2.3. Conflict trends by province

2.3. Conflict trends by province

Kabul City and Kabul Province
Kabul City has faced most security incidents since the Taliban takeover in August 2021. As noted by Landinfo, many high-profile de facto government targets are located in the capital, and Kabul has a large population.667 Sources suggest that the general security situation in Kabul City has improved since the powershift.668 ACLED recorded 155 events in Kabul Province within the reference period of this report, and the main actors involved were the de facto security forces targeting civilians, and the NRF and AFF targeting the de facto security forces.669 The UN Secretary-General noted that the de facto authorities had carried out several operations killing alleged ISKP members in, inter alia, Kabul City.670 Some notable events in Kabul City included:

• 19 October 2024: AFF claimed two rocket attacks against Kabul airport;671

• 11 December 2024: the ISKP carried out a suicide attack outside the de facto Ministry of Refugees killing the de facto Minister of Refugees, Khalil Haqqani, and six others;672

• 28 December 2024: an IED explosion by NRF killed one and injured four civilians;673

• 13 February 2025: the ISKP carried out a suicide attack against the de facto Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, killing 3 and injuring 10 employees, including the de facto Deputy Minister674 who was ‘severely injured’;675

• 9 and 15 October 2025: Pakistan carried out carried out two airstrikes.676

Northeastern provinces
When comparing conflict data of northeastern provinces (Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Panjsher) from the period January–November 2024 with the same period in 2025, ACLED events have remained on similar levels with 201 events recorded in 2024 and 188 in 2025.677 Within the reference period of this report (1 October 2024–30 November 2025), data trends looked as follows:

Kunduz (71 ACLED events). Most events involved resistance groups targeting de facto security forces.678 Rawadari recorded suicide and explosive attacks causing civilian deaths and injuries in, inter alia, Kunduz in the first half of 2025, but did not provide a data breakdown.679 One notable attack claimed by the ISKP targeted de facto security force employees collecting their salaries in Kunduz City, killing 15 de facto officials and 4 civilians.680

Takhar (65 ACLED events). Most events involved the de facto security forces targeting civilians, and resistance groups targeting the de facto security forces.681 In the first quarter of 2025, AW reported on counteroperations against the ISKP in the province.682 Notable attacks reported by other sources included:

• 5 October 2024: an IED explosion in front of a high school, wounding six children, one man, and two de facto police officers. NRF claimed responsibility.683

• 21 December 2024: an IED explosion in Taloqan City injuring a civilian. The Afghan Liberation Front claimed responsibility. 684

• 21 January 2025: the killing of a Chinese citizen and a de facto security official in Khwaja Baha ud Din District. The ISKP claimed responsibility.685

Badakhshan (54 ACLED events) and Baghlan (24 ACLED events). Most events involved resistance groups targeting the de facto security forces, and the de facto security forces targeting civilians. In both provinces, a handful cases were also attributed to the ISKP or ‘unidentified armed groups’, targeting both civilians and the de facto security forces.686 UCDP recorded 37 civilian deaths in Badakhshan, mainly connected to the de facto security forces targeting civilians, including violently supressing protests causing 13 deaths. Moreover, 10 civilian deaths were caused by unknown actors targeting civilians. In Baghlan, UCDP recorded 17 civilian deaths, whereof 11 were caused by the ISKP attacking a Sufi shrine.687 In the first quarter of 2025, AW reported on counteroperations against the ISKP taking place in, inter alia, these provinces,688 and the UN Secretary-General reported on killings of alleged ISKP members during operations in, inter alia, Badakhshan.689 Notable attacks in Baghlan included:

• 21 November 2024: the ISKP attacked a Sufi shrine in Nahrin District, killing 11 people;690

• 7 January 2025: the ISKP attacked two pro-Taliban clerics, killing one of them;691

• 18 January 2025: the AFF threw a hand grenade against a de facto police checkpoint in Pul-e Khumri, killing one man and injuring 18 others.692

Panjsher (32 ACLED events). Most events involved de facto security forces targeting civilians, but also a small number of cases in which resistance groups and unidentified armed actors targeted the de facto security forces.693 According to Kerr Chiovenda, there is a lot of military presence in Andarab District and Panjsher, due to its history of resistance, although NRF has been almost completely suppressed.694 More information is available in section 4.3.1. Suspected affiliates of resistance groups.

Western provinces
When comparing conflict data of western provinces (Badghis, Farah, Ghor, Herat) from the period January–November 2024 with the same period in 2025, ACLED events have decreased with 136 events recorded in 2024 and 74 in 2025.695 Within the reference period of this report (1 October 2024–30 November 2025), data trends looked as follows:

Herat (69 events). Most events involved resistance groups targeting the de facto security forces, and the de facto security forces targeting civilians.696 UCDP recorded 16 civilian deaths, connected to various situations, including violent crime.697

Badghis (25 ACLED events) and Farah (15 ACLED events). Most events involved resistance groups and unidentified armed groups targeting the de facto authorities.698 UCDP recorded 9 civilian deaths in Badghis and 4 in Farah, mainly attributed to unknown actors targeting civilians.699 In Ghor (13 ACLED events), most events involved the de facto security forces targeting civilians.700 UCDP recorded 9 civilian deaths in Ghor, caused by the de facto government and unknown actors.701

Northwestern provinces
When comparing conflict data of northwestern provinces (Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Samangan, and Sar-e Pul) from the period January–November 2024 with the same period in 2025, ACLED events have decreased with 69 events recorded in 2024 and 44 in 2025.702 Within the reference period of this report (1 October 2024–30 November 2025), data trends look as follows:

Balkh (21 ACLED events). Most events involved unidentified armed groups and de facto security forces targeting civilians. There were also some events in which resistance groups targeted the de facto authorities.703 UCDP recorded 8 civilian deaths in the province.704 Notable events included three IEDs attacks in Mazar-e Sharif in April 2025, two of which were claimed by the AFF and wounded seven civilians, and one remain unclaimed and killed one man and wounded nine men and one boy.705 According to Afghan media sources the third attack took place in the vicinity of a Shia mosque.706

Faryab (23 ACLED events). Most events involved the de facto security forces and unidentified armed groups targeting civilians, and also some cases of resistance groups targeting the de facto security forces.707 In Samangan (10 ACLED events), Jowzjan (7), and Sar-e Pul (4), most events involved de facto military forces and unidentified armed groups targeting civilians.708 UCDP recorded 2 civilian deaths in Samangan, 17 civilian deaths in Jowzjan, and 11 civilian deaths in Sar-e Pul, mainly connected to unknown armed groups targeting civilians, but also some cases in which civilians were targeted by the de facto security forces, and one case in which the ISKP caused two civilian deaths in Sar-e Pul.709 AW reported counteroperations against the ISKP in, inter alia, Sar-e Pul and Samangan.710

South and southeastern provinces
When comparing conflict data of southern and southeastern provinces (Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, Paktya, Laghman, Ghazni, Kunar, Nuristan, Kandahar, Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, and Zabul) from the period January–November 2024 with the same period in 2025, ACLED events have increased with 195 events recorded in 2024 and 226 in 2025.711 Some areas along the border with Pakistan have been impacted by airstrikes and cross-border violence.712 Within the reference period of this report (1 October 2024–30 November 2025), data trends looked as follows:

In Nangarhar (63 ACLED events), Khost (37), Paktika (32), and Paktya (24), a large share of events involved Pakistani security forces, but also the de facto security forces targeting civilians. In Laghman (14 ACLED events) and Ghazni (13), most events involved de facto authorities targeting civilians. In Kunar (37 ACLED events), there were events in which Pakistani security forces and unidentified armed groups also clashed with the TTP. In Nuristan (7 ACLED events), most events involved Pakistani security forces and unidentified armed groups targeting civilians.713 A large share of civilian deaths recorded by the UCDP in Khost (20) and Paktika (67) where caused by Pakistani airstrikes.714 The UN Secretary-General noted that the de facto intelligence and security forces had carried out several operations killing alleged ISKP members in Kunar and Nangarhar in the period 1 May–31 July 2025. The ISKP moreover attacked de facto security forces in Darah-i Nur District (Nangarhar Province) on 15 June 2025, clashed with de facto security forces in Alingar District (Lagman Province) on 8 July 2025,715 and reportedly carried out an explosion and subsequent ambush on de facto security forces, killing three de facto state employees in Kunar Province on 12 October 2024.716

Kandahar (37 ACLED events). Most events involved Pakistani security forces targeting civilians and the de facto security forces, although there were also a large share of events in which the de facto security forces targeted civilians.717 UCDP recorded 48 civilian deaths, with a large share caused by Pakistani airstrikes and border clashes.718

Helmand (23 ACLED events). Most events involved unidentified groups targeting civilians, the de facto security forces and Pakistani security forces. There were also clashes between the de facto and Pakistani security forces. Both actors also targeted civilians.

Most events in Nimruz (11), Uruzgan (4) and Zabul (3) related to the de facto security forces targeting civilians.719

Other provinces
In Parwan (35 ACLED events) and Kapisa (25) the data involved various actors, with civilians mainly being targeted by the de facto security forces. The de facto security forces were also targeted by resistance groups as well as unidentified groups. In Wardak (13 events), Daykundi (7), Logar (3), Bamyan (1), most events related to de facto security forces targeting civilians.720

Figure 4. Conflict data by province
The table on the next page contains available conflict, population, and displacement data. Data limitations include challenges in collecting accurate data on population movements,721 and population data, as Afghanistan lacks a census.722 The official population data used is an estimate based on a household listing collected in 2003–2005 and mathematical formulas. As per this estimate the Afghan population stands at 36 million people in 2025,723 which is about 10 million less than figures used by e.g. the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).724 There has also been a recent large-scale influx of returnees from neighbouring countries.725 It should further be noted that the UNHCR return data only include parts of 2025 and not the whole reference period of this report.726

Figure 5. ACLED data by province

Source: ACLED, Curated Data Files, Afghanistan covering the period 1 October 2024–30 November 2025, as of 10 December 2025, url