Colectivos are pro‑government paramilitary organisations382 accused of carrying out widespread abuses, often in coordination with state security forces, against protesters and political dissidents.383 Over time, they have consolidated political and social control in key neighbourhoods, preventing residents from protesting and pressuring them to vote for pro‑government candidates.384 Some colectivos reportedly conducted drills in late 2025 in preparation for a potential foreign invasion.385

Originally formed under Chávez as ideologically driven groups financed and armed by the state, colectivos have evolved into paramilitary structures that combine diminishing state support with increasing involvement in criminal activities to sustain their operations.386 Their close ties to police, military, and political actors have granted them access to subsidised food programmes, enabling them to divert low‑cost goods and resell them at higher prices in the areas they control.387 Colectivos also maintain strong political connections with PSUV officials, from councillors and mayors to governors and the Minister of the Interior,388 and in some cases act as intermediaries, brokering mutually beneficial arrangements due to their ability to influence local elections by directing residents to support specific candidates in exchange for favours.389 For example, Caracas Mayor Carmen Meléndez has reportedly collaborated closely with the colectivos Tres Raíces and La Piedrita, which campaigned for her in return for concessions and contracts.390 Amaya gave the view that 'colectivos are not homogeneous; they do not operate as a single unified organisation and conflicts can arise among them. What is consistent, however, is the fluid communication between colectivos and local authorities, as well as the integration that exists between civil and military authorities and these groups. It is therefore unlikely that a core colectivo based in Mérida would communicate with one in Miranda, but each maintains communication with authorities in its respective locality, and authorities do communicate with each other. The relationship is predominantly vertical rather than horizontal, although communication may occur between authorities even when it does not occur between colectivos'.391

Colectivos are reportedly under the influence of Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello,392 and following the fall of Maduro, they emerged as key actors due to their alignment with Cabello.393 Sources indicated that colectivos continued operating after Maduro’s capture,394 including by patrolling streets,395 restricting civic space, and harassing or intimidating independent media, civil society organisations, and political actors.396

A small number of colectivos retain the ideological roots of the community movements from which they emerged; most now prioritise revenue generation by controlling territory, operating local businesses, and negotiating arrangements with political actors.397 In the areas they dominate, colectivos have constructed a powerful system of local governance: they enforce rules and punishments within the communities they oversee, and they manage the distribution of subsidised food and certain public services, consolidating both social control and economic influence.398

Colectivos also engage in a range of criminal activities,399 operating with near‑total impunity due to their political protection.400 Crimes attributed to these groups include kidnapping, robbery, extortion,401 contract killings, small‑scale drug distribution, and the illicit sale of subsidised food.402 They additionally establish informal checkpoints within neighbourhoods, where they detain passersby and search their mobile phones for content deemed incriminating or critical of the government.403

Colectivos are heavily armed and well trained.404 The strongest colectivos are found in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood of Caracas, located near the presidential palace; many of these groups have aligned under the Sergio Rodríguez Revolutionary Collectives National Front (Frente Nacional de Colectivos Revolucionarios Sergio Rodríguez).405

  • 382

    El Mundo, El silencio y el miedo a los paramilitares chavistas se mezclan en las calles de Venezuela: "Estamos asustados, no sabemos qué va a pasar", 5 January 2026, url; Clarín, Las bandas paramilitares, otra vez al acecho en las calles venezolanas, 5 January 2026, url

  • 383

    HRW, World Report 2026: Venezuela, 2026, url; AI, The State of the World's Human Rights: Venezuela, 28 April 2025, url, p. 395

  • 384

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url 

  • 385

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url 

  • 386

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url; El Periódico, Colectivos armados, el factor decisivo en la reconfiguración del poder chavista tras la caída de Maduro, 14 January 2026, url

  • 387

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 388

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url; El Periódico, Colectivos armados, el factor decisivo en la reconfiguración del poder chavista tras la caída de Maduro, 14 January 2026, url

  • 389

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 390

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url; El Periódico, Colectivos armados, el factor decisivo en la reconfiguración del poder chavista tras la caída de Maduro, 14 January 2026, url 

  • 391

    Amaya, telephone interview,

  • 392

    Independent, Inside the Venezuelan refugee shanty towns where post-Trump hope is dangerous, 8 January 2026, url

  • 393

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 394

    DW, Venezuela: radiografía a los cien días de Delcy Rodríguez, 13 April 2026, url; UN, FFMV, Statement by Maria Eloisa Quintero, Expert Member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the 61st session of the Human Rights Council, 12 March 2026, url

  • 395

    DW, Venezuela: radiografía a los cien días de Delcy Rodríguez, 13 April 2026, url

  • 396

    UN, FFMV, Statement by Maria Eloisa Quintero, Expert Member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to the 61st session of the Human Rights Council, 12 March 2026, url

  • 397

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 398

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 399

    Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Venezuela, 2026, url, p. 6; InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 400

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 401

    Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Venezuela, 2026, url, p. 6; El Periódico, Colectivos armados, el factor decisivo en la reconfiguración del poder chavista tras la caída de Maduro, 14 January 2026, url

  • 402

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 403

    Time, Fear Grips Venezuela Amid a New Wave of Repression, 13 January 2026, url

  • 404

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url

  • 405

    InSight Crime, The Colectivos’ Role in the Struggle for Power in Post-Maduro Venezuela, 9 January 2026, url