1.5. Judicial system

The judiciary is organised into four tiers (courts of appeal, high tribunals, courts of first instance, and parish courts), which collectively handle civil and criminal matters.206 In addition, specialised jurisdictions oversee civil, criminal, labour, tax and customs, administrative, juvenile, military, and agrarian cases.207 The system is further complemented by justices of the peace, as well as the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Executive Office of the Magistracy, which supervises the lower courts.208

The judicial system is heavily influenced by the executive branch.209 The Supreme Justice Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ) has been effectively captured and turned into an extension of executive power; most TSJ magistrates are members of the PSUV or former government officials.210 In 2024, the TSJ appointed a new board of directors that included three judges who had previously run for elected office under the ruling PSUV before joining the judiciary.211 Many government contracts are awarded through 'emergency procurement', a mechanism that allows officials to bypass open bidding.212 Because the judiciary is described as 'heavily politicized', it often steps in to '"legalize"' unlawful or irregular practices.213

The Citizen's Corruption Observatory (OCC, Observatorio Ciudadano de Corrupción) reported that Venezuela’s witness‑protection law, revised in 2021, lacks clear definitions and procedures for safeguarding whistleblowers in corruption cases.214 This leaves decisions to the discretion of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, discouraging the reporting of corruption and often resulting in reprisals.215 According to the OCC, the agencies responsible for implementing the witness‑protection law are understaffed and provide only minimal and sporadic protection.216 The Public Ministry has not published statistics since 2017 and has not provided additional information to supplement the few institutional reports it has released.217

Sources indicated that access to justice for victims of civil‑rights violations is effectively non-existent.218 The judicial system applies the law selectively, targeting opposition figures and dissidents while shielding government officials from accountability.219 The government also uses the courts to criminalise dissent, employing fabricated charges against opposition leaders to neutralise political rivals rather than uphold justice.220 A number of foreign nationals have been detained and accused of engaging in 'mercenary', 'terrorist', or 'destabilising' activities.221 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS) reported that the Venezuelan government intensified these detentions in 2025 and that they are carried out in order to later 'us[e] them as bargaining chips for Venezuelan citizens deprived of liberty abroad'.222 Consular visits are routinely denied.223

Sources indicated that violations of due process are systematic.224 Detentions were frequently carried out by unidentified individuals who provided neither arrest warrants nor reasons for the arrest, often using excessive force.225 Those detained then faced legal proceedings and detention conditions marked by widespread abuses.226 Hearings were held privately and conducted through digital platforms; detainees were unable to see, hear, or question the officers involved and were denied communication with public defenders before or during the proceedings.227 Authorities routinely withheld information about detainees’ whereabouts, and the criteria and timelines for their release remained unclear.228

The UN Independent International Fact‑Finding Mission on Venezuela (UNFFMV) reported that investigations and judicial proceedings remain 'virtually paralyzed for years, with hearings repeatedly suspended due to the absence of defendants, frequent changes of judges, or delays in basic procedures'; most cases stall at the preliminary stage, leaving victims without an effective judicial response.229 The UNFFMV also found long gaps between procedural actions and cases dismissed by prosecutors without proper higher‑level review, hindering evidence collection, essential procedures, and efforts to secure the appearance of alleged perpetrators.230 Several detainees were photographed with incriminating items they did not possess at the time of arrest.231 Following the 2024 elections, in the context of what observers described as 'indiscriminate' detentions of dissidents and protestors, detainees were sent to provisional detention centres where prosecutors opened cases based on real or fabricated criticism of the government using social‑media posts or reports from 'cooperating patriots',232 regime‑affiliated groups, as evidence.233 Authorities organised collective hearings involving up to 103 individuals and brought charges such as 'terrorism', 'incitement to hatred', and 'instigation to commit a crime'.234

Sources indicated that habeas corpus235 is no longer an effective safeguard against violations, and that deliberate obstruction by justice officials has enabled these abuses.236 Acceso a la Justicia reported that between 2021 and 2023, Venezuelan courts issued 207 rulings on habeas corpus applications: only one was granted, 118 were rejected, and the remaining 88 consisted of procedural actions that neither approved nor denied the request (such as declaring an application incomplete or requesting additional information).237 The same source also noted that the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ took more than six years to rule on the single granted application (filed in July 2017 and approved in December 2023) which concerned an individual arrested for homicide in 2010 and held in preventive detention ever since.238

Sources indicated that impunity remained a problem in Venezuela.239 About 24.6 % of Venezuelans trust the justice system,240 and adherence to the law is described as the exception rather than the rule.241 The World Justice Project's (WJP) 2025 Rule of Law Index ranked Venezuela last out of 143 countries in overall adherence to the rule of law, and in the categories of 'constraints on government powers', 'regulatory enforcement', 'civil justice', and 'criminal justice'.242

Factors contributing to impunity include the absence of international‑standard judicial procedures, deficiencies in evidence collection, reluctance to investigate serious human rights violations,243 and a pattern in which investigations focus on the victims’ prior political or personal activities rather than the perpetrators’ intent.244 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) indicated that additional obstacles include lack of information on case status, insufficient resources, and high turnover among prosecutors.245 The US Department of State (USDOS) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Venezuela cited a 'general lack of transparency and technical criteria in the assignments of district attorneys to criminal investigations'.246

Transparencia Venezuela reported that, since 2000, judicial dismissals have been highly discretionary, and the Supreme Court has ruled that provisional judges may be removed through a simple administrative order.247 According to the ICJ, cooperation between state security forces and investigators or prosecutors is 'problematic', as security agencies implicated in human rights violations often interfere with Public Ministry investigations.248 Corruption is also prevalent in the justice system to obtain favourable rulings or procedural benefits.249 Transparencia Venezuela documented cases including the arrest of a prosecutor and two Public Defender’s Office representatives for receiving 360 000 USD from a member of criminal organisation Tren de Aragua in exchange for procedural advantages, as well as the detention of judicial employees, including a judge, who allegedly attempted to collect 100 000 USD from a woman to expedite her case.250 Illegal charges at registry offices and notaries are also reported as common.251 For additional information on Tren de Aragua, see section 2.1.2 Megabandas.

International Crisis Group indicated that judicial reform aimed at ensuring independence and dismantling the repressive structures that sustained chavismo has seen no meaningful progress since Maduro's fall.252 On 19 February 2026, interim president Rodríguez reactivated a long‑dormant 'reform commission', but it remains under the control of Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who has overseen it since its creation by Maduro in 2021.253

In March 2026, the UNFFMV indicated that state institutions previously identified as central to repression remain unchanged and unreformed, including the judiciary, the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and the Office of the Comptroller General.254 In a telephone interview, Víctor Amaya, Editor-in-Chief of Venezuelan news source Tal Cual, stated that justice‑system reforms are frequently announced but do not result in substantive change, noting that 'everything is changed so that nothing changes'.255