1.4.7 Southern governorates (Babil, Basrah, Karbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya, and Wassit)

1.4.7 Southern governorates (Babil, Basrah, Karbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Thi-Qar, Qadissiya, and Wassit)

Map 8. Southern governorates, © UNOCHA and MapAction.381

For a general description of the southern governorates, please refer to section 2.2 and 2.11-2.18 of the EUAA COI Report Iraq – Security Situation (May 2024).

The ISF maintained four Provincial Operations Commands in the country’s south, located in Karbala, Amarah in Missan governorate, Nasiriyah in Thi-Qar governorate and Basrah.382 According to a June 2025 article published by Al-Hurra channel, all key pro-Iranian militias had significant economic clout in southern Iraq by controlling commercial activities at ports and border crossings. The town of Jurf Al-Sakhar in Babil governorate was described as being under Kata’ib Hezbollah’s control, while hosting fighters from other militia such as Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada as well as allied foreign fighters.383 Furthermore, Kata’ib Hezbollah was reportedly trying to expand its influence in Basrah by fuelling tensions between Basrah’s governor and Prime Minister Al-Sudani.384 Tensions involving armed factions were reported in August 2024, when armed clashes broke out between PMF forces and members of the Iraqi army385 near an army checkpoint in Karbala.386 Furthermore, in May 2025, security forces arrested several security guards of a local Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq leader, in the north of Basrah, after the killing of a Saraya Al-Salam member.387

Armed clashes in the context of tribal conflicts were reportedly a frequent occurrence in Basrah, Missan and Thi-Qar governorates, involving light and medium weapons and in some cases mortar shells. The root causes of these tribal conflicts were issues such as control over agricultural land, water resources, and border crossings.388 Local media frequently reported on such clashes in the three aforementioned governorates as well as in Wassit and Qadissiya over the reference period389, some of which resulted in casualties.390 The Iraqi army as well as police forces were deployed to contain tribal feuds.391 See section 2.10.

Security incidents (number and type of security incidents)

During the reference period (1 August 2024 – 1 August 2025), ACLED recorded 381 security incidents in the southern governorates, of which 196 were coded as battles, 51 as explosions/remote violence, and 134 as incidents of violence against civilians. Security incidents were recorded especially in the southernmost governorates of Missan (124), Thi-Qar (88) and Basrah (66).392

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Figure 13: Security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in the southern governorates between August 2024 and 1 August 2025 on district level, based on ACLED data.393

According to ACLED data, unidentified armed groups were involved as main actor (coded as either ‘Actor 1’ or ‘Actor 2’) in 158 security incidents, followed by unidentified tribal militia with 156 security incidents.394 For the period between 1 August 2024 and 1 August 2025, UCDP recorded 6 security events in southern governorates (1 in Babil, 2 in Basrah, 1 in Missan, 2 in Wassit), leading to 9 casualties. No security incidents were recorded in the governorates of Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadissya.395

Civilian casualties

According to UNAMI data, Basrah recorded the highest number of civilian casualties among the southern governorates, with 23 casualties including 10 fatalities, and the second highest number nationwide. UNAMI recorded 8 civilian casualties (including 1 killed) in Missan governorate; 4 civilian casualties in Muthanna (including 1 killed); 1 civilian casualty in Najaf and 5 civilian casualties in Thi-Qar (including 3 killed). 396

UNAMI did not record any civilian casualties in the southern governorates of Babil, Karbala, Qadissiya and Wassit.397

Consistent with UNAMI data, UCDP reported the highest number of civilian deaths in Basrah (5) among the southern governorates.398 UCDP recorded 1 civilian fatality in Missan, 2 in Wassit, and 1 in Thi-Qar.399 UCDP did not record any civilian casualties in the southern governorates of Babil, Karbala, Qadissiya, Najaf and Muthanna.400

Conflict-related infrastructure damage and ERW

No information on new conflict-related infrastructure damage in the reference period could be found within the time constraints of this report.

A spokesperson at the Iraqi Directorate for Mine Action (DMA) stated in August 2024 that Basrah governorate is among four governorates with the largest mine-contaminated areas.401 As of the end of 2023, the Mine Action Review estimated the area of cluster munition-contamination for the southern governorates (excluding Wassit) in the following way: Muthanna (90 117 749 m²), Basrah (56 053 577 m²), Thi-Qar (43 329 654 m²), Najaf (3 704 571 m²), Babil (911 758 m²) and Karbala (141 910 m²). The Mine Action Review further revealed that at the end of 2023, 92% of Iraq’s overall contamination was concentrated in Basrah, Muthanna and Thi-Qar governorates, while Missan and Qadissiya were reported to be cleared of cluster-munition contamination.402 Several instances of ERW explosions were reported over the reference period especially in Basrah governorate,403 but also in Missan404 and Thi-Qar,405 causing deaths and injuries.406 Basrah governorate, particularly Al-Zubair district, was reportedly especially affected by ERW contamination.407

Conflict-induced displacement and return

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)408 unit stated in its Iraq Master List Report 134 (covering the period September – December 2024) that, as of 31 December 2024, the southern governorates were hosting 46 440 displaced people, 15 912 of them in Babil governorate, followed by Karbala governorate with 9 876 and Najaf governorate with 6 378. 96 % of IDPs in Babil governorate were displaced within the governorate, while in the governorates of Karbala 86 % of IDPs and in Najaf 99 % of IDPs were displaced from Ninewa governorate.409 The only southern province where IOM had monitored return movements was Babil governorate, with 2 160 returnees. This amounted to a return rate410 of 5 %.411