6.3. Areas controlled by different actors

6.3. Areas controlled by different actors

As of July 2025, the LAF had deployed over 5 000 of their planned 10 000 troops south of the Litani River, trying to take control of areas previously dominated by Hezbollah.431 Despite this, Hezbollah continued to maintain presence in the south of Lebanon.432 In August 2025, Daher stated that ‘in practice, Hezbollah retains influence in southern Lebanon, parts of the north-east, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, while the army is already deployed alongside Hezbollah in these areas, and the organisation maintains a presence beyond the south’.433 Daher further noted that the ‘LAF and Hezbollah sometimes both operate on the ground in the same areas’.434 However, ‘the groups co-exist rather than compete for control and are not hostile to each other’, according to Daher.435 For more information on disarming Hezbollah and deployment of LAF to the south, see section 6.2 Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel.

As of September 2025, UNIFIL continued its mandate in southern Lebanon.436 According to its August 2025 report, the mission operated from 50 positions along the Blue Line, supported by a Maritime Task Force of five patrolling ships, and was staffed by over 10 000 troops from around 50 countries, along with 800 civilian personnel.437

As of September 2025, Israel continued to maintain military positions at five locations in southern Lebanon438 including Hamames hill (Marjayoun district), Labouneh/Alma al-Shaab (Sour), Jabal Blat near Ramaya (Bint Jbeil), Jal al-Deir south of Aitaroun (Bint Jbeil), and a newly established position along the Markaba-Houla road (Marjayoun).439 These locations were chosen by the Israeli army for their elevation and proximity to the border, providing surveillance over areas linked to Hezbollah activity.440 In addition, Israel has continued occupying the Shebaa Farms since 1967.441 UNIFIL reported that the Israel Defense Forces remained in five positions and two buffer zones north of the Blue Line, while also observing their presence on at least 98 occasions outside these posts in areas such as Arab al-Luwayzah, Ghajar, Markaba, Ayta al-Sha‘b, Labouneh, Marwahin, Rumaysh and Ramiyah, often engaged in earthworks or installing concertina wire.442

On 21 December 2024, the LAF took control of three military bases in Bekaa that had for decades been held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah al-Intifada (Palestinian factions), including positions in Sultan Yaaqoub and Hechmech, as part of efforts to confiscate weapons, dismantle non-state armed infrastructure, and extend state authority.443 According to Arab News, these factions were historically aligned with the Syrian regime and later with Hezbollah, and the army seized weapons and equipment during the takeover.444

As of June 2025, a PLO delegation has been working with Lebanese officials in Beirut on a plan to disarm armed groups in all 12 Palestinian refugee camps in the country, aiming to strengthen state control, though the effort faced delays and resistance from factions not aligned with the Palestinian Authority.445 The 12 official Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are located across several cities and areas:446 (1) Burj al-Barajneh in the southern suburbs of Beirut;447 (2) Shatila in Beirut448 (near Sabra, a neighbourhood that became an extension of the camp due to population displacement and informal settlement after 1948449); (3) Mar Elias in southern Beirut;450 (4) Dbayeh 12 kilometers north of Beirut;451 (5) Nahr el-Bared near Tripoli;452 (6) Beddawi northeast of Tripoli;453 (7) Ain el-Helweh south of Saida;454 (8) Mieh Mieh south of Saida;455 (9) Rashidieh south of Tyre;456 (10) El Buss south of Tyre;457 (11) Burj Shemali near Tyre;458 and (12) Al-Jalil459, which is referred to as Wavel camp by UNRWA, located near Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley.460

As of July 2025, Lebanon has dismantled over 500 arms sites in the south since the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war461 though the state has continued to struggle with controlling and securing its territory.462

On 27 August 2025, the International Crisis Group reported that Lebanon has relied increasingly on hybrid security arrangements, with formal agencies delegating tasks to informal actors: in Tripoli through local notables including crime figures; in Beirut’s southern suburbs through cooperation with Hezbollah, Amal, and local clans; in refugee inhabitant areas through camp committees; in other communities through self-organised patrols.463