1.4.3 Diyala

1.4.3 Diyala

Map 4. Diyala governorate, © UNOCHA and MapAction.223

For a general description of the governorate, please refer to section 2.4 of the EUAA COI Report Iraq – Security Situation (May 2024). According to the latest available figures of 2022, Diyala governorate’s population was estimated at 1 814 368.224

The Badr Organisation, led by Hadi Al-Ameri, reportedly had control over the local army division (5^th Division) and maintained a base at Ashraf camp.225 This camp was apparently also hosting Pakistani fighters from the Liwa Fatemiyoun and Afghan fighters from the Liwa Zainabiyoun, both supported by the IRGC.226 Several PMF brigades operating in Diyala were described as being controlled by the Badr Organisation and taking part in security operations under the Diyala Operations Command, whose commander was also affiliated with the Badr Organisation.227

Next to the Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah also reportedly had a prominent presence in the governorate.228 Based on confidential sources, the US news publication Foreign Policy (FP) reported in March 2025 that Houthi fighters from Yemen were being trained in a camp run by Kata’ib Hezbollah in Diyala,229 a claim denied by the Iraqi authorities.230 Furthermore, Saraya Al-Salam, the military arm of the movement led by cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, maintained a base east of Baquba.231

A member of the Diyala Provincial Council stated in December 2024 that ISIL activities were limited to the border areas of the governorate, with limited operational capacities.232 The US-based civil society organisation EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Centre) recorded two attacks on security forces carried out by ISIL members over the reference period.233 The Iraqi army, CTS and PMF, carried out anti-ISIL raids,234 destroying hideouts and supplies of ISIL militants235 as well as killing several ISIL suspects236.

Several IED explosions were reported during the reference period, among them IEDs targeting armed forces and PMF,237 but also affecting residential areas.238

Security incidents (number and type of security incidents)

During the reference period (1 August 2024 – 1 August 2025), there were 36 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Diyala governorate, of which 10 were coded as battles, 16 as explosions/remote violence, and 10 as incidents of violence against civilians. Security incidents were recorded in all six governorate districts, about 30 % of which being documented in Al-Khalis district.239

Figure 9: Security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in Diyala between August 2024 and 1 August 2025 on district level, based on ACLED data.240

According to ACLED data, unidentified armed groups were involved as main actor (coded as either ‘Actor 1’ or ‘Actor 2’) in the majority of security incidents (18), followed by ISIL with 10 incidents and unidentified tribal militia with 5 incidents.241 For the period between 1 August 2024 and 1 August 2025, UCDP recorded 6 security events in Diyala governorate, leading to 16 casualties.242

Civilian casualties

During the reference period, UNAMI recorded 3 civilian casualties in Diyala governorate243 without any fatalities,244 while UCDP recorded 1 civilian fatality for the same reference period.245

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and ERW

No information on new conflict-related infrastructure damage in the reference period could be found within the time constraints of this report. A spokesperson at the Iraqi Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) stated in August 2024 that Diyala governorate is one of four governorates with the largest mine-contaminated areas.246 Several instances of ERW explosions were reported over the reference period, leading to injuries and material damages.

Conflict-induced displacement and return

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)248 unit stated in its Iraq Master List Report 134 (covering the period September – December 2024) that, as of 31 December 2024, Diyala governorate was hosting 40 584 displaced people, 18 360 of them in Baquba district, followed by Khanaqin district with 12 420. The number of IDPs hosted in Diyala decreased by approximately 7 % in 2024 compared to 2023. 90% of the IDPs were displaced within the governorate, 6 % were from Salah Al-Din and 4% from other governorates.249 As of December 2024, the return rate250 in Diyala was 78 %. The governorate recorded 241 830 returnees, with the principal districts of return being Khanaqin (105 810), Al-Khalis (74 322) and Al-Muqtadiya (60 198).251