6.2. Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel

6.2. Overview of security dynamics related to recent developments with Israel

Hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel intensified between October 2023 and September 2024,387 with over 10 000 cross-border attacks recorded during that period,388 including strikes reaching Beirut by late September 2024, while Israeli airstrikes389 killed several of Hezbollah’s senior leaders.390 Meanwhile, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in the second half of 2024, including near Palestine refugee camps, further affected the broader security situation in southern Lebanon.391 On 17 and 18 September 2024, coordinated blasts of thousands of pagers and handheld radios resulted in the fatalities of at least forty people, among them two children, and left over 3 400 injured.392 This attack reportedly targeted around 4 000 Hezbollah members, including fighters and commanders, and was blamed by the group on Israel.393

On 16 October 2024, an Israeli airstrike struck the municipal headquarters in Al Nabatieh, during a council meeting, killing at least sixteen people including the mayor, Ahmad Kahil, and injuring more than fifty others.394 A ceasefire agreement was reached on 27 November 2024395 and violence declined following the ceasefire as disarmament talks with Hezbollah and Palestinian armed groups progressed.396

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) report of March 2025 ‘The situation in Lebanon remains tenuous as continued military operations threaten the safety and protection of civilians’.397 Conflict-related violence has killed at least 98 civilians, including more than a dozen children, since the cessation of hostilities, and recent air strikes, demolitions, and artillery shelling have contributed to a significant increase in military activity in southern Lebanon.398 While the November 2024 ceasefire allowed border residents to return to their homes,399 and markets and services in southern Lebanon gradually resumed,400 Lebanon has continued to face repeated shelling and clashes along its southern border with Israel.401 The Israel army carried out several attacks on Lebanon between December 2024 and September 2025.402

On 8 September 2025, Israeli warplanes conducted a series of airstrikes over northeastern Lebanon, targeting alleged training and weapons-storage sites of Hezbollah’s elite al-Radwan unit across the Anti-Lebanon heights, specifically near Hermel and several areas within northern Bekaa, causing five deaths and injuries.403 This incident reflects a notable expansion in Israel’s operational zones, which typically focus on southern Lebanon, now extending into the Bekaa amid tensions.404

Meanwhile, UNIFIL’s mandate, initially set to expire in August 2025,405 was unanimously extended, reaffirming its tasks of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting LAF, and facilitating humanitarian access.406 The UNIFIL noted that the LAF currently lacks full capacity in the south due to Lebanon’s financial crisis and the ongoing presence of Israeli forces, emphasising that the mission’s role is to support state authority rather than disarm Hezbollah.407 With UNIFIL’s withdrawal set for the end of 2026, concerns remain over a potential security vacuum and the need to reduce Hezbollah’s influence to rebuild state credibility.408

The ongoing economic crisis has weakened Lebanon’s defence and security forces.409 Meanwhile, Hezbollah, backed by Iran,410 continues to exert influence in the Bekaa Governorate and other Shia border areas. Although the government has proposed bringing weapons under state control411 and integrating Hezbollah into the army,412 the group’s ideology and the army’s limited capacity make full integration unlikely.413

Hezbollah’s new leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, stated that disarmament would only be considered as part of a nationally determined defence strategy and after a full Israeli withdrawal,414 warning of possible violence if forced to disarm.415 While Hezbollah and Amal split over protests against the government’s weapons monopoly,416 Israel indicated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) could withdraw if the LAF takes steps to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 under a US-led security mechanism.417 Meanwhile, Samy Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb (Phalange) Party, has called for all weapons to be brought under state authority.418

According to the Associated Press article of 8 September 2025, Hezbollah has not fired at Israel since November 2024 ceasefire and claims it no longer maintains an armed presence south of the Litani River, while continuing to reject disarmament talks until Israel withdraws from five hilltop positions captured during the war.419 Maalouf Monneau noted that security remains particularly precarious in southern Lebanon, western Bekaa, and southern Beirut.420

On 28 August 2025, the UN Security Council welcomed the Lebanese government’s efforts to assert sovereignty across the country through the LAF, called on Israel to withdraw north of the Blue Line, and urged deployment of Lebanese forces, with UNIFIL support, to ensure that only the state maintains authority and weapons in line with relevant UN resolutions and the Taif Agreement.421 Between 8 and 14 September 2025, the Israel Defense Forces conducted multiple operations across 17 locations in Lebanon, mainly south of the Litani River but also reaching as far as Hermel, including airstrikes, targeted assassinations, ground activities, detonations, and leaflet drops against Hezbollah personnel and assets, while overall activity remained relatively low compared with previous weeks.422

On 18 September 2025, the Israeli army carried out multiple airstrikes in the southern and northern areas of the Litani River,423 claiming to target Hezbollah positions to prevent them from rebuilding their strongholds.424 The IDF reportedly issued evacuation notices in southern Lebanon, asking residents to leave six specific buildings, which it described as Hezbollah military sites.425

Meanwhile, Israel, through the United States, asked the Lebanese Army to start its disarmament plan in the Baalbek and Hermel Governorates, described as hubs for advanced missiles and drones, and after Lebanese officers expressed reservations, Israeli warplanes struck the outskirts of Hermel, claiming to have hit Hezbollah training camps and weapons depots.426 By 18 September 2025, the Lebanese army recorded over 2 500 Israeli land, air and sea attacks on Lebanon since the November 2024 ceasefire.427

On 19 September 2025, the UNIFIL considered the Israeli attacks violations of Security Council resolution 1701, emphasising that they endanger civilians, put UN peacekeepers and Lebanese soldiers at risk, and threaten the fragile stability achieved in southern Lebanon.428 As of 23 September 2025, in a meeting with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, President Aoun stated that Lebanon’s disarmament plan is ready but obstructed by Israeli strikes.429 As of 27 September 2025, Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem rejected disarmament, urged the government to ‘correct its mistake,’ highlighted the group’s ‘victories’ and resilience during the 66-day war, and reaffirmed Hezbollah’s readiness for any confrontation with Israel. He also called for parliamentary elections under the current law and the creation of a Senate as outlined in the Taif Agreement.430