4. Treatment of certain profiles and groups of the population

4.1. Officials of the former government

4.1.1. General amnesty and its implementation

Soon after their takeover in 2021, the Taliban issued a general amnesty for individuals who had served in the former government’s civil administration and security forces. Since then, senior de facto officials have reiterated the de facto government’s commitment to the amnesty, calling for it to be upheld.1054 The amnesty’s text has not been available beyond general references to its existence,1055 and according to UNAMA this has caused uncertainties around its temporal scope and consequences for breaching it.1056 The challenging information environment complicates research on the issue, with the de facto authorities reportedly preventing reports on killings,1057 by deterring media,1058 victims and family members.1059

Despite the amnesty, extrajudicial killings of former civil and security personnel,1060 as well as arbitrary arrests and torture, have been documented.1061 There have not been any ‘large-scale purges’1062 or massacres,1063 as amid previous power-shifts in Afghan history.1064 Sources have indicated that the killings that have occurred have not been part of a ‘nationwide policy’1065 or an orchestrated campaign,1066 as this would have caused significantly more deaths.1067 However, in 2025, a joint investigative media report suggested some level of systematicity in the targeting of former security officials as three former elite soldiers had been tortured by de facto officials to extract contact details of former colleagues.1068 Rawadari reported that similarities in methods and victim selection among recorded killings indicated a more systematic and coordinated effort.1069

Sources have stressed that perpetrators have not been held accountable1070 and described a climate of impunity around the issue of targeted killings.1071 When commenting on the functioning of the de facto administration in general, Timor Sharan, Director of the research organisation Afghanistan Policy Lab, stressed the high level of ambiguity and lack of control of operative de facto officials, allowing them to unpredictably conduct arrests and abuse anyone without being held accountable.1072 The de facto administration itself also sometimes struggled to locate arrested individuals within its own structures.1073

While killings and other abuse against former military and civil government employees have been reported,1074 retired former government officials have staged regular street protests to demand their pensions.1075 Some senior members of the former government have also been able to remain in Afghanistan.1076 This includes former President Hamid Karzai,1077 the former chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah,1078 and the leader of the political party Hezb-e Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.1079 The de facto government has not awarded them with any role in the de facto government or given them any advisory status, but they continue to meet with segments of society.1080 Karzai has been publicly advocating for inter alia women’s access to education,1081 and Hekmatyar has been publicly voicing concerns over the de facto administration’s legitimacy and its ability to maintain security.1082 Meanwhile, Abdullah has reportedly avoided public commentary and maintains a lower profile.1083 They have however faced some restrictions,1084 including travel restrictions for Karzai and Abdullah in 2022 and 2023.1085 Hekmatyar was evicted from his government-owned home in Kabul City in March 2024,1086 and in April 2025, the Taliban Supreme Leader issued an order to shut down all active offices of Hezb-e-Islami, arrest affiliated staff, and confiscate party assets.1087

Immediately after the Taliban takeover in 2021, most male civilian former public officials resumed their duties within the new de facto administration,1088 as most of the former administration’s structure was retained.1089 Most female civil servants were however sent home1090 and have not been invited back to work.1091 There has moreover been a gradual exchange of personnel, where those who used to work for the former government have been replaced by individuals loyal to the Taliban.1092 Most new recruits to the de facto authorities have been ethnic Pashtuns,1093 and also in Hazara-dominated areas such as Bamyan and Daykundi most employees of minority communities have been replaced with Pashtuns.1094

Although most former security personnel have been dismissed in favour of Taliban members,1095 some have been retained or invited back to work due to their specialist skills.1096 Sources reported on the de facto authorities making use of biometrics to identify former government personnel, and dismiss them from the de facto security forces.1097 In research for Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep) from November 2024, former ANDSF members stated that they were ‘prevented from leading a normal life’, not being allowed to serve in the de facto security forces, constantly fearing arrests, and facing ‘hurdles in simple tasks such as registering a vehicle’ – sometimes the de facto police refused registration as they could identify the person as having served in the ANDSF as the process involves biometric registration.1098

The de facto authorities have announced that former officials returning from abroad will be ensured safety,1099 and established the ‘Commission for the Return and Communications with Former Afghan Officials and Political Figures’ in March 2022.1100 As mentioned, following the US entry ban on Afghan citizens in June 2025, the de facto prime minister reiterated the general amnesty1101 and said that all who fled after the collapse of the former government were free to return home under safe conditions.1102 The commission claimed that 1 223 former government officials had returned via the commission by July 2025.1103 These figures could not be corroborated.

There have been reports of sporadic cases in which former government officials have been killed, subjected to arbitrary arrests and torture after returning to Afghanistan,1104 including individuals who had been personally invited back by the Taliban as reported by Rawadari in August 2024.1105

  • 1054

    UNAMA, No safe heaven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan, July 2025, url, p. 9

  • 1055

    Afghanistan International, Former Afghan President’s Daughter Draws Attention During Meeting With Abdullah, 28 April 2025, url; International analyst (A), interview 8–9 June 2023, and email communication, 10 October 2023

  • 1056

    UNAMA, A barrier to securing peace: Human rights violations against former government officials and former armed force members in Afghanistan, 22 August 2023, url, p. 11

  • 1057

    Germany, BAMF, Länderkurzinformation Afghanistan, Situation ehemaliger Sicherheitskräfte (ANSF), October 2024, url, p. 1

  • 1058

    Rawadari, Afghanistan, Human Rights Situation Report 2023, March 2024, url, pp. 5, 11

  • 1059

    Rawadari, The Afghanistan Mid-Year Human Rights Situation Report, August 2024, url, p. 10

  • 1060

    Rahimi, H. and Watkins, A., Taliban Rule at 2.5 Years, CTC Sentinel, January 2024, url, p. 1; Rawadari, Afghanistan Mid-Year Human Rights Situation Report: January-June 30, 2025, August 2025, url, p. 19; UNAMA, Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: January-March 2024, 1 May 2024, url, p. 6

  • 1061

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 5 September 2025, url, para. 28

  • 1062

    Rahimi, H. and Watkins, A., Taliban Rule at 2.5 Years, CTC Sentinel, January 2024, url, p. 1

  • 1063

    Rahimi, H. and Watkins, A., Taliban Rule at 2.5 Years, CTC Sentinel, January 2024, url, p. 1 7; Richard Bennet in Radio Sweden, Konflikt: Dödshoten mot Sveriges medarbetare i Afghanistan, 12 January 2024, url, 25:40–25:48

  • 1064

    Homayun Nadiri, K., Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond, January 2017, url, pp. 164, 166, 172; HRW, Afghanistan, The Forgotten War: Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws Of War Since the Soviet Withdrawal, February 1991, url; HRW, Afghanistan: Blood-Stained Hands: II. Historical Background, 2005, url

  • 1065

    International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, 12 August 2022, url, p. 23

  • 1066

    International journalist, online interview, 3 October 2023

  • 1067

    International journalist, online interview, 3 October 2023; International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban, 12 August 2022, url, p. 23

  • 1068

    Lighthouse Reports, Hunted by the Taliban, 15 October 2025, url

  • 1069

    Rawadari, Afghanistan Mid-Year Human Rights Situation Report: January-June 30, 2025, August 2025, url, p. 16

  • 1070

    UN, Afghanistan’s Taliban responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials, 22 August 2023, url; Rawadari, Afghanistan Mid-Year Human Rights Situation Report: January-June 30, 2025, August 2025, url, p. 19; Sharan, T., email, 27 November 2025

  • 1071

    AI, The State of the World’s Human Rights: April 2024, 23 April 2024, url, p. 71; Rahimi, H. and Watkins, A., Taliban Rule at 2.5 Years, CTC Sentinel, January 2024, url, p. 1; Sharan, T., email, 27 November 2025

  • 1072

    Sharan, T., email, 27 November 2025

  • 1073

    Sharan, T., email, 27 November 2025; ACCORD, Afghanistan: Report on the impact of the Taliban’s information practices and legal policies, particularly on women and girls, February 2025, url, p. 48

  • 1074

    UNAMA, A barrier to securing peace: Human rights violations against former government officials and former armed force members in Afghanistan, 22 August 2023, url, pp. 6–9

  • 1075

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 6 December 2024, url, para. 10; Sabawoon, A. M., Where Are My Rights? Afghan retirees appeal for their pensions, AAN, 22 May 2024, url

  • 1076

    Afghanistan International, Taliban Leader Reportedly Pressures Hamid Karzai Into Exile, 28 August 2025, url

  • 1077

    Afghanistan International, Taliban Lifts Ban on Former President’s Travel, Claim Sources, 20 May 2024, url

  • 1078

    Amu TV, UN’s DiCarlo meets with Karzai, Abdullah in Afghanistan, 19 May 2024, url

  • 1079

    TOLOnews, No Restrictions Imposed on Former Govt Officials: Mujahid, 28 April 2023, url

  • 1080

    Afghanistan International, Former Afghan President’s Daughter Draws Attention During Meeting With Abdullah, 28 April 2025, url

  • 1081

    Afghanistan International, Former Afghan President’s Daughter Draws Attention During Meeting With Abdullah, 28 April 2025, url; TOLOnews, Karzai: Ban on Girls' Education Key to Lack of Intl Recognition, 30 May 2025, url

  • 1082

    Afghanistan International, Hekmatyar Warns Of Rising Instability, Calls For Legitimate Government In Afghanistan, 24 February 2025, url; Ariana News, Hekmatyar: We need a legitimate government in Afghanistan, 24 February 2025, url

  • 1083

    Afghanistan International, Former Afghan President’s Daughter Draws Attention During Meeting With Abdullah, 28 April 2025, url

  • 1084

    Diplomat (The), Bridging the Gap: Karzai, the Taliban, and the US Dilemma in Afghanistan, 1 April 2025, url; TOLOnews, Abdullah Abdullah Leaves Afghanistan, 1 May 2022, url

  • 1085

    TOLOnews, Karzai’s Relatives Confirm Ban On His Travel Abroad, 6 September 2023, url; TOLOnews, Abdullah Abdullah Leaves Afghanistan, 1 May 2022, url

  • 1086

    AW, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar relocated from state-owned land by Taliban officials, 30 April 2024, url

  • 1087

    Rudabe, Taliban Orders Closure of Hezb-e-Islami Offices and Arrest of Party Staff in Widening Crackdown, 14 April 2025, url; Kabul Now, Taliban Orders Closure of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami Offices, Arrest of Members, 14 April 2025, url

  • 1088

    Afghan analyst, interview 8–9 June 2023, and email communication, 10 October 2023; International analyst (A), interview 8–9 June 2023, and email communication, 10 October 2023; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report, Afghanistan, 19 March 2024, url, p. 31

  • 1089

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 17

  • 1090

    International analyst (A), interview 8–9 June 2023, and email communication, 10 October 2023; ACAPS, Afghanistan, Scenarios, April 2023, url, p. 13

  • 1091

    AAN, Deepening Discrimination: A dossier of reports about Afghan women, 8 March 2025, url

  • 1092

    Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Afghanistan, Situasjonen for afghanske menn, 20 January 2025, url, p. 13; Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 17; van Bijlert, M., How The Emirate Wants To Be Perceived, AAN, July 2024, url, p. 30

  • 1093

    Formuli, H. A., Leaving Many Behind: Examining the State of Inclusivity and Non-Discrimination in Afghanistan, RWI, May 2025, url, p. 44; Norway, Landinfo, Temanotat, Afghanistan, Situasjonen for afghanske menn, 20 January 2025, url, p. 13

  • 1094

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 18; Kerr Chiovenda, M., email, 29 November 2025

  • 1095

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 18

  • 1096

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 19; Afghan analyst, online interview 1 October 2024, and email communication 13 October 2024. The interview was conducted by the EUAA in cooperation with Austrian, Norwegian and Swedish COI units

  • 1097

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 18; Afghan analyst, online interview 1 October 2024, and email communication 13 October 2024. The interview was conducted by the EUAA in cooperation with Austrian, Norwegian and Swedish COI units.

  • 1098

    Saleem, M. A. and Semple, M., Peace Matrix for Afghanistan, PeaceRep, 11 November 2024, url, p. 28

  • 1099

    TOLOnews, Islamic Emirate Pledges Safety for Returning Afghans, 21 May 2022, url; Ariana News, EA reassures returning Afghan politicians and military figures of their security, 22 May 2022, url

  • 1100

    Arab News, Former government officials return to Kabul at Taliban invitation, 8 June 2022, url

  • 1101

    TRT World, Taliban urges Afghans to ‘return to your country’ after new US travel ban, 7 June 2025, url

  • 1102

    AP, The Taliban leader slams Trump’s travel ban on Afghans and calls the US an ‘oppressor’, 7 June 2025, url

  • 1103

    TOLOnews, Contact Commission Issues Security Cards to Returning Former Officials, 27 July 2025, url

  • 1104

    UNAMA, No safe haven: Human rights risks faced by persons involuntarily returned to Afghanistan, July 2025, url, pp. 17–18

  • 1105

    Rawadari, The Afghanistan Mid-Year Human Rights Situation Report, August 2024, url, p. 11