Venezuela is home to numerous megabandas, defined as large, heavily armed criminal organisations typically comprising between 100 and 1 000 members.406 These groups engage in a wide range of criminal activities, including drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and contract killings.407 Approximately nineteen megabandas have been identified nationwide, among them the Tren de Aragua, the Coqui organisation based in the Cota 905 neighbourhood of Caracas, the Tren del Llano, the Wuilexis group in Petare,408 and the Carlos Capa organisation in Miranda.409

The origins of megabandas vary among sources. News source El Debate indicated that megabandas emerged out of government‑backed 'Peace Zones' and Bolivarian circles, structures originally created to suppress protests but which later evolved into autonomous armed groups that now pose a significant threat to the state. 410 Casla Institute indicated that megabandas, which usually have the word '"tren"' (or 'train') as part of their name, originated around 2006, when existing criminal groups embedded themselves in pro‑government railway unions to obtain benefits and extort workers; as they accumulated power, they began stealing materials and diverting state resources. When corruption halted the flow of funds, these groups had already evolved into heavily armed mega‑gangs with territorial control and expanded into high‑profit criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and arms smuggling.411 El Nacional similarly reported that over time, these organisations have developed characteristics resembling insurgent or even terrorist entities, including the use of high‑powered weapons, territorial control, regulation of community life, and the assumption of functions typically carried out by state institutions.412 Megabandas apply principles associated with irregular warfare, such as blending into the civilian population, relying on local communities for protection, and building support networks through coercion or selective assistance.413 These tactics make them difficult to identify and dismantle, and in many areas they have effectively become the de facto local government.414

Tren de Aragua is widely regarded as Venezuela’s most powerful homegrown criminal organisation.415 Although authorities announced in July 2024 that the group had been dismantled, including the shutdown of its command centre in Tocorón Prison, Lara state,416 multiple sources reported that Tren de Aragua and other megabandas continue to operate across the country.417 Tren de Aragua is accused of crimes including express kidnappings, extortion,418 bribery of public officials, killings,419 human smuggling, illegal mining, violent robbery, and money laundering.420 Tren de Aragua disputes the control of informal border crossings with Colombia with the ELN.421

Tren de Aragua has diversified its criminal portfolio and expanded beyond Venezuela, aided by large‑scale emigration.422 Cells have been identified in Colombia, Peru, and Chile, with sporadic presence in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil.423 Additional activity has been reported in the US, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, and Spain.424 According to Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua has attempted to establish operations in Spain involving migrant exploitation, human trafficking, and extortion.425 In March 2024, the brother of the group’s leader, 'Niño Guerrero', was detained in Barcelona and later extradited to Venezuela; he was reportedly attempting to build and expand the gang’s criminal structure in Europe.426 Sources also reported that, in February 2024, former Venezuelan Lieutenant Ronald Ojeda, who fled Venezuela in 2017 and received asylum in Chile, was kidnapped and killed in Santiago de Chile by members of Tren de Aragua; his killing was reportedly ordered by Diosdado Cabello.427 In February 2025, the US designated Tren de Aragua as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organization' (FTO).428 Alleged members have been detained in the United States and transferred to El Salvador.429

Estimates of the group’s size vary widely, from 'hundreds' to 'several thousand' recruits, reportedly under the command of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, known as 'Niño Guerrero', and the organisation is widely recognised for its 'extreme violence'.430 Transparencia Venezuela estimates that Tren de Aragua has approximately 4 000 members.431

According to Transparencia Venezuela, the group’s internal structure is headed by the pran (top leader in prison), followed by lieutenants who act as his 'ministers'.432 Beneath them are the luceros de la alta, closest to the leadership, and the luceros de la baja, who interact more directly with the general prison population.433 The escuderos serve as the pran's protectors, while the gariteros are responsible for surveillance.434 Outside Venezuela, Tren de Aragua has adopted more 'flexible', network‑based organisational models, with each cell managing its own criminal activities while maintaining coordination to avoid conflict and maximise profits.435 The command structure inside Venezuela, however, continues to set the terms of alliances with local gangs abroad and provides resources such as weapons, money, and contacts, retaining the capacity to issue orders.436

Branches of Tren de Aragua adapt to local conflict dynamics.437 In Brazil, the group collaborates with and provides services to the country’s largest criminal organisation, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC).438 In Colombia, by contrast, Tren de Aragua has faced resistance from established armed actors, including the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the AGC.439

Tren del Llano is one of the first megabandas emerging in Venezuela and currently operates in the area straddling the border between Guárico and Miranda states.440 Following the killing of one of its leaders by state forces in 2021, the group withdrew from Sucre state.441 Tren del Llano reportedly refused to align itself with the Maduro government and instead negotiated an agreement with Tren de Aragua to respect each other’s territories.442 The gang’s primary activity is the extortion of merchants and agricultural producers in the region.443 Sources reported that seven members of the Tren del Llano were killed during a police operation in Guárico State. The cell was accused of carrying out kidnappings and extortion targeting farm owners and businesses in the area.444

  • 406

    El Debate, La red criminal que sostiene a Maduro en Venezuela: megabandas, pandillas y cartels, 12 April 2025, url; EUISS, After Maduro: The future of Venezuela and the Caribbean, 7 January 2026, url; InSight Crime, Carlos Luis Revete, alias ‘El Koki’, 8 February 2022, url

  • 407

    EUISS, After Maduro: The future of Venezuela and the Caribbean, 7 January 2026, url; InSight Crime, Carlos Luis Revete, alias ‘El Koki’, 8 February 2022, url 

  • 408

    El Debate, La red criminal que sostiene a Maduro en Venezuela: megabandas, pandillas y cartels, 12 April 2025, url

  • 409

     InSight Crime, Banda de Carlos Capa, 10 February 2025, url

  • 410

    El Debate, La red criminal que sostiene a Maduro en Venezuela: megabandas, pandillas y cartels, 12 April 2025, url; Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 7

  • 411

    Casla Institute, Informe anual 2024-2025 sobre crímenes de lesa humanidad, May 2025, url, p. 12

  • 412

    El Nacional, Lecciones de Bukele para Venezuela, 17 April 2026, url

  • 413

    El Nacional, Lecciones de Bukele para Venezuela, 17 April 2026, url

  • 414

    El Nacional, Lecciones de Bukele para Venezuela, 17 April 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url

  • 415

    InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 25 April 2025, url; International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url 

  • 416

    SWI swissinfo.ch, Más extorsión y menos homicidios, la inseguridad se transforma en Venezuela, 11 July 2024, url

  • 417

    SWI swissinfo.ch, Más extorsión y menos homicidios, la inseguridad se transforma en Venezuela, 11 July 2024, url

  • 418

    SWI swissinfo.ch, Más extorsión y menos homicidios, la inseguridad se transforma en Venezuela, 11 July 2024, url; USDOS, Designation of International Cartels, 20 February 2025, url

  • 419

    USDOS, Designation of International Cartels, 20 February 2025, url

  • 420

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 3

  • 421

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 11

  • 422

    IISS, After the fall: what Maduro’s capture means for criminal geopolitics, 7 January 2026, url; International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url

  • 423

    USDOS, Designation of International Cartels, 20 February 2025, url. See also: International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url

  • 424

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, pp. 3, 16

  • 425

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 36

  • 426

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 36

  • 427

    CNN, Un año del caso Ronald Ojeda: qué se sabe del secuestro y asesinato del exmilitar venezolano en Chile, 21 February 2025, url; CIPER, Estas son las evidencias que apuntan al gobierno venezolano en la investigación por el asesinato del exteniente Ronald Ojeda, 29 December 2025, url

  • 428

    USDOS, Designation of International Cartels, 20 February 2025, url

  • 429

    ABC, The US wants to control Venezuela's finances. These armed groups could make it difficult, 29 January 2026, url

  • 430

    International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url; Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 8

  • 431

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 5

  • 432

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 8

  • 433

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 8

  • 434

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 8

  • 435

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 8

  • 436

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 10

  • 437

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 10

  • 438

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 10

  • 439

    Transparencia Venezuela, Tren de Aragua: Criminal network without borders, April 2025, url, p. 10

  • 440

    InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 25 April 2025, url; International Crisis Group, Unpacking the Use of U.S. Wartime Powers against a Criminal “Invasion”, 26 March 2025, url 

  • 441

    InSight Crime, Tren del Llano, 31 May 2024, url

  • 442

    InSight Crime, Tren del Llano, 31 May 2024, url

  • 443

    InSight Crime, Tren del Llano, 31 May 2024, url

  • 444

    El Nacionalista, Operativo en Guárico dejó siete abatidos integrantes del Tren del Llano y suman 16 entre marzo y abril, 1 May 2016, url; El Periodiquito, Neutralizada presunta célula del "Tren del Llano". 1 May 2026, url