

## 4. Treatment of certain profiles and groups of the population

### 4.1. Officials of the former government

#### 4.1.1. General amnesty and its implementation

Soon after their takeover in 2021, the Taliban issued a general amnesty for individuals who had served in the former government's civil administration and security forces. Since then, senior de facto officials have reiterated the de facto government's commitment to the amnesty, calling for it to be upheld.[1054](#) The amnesty's text has not been available beyond general references to its existence,[1055](#) and according to UNAMA this has caused uncertainties around its temporal scope and consequences for breaching it.[1056](#) The challenging information environment complicates research on the issue, with the de facto authorities reportedly preventing reports on killings,[1057](#) by deterring media,[1058](#) victims and family members.[1059](#)

Despite the amnesty, extrajudicial killings of former civil and security personnel,[1060](#) as well as arbitrary arrests and torture, have been documented.[1061](#) There have not been any 'large-scale purges'[1062](#) or massacres,[1063](#) as amid previous power-shifts in Afghan history.[1064](#) Sources have indicated that the killings that have occurred have not been part of a 'nationwide policy'[1065](#) or an orchestrated campaign,[1066](#) as this would have caused significantly more deaths.[1067](#) However, in 2025, a joint investigative media report suggested some level of systematicity in the targeting of former security officials as three former elite soldiers had been tortured by de facto officials to extract contact details of former colleagues.[1068](#) Rawadari reported that similarities in methods and victim selection among recorded killings indicated a more systematic and coordinated effort.[1069](#)

Sources have stressed that perpetrators have not been held accountable[1070](#) and described a climate of impunity around the issue of targeted killings.[1071](#) When commenting on the functioning of the de facto administration in general, Timor Sharan, Director of the research organisation Afghanistan Policy Lab, stressed the high level of ambiguity and lack of control of operative de facto officials, allowing them to unpredictably conduct arrests and abuse anyone without being held accountable.[1072](#) The de facto administration itself also sometimes struggled to locate arrested individuals within its own structures.[1073](#)

While killings and other abuse against former military and civil government employees have been reported,[1074](#) retired former government officials have staged regular street protests to demand their pensions.[1075](#) Some senior members of the former government have also been able to remain in Afghanistan.[1076](#) This includes former President Hamid Karzai,[1077](#) the former chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah,[1078](#) and the leader of the political party Hezb-e Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.[1079](#) The de facto government has not awarded them with any role in the de facto government or given them any advisory status, but they continue to meet with segments of society.[1080](#) Karzai has been publicly advocating for *inter alia* women's access to education,[1081](#) and Hekmatyar has been publicly voicing concerns over the de facto administration's legitimacy and its ability to maintain security.[1082](#) Meanwhile, Abdullah has reportedly avoided public commentary and maintains a lower profile.[1083](#) They

have however faced some restrictions,[1084](#) including travel restrictions for Karzai and Abdullah in 2022 and 2023.[1085](#) Hekmatyar was evicted from his government-owned home in Kabul City in March 2024,[1086](#) and in April 2025, the Taliban Supreme Leader issued an order to shut down all active offices of Hezb-e-Islami, arrest affiliated staff, and confiscate party assets.[1087](#)

Immediately after the Taliban takeover in 2021, most male civilian former public officials resumed their duties within the new de facto administration,[1088](#) as most of the former administration's structure was retained.[1089](#) Most female civil servants were however sent home[1090](#) and have not been invited back to work.[1091](#) There has moreover been a gradual exchange of personnel, where those who used to work for the former government have been replaced by individuals loyal to the Taliban.[1092](#) Most new recruits to the de facto authorities have been ethnic Pashtuns,[1093](#) and also in Hazara-dominated areas such as Bamyan and Daykundi most employees of minority communities have been replaced with Pashtuns.[1094](#)

Although most former security personnel have been dismissed in favour of Taliban members,[1095](#) some have been retained or invited back to work due to their specialist skills.[1096](#) Sources reported on the de facto authorities making use of biometrics to identify former government personnel, and dismiss them from the de facto security forces.[1097](#) In research for Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep) from November 2024, former ANDSF members stated that they were 'prevented from leading a normal life', not being allowed to serve in the de facto security forces, constantly fearing arrests, and facing 'hurdles in simple tasks such as registering a vehicle' – sometimes the de facto police refused registration as they could identify the person as having served in the ANDSF as the process involves biometric registration.[1098](#)

The de facto authorities have announced that former officials returning from abroad will be ensured safety,[1099](#) and established the 'Commission for the Return and Communications with Former Afghan Officials and Political Figures' in March 2022.[1100](#) As mentioned, following the US entry ban on Afghan citizens in June 2025, the de facto prime minister reiterated the general amnesty[1101](#) and said that all who fled after the collapse of the former government were free to return home under safe conditions.[1102](#) The commission claimed that 1 223 former government officials had returned via the commission by July 2025.[1103](#) These figures could not be corroborated.

There have been reports of sporadic cases in which former government officials have been killed, subjected to arbitrary arrests and torture after returning to Afghanistan,[1104](#) including individuals who had been personally invited back by the Taliban as reported by Rawadari in August 2024.[1105](#)

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