2.2.2. Activities of the ISKP

Table of contents

2.2.2. Activities of the ISKP

The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team estimated the strength of the ISKP to 2 000 individuals in 2025, and described the group as ‘scattered across the northern and northeastern provinces’.594 Sources suggest that the ISKP has not had any overt presence in Afghanistan under the de facto government.595 The group reportedly operate through scattered decentralised networks596 of cells scattered across the country.597 Many ISKP cells have moreover relocated from former strongholds to Pakistan and northern Afghanistan.598 The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported on sympathisers and supports increasing ‘significantly’ in the provinces of Badakhshan and Kunduz, including in retaliation for the de facto authorities poppy eradication campaign.599 AW reported on ISKP attacks as well as counteroperations by the de facto authorities ‘intensifying’ in the north of Afghanistan in the first quarter of 2025, with five attacks being claimed in the provinces of Baghlan, Takhar, and Kunduz, and counteroperations taking place in the provinces of Sar-e Pul, Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, and Samangan.600

The number of ISKP attacks have significantly decreased since peaking in 2022.601 The group’s operational capacity has reportedly been weakened following intense counter-operations602 in which the de facto authorities captured and killed several ISKP commanders and dismantled numerous ISKP cells.603 International Crisis Group noted that the ISKP had shifted its operations to targets abroad,604 although other sources noted that sporadic ISKP attacks have continued in Afghanistan, mainly targeting the de facto authorities,605 but also religious minorities:606 on 21 November 2024 the ISKP attacked the Sufi community in Nahrin District (Baghlan Province),607 and on 14 June 2025 a Shia imam was shot and beheaded in Nusay District (Badakshan Province) by unknown individuals leaving behind an ISKP flag.608

The UN Secretary-General’s report assessed that the ISKP poses no significant challenge to the de facto authorities’ territorial control.609 In the period 1 August 2024–30 January 2025 the UN recorded at least 12 attacks.610 In subsequent reports covering the reporting period 1 February–31 October 2025, the UN Secretary-General states that attacks continue without providing any numbers,611 adding that they have decreased in number and scale since 1 May 2025.612 Although the ISKP claimed no attack in 1 May–31 July 2025, the UN Secretary-General noted that the de facto GDI and the de facto security forces had carried out several operations killing alleged ISKP members in Kabul City, and the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan, and that the ISKP had attacked de facto security forces in Darah-i Nur District (Nangarhar Province) on 15 June 2025, and clashed with de facto security forces in Alingar District (Lagman Province) on 8 July 2025.613 Within the reference period of this report, ACLED recorded 13 events in which the ISKP was the apparent perpetrating actor in the provinces of Baghlan (3 events), Nangarhar (3), Kabul (2), Ghor (1), Kunar (1), Kunduz (1), Laghman (1), Takhar (1).614

According to the UN Secretary-General reporting on 6 December 2024, IEDs and suicide attacks, primarily claimed by the ISKP, were the leading cause of civilian casualties in the period 1 August–30 October 2024. The source recorded 87 civilian casualties caused by such attacks, including 16 deaths and 71 injured.615 In a subsequent publication covering the period 1 November 2024–30 April 2025, the UN Secretary-General reported on 88 civilians killed in attacks, and 150 civilians wounded, but did not always specify the actor behind the attacks or the means of the attack.616 No IED attack was mentioned in the UN report covering 1 May–31 July 2025.617 According to UCDP, events involving the ISKP caused 20 civilian deaths within the reference period of this report.618

  • 594

    UN Security Council, Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 24 July 2025, url, paras. 86–87

  • 595

    Giustozzi, A., Crisis and adaptation of the Islamic State in Khorasan, LSE IDEAS, February 2024, url, pp. 7, 11; Winter, C., ISKP: A Primer, CJA, May 2025, url, pp. 7–8, 17

  • 596

    AW, ISKP shifts focus to northern Afghanistan, 31 March 2025, url

  • 597

    Diplomat (The), Is the Islamic State of Khorasan Province Losing Momentum, 26 June 2025, url; Giustozzi, A., Crisis and adaptation of the Islamic State in Khorasan, LSE IDEAS, February 2024, url, p. 11

  • 598

    Giustozzi, A., Crisis and adaptation of the Islamic State in Khorasan, LSE IDEAS, February 2024, url, pp. 7, 11

  • 599

    UN Security Council, Thirty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 6 February 2025, url, para. 87

  • 600

    AW, ISKP shifts focus to northern Afghanistan, 31 March 2025, url

  • 601

    International Crisis Group, The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?, 16 July 2025, url

  • 602

    UN Security Council, Thirty-sixth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, 24 July 2025, url, para. 88; International Crisis Group, The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?, 16 July 2025, url; Diplomat (The), Is the Islamic State of Khorasan Province Losing Momentum, 26 June 2025, url

  • 603

    International Crisis Group, The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?, 16 July 2025, url

  • 604

    International Crisis Group, The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?, 16 July 2025, url

  • 605

    HRW, World Report 2025, Afghanistan, Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 6 December 2024, url, para. 26

  • 606

    ACCORD, Afghanistan: Report on the impact of the Taliban’s information practices and legal policies, particularly on women and girls, February 2025, url, p. 20; HRW, World Report 2025, Afghanistan, Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for

  • 607

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 21 February 2025, url, para. 20

  • 608

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 5 September 2025, url, para. 13

  • 609

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 21 February 2025, url, para. 3; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url, para. 3

  • 610

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 6 December 2024, url, para. 15; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 21 February 2025, url, para. 20

  • 611

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url, para. 21; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 5 September 2025, url, para. 18; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 3 December 2025, url, para. 18

  • 612

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url, para. 18; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 3 December 2025, url, para. 18

  • 613

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url, para. 18

  • 614

    ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan covering the period 1 October 2024–30 November 2025, as of 10 December 2025, url

  • 615

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 6 December 2024, url, paras. 25–26

  • 616

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 21 February 2025, url, para. 32; UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url, para. 30

  • 617

    UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 11 June 2025, url

  • 618

    UCDP, data covering the period 1 October 2024–30 November 2025, provided by courtesy of UCDP in an email, 8 December 2025.