3.3.2 Situation of returnees

Table of contents

3.3.2 Situation of returnees

As of 31 December 2024, the returnees population in Iraq stood at 4 897 128,1204 increasing to 5.1 million of returned IDPs as of 10 April 2025.1205 Since 2021, the Iraqi government has accelerated repatriation efforts, particularly for individuals from Al-Hol and Rawj camps in northeast Syria.1206 The pace of the return process further accelerated since January 2025, in light of the recent developments in Syria, notably the takeover of Damascus by a coalition of armed groups led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in December 2024.1207 In 2024, around 34 % of IDPs left camps in the KRI. Between January and April 2025, 421 families (1 810 individuals) returned, mainly to Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, and Erbil governorates,1208 with the majority of returnees being children and female-headed households.1209

Returnees faced limited access to services,1210 scarce livelihood opportunities,1211 and security issues, as some had to return in areas impacted by intra-group violence or areas controlled by multiple security actors.1212 Returnees, particularly women, girls, persons with disabilities and marginalised groups often face stigma and harassment,1213 exposing them to negative coping mechanisms,1214 such as exploitation, gender-based violence, trafficking, economic hardship and renewed displacement due to lack of legal identity documents.1215 (See section 2.6 on Women and Girls; see section 2.7 on Children).

Reintegration is also hindered by damaged infrastructure,1216 landmines and ERW continuing to endanger civilians and impede their movement and livelihoods,1217 as well as insufficient social services.1218 Lack of farming land1219 due to climate change1220 also influenced return decisions. Water scarcity caused tensions,1221 reducing economic stability and hindering durable solutions.1222

The delayed return of Yazidi IDPs is largely due to lack of security,1223 political and legal challenges, including the ‘stalled’ implementation of the Sinjar Agreement between the KRG and the federal Government. Consequently, around 100 000 Yazidis from Sinjar remained displaced and living in precarious conditions,1224 many of them in the KRI.1225 In Sinjar, armed groups such as the PKK and PMF compete for control over military, economic, and political power, turning the area into a ‘transnational conflict hub’ and impeding returns.1226 Many returnees in Sinjar face harsh prospects due to destroyed homes, damaged infrastructure, and the presence of multiple armed groups.1227

  • 1204

    UNCHR/DTM, Iraq - Population Profile - Breakdown Overview - IDPs and Returnees, 28 January 2025, url

  • 1205

    UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2732 (2024) Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 2025, url, paras 40-41

  • 1206

    UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2732 (2024) Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 2025, url, paras 40-41

  • 1207

    UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2732 (2024) Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 2025, url, paras 40-41; Arab Center Washington DC, Pragmatism Shapes Iraq’s Position Toward Post-Assad Syria, 1 July 2025, url

  • 1208

    UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2732 (2024) Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 2025, url, paras 40-41

  • 1209

    Save the Children, UNICEF, Working in the Nexus: How Save the Children and UNICEF are working together to strengthen the Child Protection System in Iraq, 2025, url p. 3

  • 1210

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 3

  • 1211

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 3; NRC,

  • 1212

    IOM, Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2025, February 2025, url, pp. 5-6

  • 1213

    UNIDIR, From Al Hol to hope: Navigating return and reintegration challenges, 15 August 2024, url, pp. 8-9, 21; IOM, Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2025, February 2025, url, pp. 5-6

  • 1214

    NRC, NRC’s operations in Iraq, Humanitarian overview, Factsheet May 2025, url p. 2

  • 1215

    UNSG, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, 15 May 2025, url, para 5

  • 1216

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 3

  • 1217

    UNSG, Protection of civilians in armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, 15 May 2025, url, para 5

  • 1218

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 3

  • 1219

    IDMC, NRC, Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) 2025, 13 May 2025, url, p. 48

  • 1220

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 10

  • 1221

    IDMC, NRC, Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) 2025, 13 May 2025, url, p. 48

  • 1222

    WFP, Iraq Annual Country Report 2024 Country Strategic Plan 2020 – 2025, 5 February 2025, url, p. 10

  • 1223

    Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies, Shivan Fazil – Iraq’s ethnoreligious minorities:

  • 1224

    UN in Iraq, UN Security Council Briefing Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq Dr. Mohamed Al Hassan, 10 June 2025, url

  • 1225

    UNSG, Implementation of resolution 2732 (2024) Report of the Secretary-General, 30 May 2025, url, para 36

  • 1226

    XCEPT/Middle East and North Africa Programme, Responding to instability in Iraq’s Sinjar district, March 2024, url, pp. 4, 6-7; Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies, Shivan Fazil – Iraq’s ethnoreligious minorities: Exclusion from power-sharing grand bargains, 1 July 2024, url

  • 1227

    AP, Ten years on, many Yazidis uprooted by Islamic State onslaught struggle to find stable homes, 29 July