nagar than in other parts of the country and the fact that their community constitutes the majority in this area, Ahmadis would face a lower risk of persecution in Chenab Nagar.

This profile should be read in conjunction with Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

Some acts to which Christians could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Christians have been subjected to killings, trafficking in human beings, sexual violence, forced marriages, abductions, forced conversions to Islam, and attacks on Christian villages, by mob groups and unidentified individuals.

Christians in Pakistan have also reportedly faced blasphemy accusations, sometimes leading to killings and imprisonment. See also Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Christians could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. More specifically, they have faced destruction of places of worship and homes, forced eviction, land grabbing, and intimidation, including in the context of mob violence. They have also been subjected to ongoing threats, violence, and socio-economic marginalisation (including loss of employment) which in some cases resulted in displacement. At times, they have also been prevented from performing funeral rites.

• Visibility and nature of the religious practice: Christians publicly participating in Christian ceremonies, thereby publicly adopting non-Muslim behaviour, face a higher risk. The nature, the repetitiveness and the visibility of the non-Muslim practice, should be taken into account.

• Gender: Christian women and girls are at higher risk of abductions, forced conversions to Islam and forced marriages. See also Women and girls.

• Socio-economic situation of the family: belonging to lower societal classes increases the risk of being subjected to work exploitation and forced conversion to Islam.

This profile should be read in conjunction with Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

The actors responsible for attacks and violence against Hindus include Islamist groups and Muslim individuals, as well as mobs, armed groups, and organised criminal gangs (see Non-state actors).

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Hindus could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also considered. More specifically, they have been subjected to land seizures, destruction of Hindu places of worship, digital extortion, threats, online hate speech and incitement to violence, harassment, economic and social exclusion, institutionalised inequality, and systematic discrimination, including by being frequently prevented from exercising their funeral rites.

• Visibility and nature of the religious practice: Hindus publicly participating in Hindu ceremonies, thereby publicly adopting non-Muslim behaviour, face a higher risk. The nature, the repetitiveness and the visibility of the non-Muslim practice, should be taken into account.

• Gender: Hindu women and girls are at higher risk of abduction, forced conversion to Islam and forced marriage. At times, they have been subjected to forced conversion to Islam through marriage. See also Women and girls.

• Socio-economic situation of the family: belonging to lower societal classes increases the risk of being subjected to work exploitation and forced conversion to Islam.

This profile should be read in conjunction with Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms.

Shia Muslims are vulnerable to blasphemy accusations (see also Individuals (perceived as) transgressing Islamic norms).

The actors responsible for attacks and violence against Shia Muslims include sectarian groups, such as ISKP and ISPP (see Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Pakistan Province (ISPP)). Some militant groups (such as SSP and LeJ, see non-state actors) even include the extermination of Shia among their goals, and actively pursue it through armed attacks against Shia places of gathering and worship.

Incidents reported against Shia Muslims include attacks on Shia convoys and places of worship, resulting in dozens of deaths and numerous injuries. One attack was claimed by the ISKP accusing Shia Muslims of being ‘infidels’.

• Ethnic background: Shias Muslims of Hazara ethnicity face a particularly high risk of persecution from Sunni extremist groups as their distinct physical features make them easily identifiable.

• Home area: the risk of targeting by Sunni extremist groups is higher in areas of ISKP operations, as well as in Kurram District (KP).

• Visibility and nature of the religious practice: Shias publicly participating in Shia ceremonies, that are in themselves different from Sunni ones, face a higher risk. The nature, the repetitiveness and the visibility of the religious practice should be taken into account.