2.3. Political developments

2.3. Political developments

In July 2025, former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez was found guilty of witness tampering and procedural fraud and was sentenced to 12 years of house arrest.84 The judge ruled that Uribe Vélez ordered third parties to manipulate incarcerated witnesses to testify in his favour after being accused in 2012 by opposition Senator Iván Cepeda of having links to paramilitary organisations.85 On 21 October 2025, the High Tribunal of Bogotá absolved Uribe Vélez of the charges in a second instance ruling and quashed the first instance decision.86

The electoral calendars for Congress and President were open in March 2025.87 Elections for Congress are scheduled for 8 March 2026, and for President and Vice-President, on 31 May 2026.88 On 26 October 2025, left-wing coalition Historic Pact carried out its presidential primaries, nominating Senator Iván Cepeda, with 65.13 % of the votes, as its presidential candidate.89 Centre-to-right wing parties are in consultations to establish a coalition and nominate a presidential candidate.90

President Petro's popularity has been plummeting in recent years due to the failure to consolidate the 'Total Peace' plan with various illegal armed groups, the stalling of social and economic reforms, rising crime, and the security situation, particularly in the remote areas of the country.91 On 24 October 2025, the US government designated President Gustavo Petro to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)'s sanctions list 'for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production'. President Petro's wife and First lady, Veronica Alcocer; his son, Nicolas Petro Burgos, and Colombia's Minister of the Interior, Armando Benedetti, were also designated.92 This came after the decertification of Colombia by the US.⁹³

In 2024, there were over 3 800 demonstrations in Colombia, mostly about labour disputes (21 % of the protests), access to public services (16 %), right to education (15 %), lack of investment or state presence (9 %), right to life, liberty, integrity and security of the person (8 %), transportation (7 %), access to health, environment, gender violence, land and housing, among others (3 % to 5 % each).94