



1.4.3 Diyala

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Dyala map

Map 4. Diyala governorate, © UNOCHA and MapAction.[223](#)

For a general description of the governorate, please refer to section 2.4 of the [EUAA COI Report Iraq – Security Situation \(May 2024\)](#). According to the latest available figures of 2022, Diyala governorate’s population was estimated at 1 814 368.[224](#)

The Badr Organisation, led by Hadi Al-Ameri, reportedly had control over the local army division (5th Division) and maintained a base at Ashraf camp.[225](#) This camp was apparently also hosting Pakistani fighters from the Liwa Fatemiyoun and Afghan fighters from the Liwa Zainabiyoun, both supported by the IRGC.[226](#) Several PMF brigades operating in Diyala were described as being controlled by the Badr Organisation and taking part in security operations under the Diyala Operations Command, whose commander was also affiliated with the Badr Organisation.[227](#)

Next to the Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah also reportedly had a prominent presence in the governorate.[228](#) Based on confidential sources, the US news publication Foreign Policy (FP) reported in March 2025 that Houthi fighters from Yemen were being trained in a camp run by Kata’ib Hezbollah in Diyala,[229](#) a claim denied by the Iraqi authorities.[230](#) Furthermore, Saraya Al-Salam, the military arm of the movement led by cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, maintained a base east of Baquba.[231](#)

A member of the Diyala Provincial Council stated in December 2024 that ISIL activities were limited to the border areas of the governorate, with limited operational capacities.[232](#) The US-based civil society organisation EPIC (Enabling Peace in Iraq Centre) recorded two attacks on security forces carried out by ISIL members over the reference period.[233](#) The Iraqi army, CTS and PMF, carried out anti-ISIL raids,[234](#) destroying hideouts and supplies of ISIL militants[235](#) as well as killing several ISIL suspects[236](#).

Several IED explosions were reported during the reference period, among them IEDs targeting armed forces and PMF,[237](#) but also affecting residential areas.[238](#)

Security incidents (number and type of security incidents)

During the reference period (1 August 2024 – 1 August 2025), there were 36 security incidents recorded by ACLED in Diyala governorate, of which 10 were coded as battles, 16 as

explosions/remote violence, and 10 as incidents of violence against civilians. Security incidents were recorded in all six governorate districts, about 30 % of which being documented in Al-Khalis district.[239](#)

Figure 9 Iraq

Figure 9: Security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in Diyala between August 2024 and 1 August 2025 on district level, based on ACLED data.[240](#)

According to ACLED data, unidentified armed groups were involved as main actor (coded as either ‘Actor 1’ or ‘Actor 2’) in the majority of security incidents (18), followed by ISIL with 10 incidents and unidentified tribal militia with 5 incidents.[241](#) For the period between 1 August 2024 and 1 August 2025, UCDP recorded 6 security events in Diyala governorate, leading to 16 casualties.[242](#)

Civilian casualties

During the reference period, UNAMI recorded 3 civilian casualties in Diyala governorate[243](#) without any fatalities,[244](#) while UCDP recorded 1 civilian fatality for the same reference period.[245](#)

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and ERW

No information on new conflict-related infrastructure damage in the reference period could be found within the time constraints of this report. A spokesperson at the Iraqi Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) stated in August 2024 that Diyala governorate is one of four governorates with the largest mine-contaminated areas.[246](#) Several instances of ERW explosions were reported over the reference period, leading to injuries and material damages.

Conflict-induced displacement and return

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)[248](#) unit stated in its Iraq Master List Report 134 (covering the period September – December 2024) that, as of 31 December 2024, Diyala governorate was hosting 40 584 displaced people, 18 360 of them in Baquba district, followed by Khanaqin district with 12 420. The number of IDPs hosted in Diyala decreased by approximately 7 % in 2024 compared to 2023. 90% of the IDPs were displaced within the governorate, 6 % were from Salah Al-Din and 4% from other governorates.[249](#) As of December 2024, the return rate[250](#) in Diyala was 78 %. The governorate recorded 241 830 returnees, with the principal districts of return being Khanaqin (105 810), Al-Khalis (74 322) and Al-Muqtadiya (60 198).[251](#)

- [223](#)

UNOCHA and iMMAP, Iraq: Diyala Governorate Reference Map 2020, 5 May 2020, [url](#)

- [224](#)

Iraq, CSO, الإحصاءات السنوية 2022-2023 [Statistical Collection 2022-2023, Part Two], 21 August 2023, [url](#), p. 8

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EPIC, ISHM: December 5 - 12, 2024, 12 December 2024, [url](#); EPIC, ISHM: January 9 - 16, 2025, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

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Al-Sumaria, "ةوبع راجف ناب "ةوحصل لاء" نم رصانع 3 ةباصا ..ىلاي د [Diyala - IED injured three tribal mobilisation members], 25 April 2025, [url](#); EPIC, ISHM: March 6 - March 13, 2025, 13 March 2025, [url](#)

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EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 August 2025, [url](#)

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EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 August 2025, [url](#)

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EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Middle East, as of 1 August 2025, [url](#)

- [242](#)

EUAA analysis based on UCDP data. UCDP, data covering 1 August 2024 to 1 August 2025 provided by courtesy of UCDP by email, 19 August 2025

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EUAA analysis based on UNAMI data. Email to EUAA, 4 August 2025

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Rudaw, One-third of Iraq's landmine-contaminated areas remain to be cleared, 12 August 2024, [url](#)

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Please note that IOM differentiates between displacement induced by conflict/violence and displacement driven by natural disasters. The displacement due to natural disasters is not included in the DTM data, see IDMC, Country Profile Iraq, n.d., [url](#)

- [249](#)

IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 134 (September-December 2024), January 2025, [url](#), p. 4

- [250](#)

The return rate is calculated by dividing the number of returnees per governorate by the total number of returnees and IDPs originating from that governorate. (IOM Iraq, Returns in Iraq: 2021 Overview, December 2020 (Round11) to December 2021 (Round 14), February 2022, [url](#), p. 2 footnote 5)

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IOM Iraq, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Iraq Master List Report 134 (September-December 2024), January 2025, [url](#), p. 10