FARC dissident factions that rejected the 2016 peace agreement492 have continued operating from former FARC strongholds inside Venezuela, using Venezuelan territory to evade Colombian security forces and remain active in illicit economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining,493 and extortion.494 Segunda Marquetalia maintains its base of operations in Apure state; the Acacio Medina Front, which is allied to Segunda Marquetalia, operates along the Orinoco River and in Amazonas state; the 33rd Front, which is part of the General Staff of Blocks and Front (EMBF, Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frentes), is active in Catatumbo on the Colombian side and in Zulia state; and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) also maintains a presence in Apure.495
However, sustained military operations by Venezuelan state security forces since 2021, combined with the territorial expansion of the ELN,496 have weakened these dissident structures.497 Several top commanders were killed, prompting many fronts to withdraw or significantly reduce their presence in Venezuela.498 In August 2025, the ELN ambushed and killed a commander of Segunda Marquetalia on the Venezuelan side of the border,499 further diminishing the group’s influence in Apure and Amazonas.500 Segunda Marquetalia has nonetheless expanded its presence in Amazonas by recruiting local residents and tightening territorial control through extortion, including demanding gold from miners and pressuring Indigenous communities to grant access to their lands.501 In Amazonas, the group has long cooperated with the ELN, establishing non‑aggression pacts, dividing territory and mining sites, and jointly overseeing operations.502 Both organisations impose strict control, extort miners and businesses, and enforce harsh forms of justice, including summary executions.503 In Amazonas, dissident commander Jhon 40 was reportedly permitted to operate a mine and sold gold to state forces at a fixed price below market value.504
Although FARC dissident groups vowed to 'resist' following the US capture of Maduro, members reportedly began retreating toward the border region as a precautionary response to the shifting political and security environment.505
- 492
In 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo) signed a Peace Agreement that ended an armed conflict that was present since 1964. At least 260,000 people died and over seven million were displaced. BBC, "Se acabó la guerra": después de más de 50 años de conflicto entra en vigencia el cese de fuego definitivo entre el gobierno de Colombia y las FARC, 29 August 2016, url
- 493
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url; International Crisis Group, A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South, 29 July 2025, url, p. 4
- 494
Transparencia Venezuela, The faces of extortion in Venezuela 2024, 2025, url, p. 17
- 495
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url
- 496
The conflict between the ELN and the FARC‑EP is longstanding, dating back to their formation in the 1960s. While the FARC‑EP originated as a peasant‑based insurgency, the ELN emerged as a more ideologically driven movement composed largely of students and union leaders. Structurally, the FARC‑EP operated as a hierarchical organisation, whereas the ELN has historically functioned as a more federalised network. These ideological and organisational differences contributed to recurring clashes between the two groups—tensions that persisted even after the FARC‑EP’s demobilisation, continuing with the rise of FARC dissident factions. BBC, 3 claves para entender la larga rivalidad entre las FARC y el ELN (y cómo ahora llena de violencia la frontera entre Colombia y Venezuela), 4 January 2022, url; SWI swissinfo.ch, El ELN y las FARC, dos caras de la lucha guerrillera en Colombia, 26 October 2016, url
- 497
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url
- 498
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url
- 499
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url; La FM, De negociador de paz a ordenar el magnicidio de Miguel Uribe: este es el perfil del abatido 'Zarco Aldinever', mano derecha de Iván Márquez, 22 March 2026, url
- 500
InSight Crime, FARC Dissidents in Venezuela, 26 January 2026, url
- 501
International Crisis Group, A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South, 29 July 2025, url, p. 4
- 502
International Crisis Group, A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South, 29 July 2025, url, p. 4
- 503
International Crisis Group, A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South, 29 July 2025, url, p. 4
- 504
International Crisis Group, A Curse of Gold: Mining and Violence in Venezuela’s South, 29 July 2025, url, p. 16
- 505
InSight Crime, Will Colombian Guerrillas Lose Their Safe Haven in Post‑Maduro Venezuela?, 22 January 2026, url