3.3.2. 'Total Peace' Plan

In November 2022, President Petro approved Law 2272 which defined the policy of 'Total Peace' to establish negotiation tables with illegal armed groups, including ELN, FARC dissident groups, and other criminal bands.407 About 22 illegal armed groups sought to enter into the 'Total Peace' framework.408 Peace negotiations with illegal armed groups under the 'Total Peace' plan have faced mounting obstacles.409 Ceasefire agreements were established with different illegal armed groups, but most of these agreements were suspended after the commission of criminal activities.410 The ELN has indicated that it did not agree to be part of any ceasefire with the government.411 At the same time, a bilateral ceasefire began in August 2023 and expired in August 2024, as negotiations stalled.412

The 'Total Peace' policy 'faced difficulties'413 and had limited impacts in ending abuses against civilians two years after implementation due to insufficient monitoring and failure of groups to comply with ceasefire conditions.414 As of late 2024, truces with some criminal structures and the government remained in force, while other groups, not party to such talks, expanded violence.415 Disputes and clashes between public security forces and armed groups continued in 2024, after suspension and non-renewal of ceasefires.416 As of 19 November 2025, there were no national ceasefires in place as part of Paz Total.417

Despite limited advances in the security situation due to temporary ceasefires, negotiations with illegal armed groups under 'Total Peace' plan have stalled due internal fragmentation in some groups, lack of coordination and strategy from the government, and continuing armed confrontation among these groups.418 Illegal armed groups also continued with criminal activities.419

Sources noted that the 'Total Peace' plan has had little effect on improving Colombia's security.420 Even though confrontations between state security forces and illegal armed groups have decreased, illegal armed groups continue fighting among themselves causing serious violations of human rights for local populations.421

The following is the status of peace initiatives under 'Total Peace' plan for each participating armed group:

FCS: International support from the OAS and the Dutch embassy. A technical commission was established for disarmament but lacks international oversight and monitoring.

EMBF: International support from the UN and OAS, with Norway, Switzerland, EU, Venezuela, and Ireland as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.

ELN: International support from the UN and OAS, with Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Norway, and Venezuela as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.

CNEB: International support from the UN and OAS, with Cuba, Norway, and Venezuela as guarantors. It has an international oversight mechanism for ceasefire and disarmament.

AGC: International support from OAS, but no verification mechanism,422 until a new agreement in September 2025 established a pilot verification mechanism in five municipalities in Antioquia and Chocó, with international support from the UN and the OAS.423

ACSN: International support from OAS, but no verification mechanism.424

According to FIP, during 'Total Peace' negotiations, illegal armed groups have modified criminal strategies to hide the effects of violence.425 This dynamic is also mentioned in reference to homicides, kidnappings, and extortion in Section 4.1.

  • 407

    Colombia, Ministerio del Interior, Presidente Gustavo Petro, sancionó la Ley de la Paz Total, 4 November 2022, url

  • 408

    Pares, 22 grupos armados buscan sumarse a la Paz Total, 16 September 2022, url

  • 409

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 11

  • 410

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 11

  • 411

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 11

  • 413

    Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2024 Country Report — Colombia, 2024, url, p. 35

  • 414

    HRW, World Report 2025 – Colombia, 16 January 2025, url

  • 415

    UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, url, para. 83

  • 416

    UNVMC, Report of the Secretary-General, 26 December 2024, url, para. 10

  • 418

    El País, La paz total, la ambiciosa apuesta de Gustavo Petro que se ha atomizado en tres años de Gobierno, 7 August 2025, url; Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, pp. 11-12

  • 419

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 12

  • 420

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 13; Infobae, La 'Paz Total' no mejora los indicadores de violencia en Colombia: es el país menos pacífico de Sudamérica, 29 June 2025, url

  • 421

    Netherlands (The), Algemeen Ambtsbericht Colombia, June 2024, url, p. 13

  • 422

    Indepaz, “El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitainista de Colombia: ¿Un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad ?”, 19 September 2025, url

  • 423

    Indepaz, “El acuerdo entre el Gobierno y el Ejército Gaitainista de Colombia: ¿Un paso hacia la paz o un riesgo de impunidad ?”, 19 September 2025, url

  • 424

    Pares, La paz ¿Cómo vamos?, 18 June 2025, url, p. 169

  • 425

    FIP, Menos muertos, más afectados: evolución de la violencia contra civiles en Colombia, 3 March 2025, url