(b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per state

Considering the long-standing conflict with Boko Haram, the high number of security incidents, the number of fatalities as well as its significant general impact on civilians, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Borno state, at a high level.

Considering the high number of security incidents largely affecting civilians as well as the high displacement and infrastructure destruction, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Katsina state at a high level.

Considering the high number of security incidents largely affecting civilians as well as considering the high displacement and infrastructure destruction, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Zamfara state at a high level.

Taking into account the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of herders and farmers armed conflict, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Benue state, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the Abuja/Federal Capital Territory, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Kogi state, however not at a high level.

Kwara is the state, along with Niger, where Mahmuda and Ansaru are most active, financing its operations through a combination of attacks, kidnappings, forced labour and illegal taxation of herders and farmers. A Boko Haram faction, known as Wulowulo, has established a presence in Kwara State. Kwara was also frequently affected by disputes between herders and farmers, especially in Kaiama LGA. Besides attacks by unspecified armed men and communal militias, other types of violence included ambushes and kidnappings, mainly along roads, and clashes between cults. In May 2025, the Nigerian army launched an operation to fight bandits and other criminal elements hiding within the Kainji Lake National Park and surrounding border areas between Kwara and Niger States. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 225 security incidents (2.2 security incidents per week) resulting in 253 fatalities (approximately 7 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Kwara state, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Nasarawa state, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Niger state, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Plateau state, however not at a high level.

Adamawa is one of the main bases of Boko Haram in Nigeria. ISWAP has assigned the state’s north to its Faruq province (wilaya) and has expanded its operations there. Northern LGAs in Adamawa are part of what it called the ‘Northeast Belt of Insurgency.’ As of July 2025, the situation in the north of Adamawa state was described as marked by insecurity. Boko Haram (ISWAP) repeatedly conducted attacks on villages, carried out by gunmen on motorbikes and involved the use of explosives against vigilantes and police, resulting in local residents' fatalities. Meanwhile, deadly communal clashes erupted and armed robberies and kidnappings were also reported, with villagers and Catholic clergymen among those targeted. Between 1 January 2024 and 15 December 2025, ACLED recorded 86 security incidents (0.8 incidents per week) resulting in 148 fatalities (approximately 3 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). The conflict has led to the destruction of multiple civilian structures. As of November 2024, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Adamawa state at 200 211, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Despite the long-standing activities by Boko Haram and the communal clashes, and considering the relatively low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Adamawa state, however not at a high level.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the relatively low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Taraba state, however not at a high level.

Alongside Borno and Adamawa states, Yobe is one of the main bases of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Moreover, the state’s south has been integrated into ISWAP’s Faruq province and is part of the ‘Northeast Belt of Insurgency’. Boko Haram conducted deadly attacks against several communities and villages, carried out by gunmen on motorcycles. Insurgents also kidnapped civilians during those attacks and targeted NAF troops, including by bombings and a suicide car attack. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 153 security incidents (1.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 271 fatalities (approximately 7 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Yobe state at 167 320, mainly because of insurgency.

Despite the long-standing activities by Boko Haram, and considering the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Yobe state, however not at a high level.

The security situation in Kaduna was characterised by persistent and multi-dimensional insecurity, driven by ethnic and religious tensions, banditry, kidnappings, farmer-herder conflict, clashes between bandit groups and attacks on civilian settlements. Bandits and other armed groups carried out attacks on smaller towns, schools, hospitals, travellers and farming communities, resulting in civilian fatalities, abductions, property destruction and the looting of villages. In addition, long-standing communal and ethnic tensions, particularly in Southern Kaduna fuelled cycles of retaliatory violence leading to the destruction of villages such as Jika da Kolo and Tudun Biri. Attacks by Boko Haram, Ansaru and government counter-operations, including drone attack and airstrike in 2024, have also resulted in civilian fatalities. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 543 security incidents (5.2 incidents per week) resulting in 1 048 fatalities (approximately 12 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). The conflict in the north-western region has worsened leading to widespread displacement and as of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Kaduna state at 117 989, mainly due to armed banditry/kidnapping and communal clashes. Some medical facilities have shut down as a result of insecurity. Households were reported as being heavily affected by increasingly violent rural banditry, with Nigeria Watch identifying the state as the third worst affected by rural banditry in 2024.

Considering the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of the armed conflict between herders and farmers, as well as between Islamist groups and the Nigerian state forces, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Kaduna state, however, not at a high level.

The state experienced insecurity driven largely by famer-herder conflict, banditry, and armed Islamist groups, such as Lakurawa, which carried out attacks across several communities. Incidents resulted in civilian deaths, abductions and destruction of property. Vigilante forces also existed in Sokoto state. Government operations against armed groups, such as Lakurawa, including airstrikes by the US, were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 497 security incidents (4.8 incidents per week) resulting in 867 fatalities (approximately 14 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Sokoto state at 99 729, mainly because of armed banditry /kidnapping.

Considering the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of the armed conflict between herders and farmers, as well as between Islamist groups and the Nigerian state forces, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Sokoto state, however not at a high level.

Kebbi State continued facing elevated levels of insecurity, primarily driven by the activities of armed groups, bandits and Islamist groups, such as Lakurawa, operating across the wider North-West corridor. Security operations, including government raids and airstrikes were conducted against armed groups. Vigilante forces also existed in Kebbi state and have clashed with state forces. Between 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 118 security incidents (1.1 incidents per week) resulting in 291 fatalities (approximately 5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in Kebbi state, however not at a high level.

Security incidents in Bauchi state are mainly linked to clashes between bandits and local security forces, such as vigilantes. In the meantime, deadly communal clashes between herders and farmers and kidnappings were also reported in Darazo LGA. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 53 security incidents (0.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 164 fatalities (approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Security incidents were recorded in approximately half of the LGAS of the state. As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Bauchi state at 65 876, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Bauchi state.

Gombe state was described as the most peaceful state in 2024 and the one with the lowest number of insecurity incidents. Most of the incidents reported arose from clashes between herders and farmers, kidnappings linked to cattle rustling, and attacks by Fulani militias. Other types of violence, including an assault by suspected Kalare Boys (a gang in Gombe) and an attack against a Christian procession, were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 14 security incidents (0.1 security incidents per week) resulting in 13 fatalities (approximately 0 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Benue state at 52 202, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Gombe state.

The situation in Jigawa was generally described as marked by low but persistent levels of violent conflict, primarily driven by herder-farmer clashes, communal violence and protests linked to economic hardship and political demands. Clashes between herders and farmers were reported across several LGAs including Miga, Jahun, Dutse, Kiyawa and Birnin Kudu. Some of these clashes resulted in civilian deaths, injuries and burning of houses. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 23 security incidents (0.2 incidents per week) resulting in 45 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is very limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Jigawa state. 

The security situation in Kano is characterised by episodic unrest, mob violence, isolated explosions and criminal activity. Kano state police conducted security operations and raids, tackling armed robbery, thuggery, abductions, and criminal activities. JAS has maintained a long-standing presence in Kano state, employing tactics similar to those of bandits, including coercion. The state also experienced protest-related violence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 52 security incidents (0.5 incidents per week) resulting in 69 fatalities (approximately 0 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Kano state at 12 555, mainly due to insurgency.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is very limited in scale and intensity and, while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Kano state.

Considering the limited number of incidents not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Abia state.

Anambra state has been described as marked by insecurity. Drivers of insecurity included incidents linked to cultism, criminality (armed robbery, kidnapping) and separatist militias. Anambra witnessed more fatalities from cult-related violence than any other state in Nigeria, with incidents often occurring near premises of institutions of higher education and several clashes between rival cults recorded in the state capital of Awka. Anambra recorded one of the lowest numbers of deaths linked to ethnic and communal violence, although an escalation of attacks on local communities related to suspected armed bandits and herdsmen has been reported for 2025. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 223 security incidents (2.1 security incident per week) resulting in 313 fatalities (5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on numbers of individuals affected by conflict-induced displacement in Anambra, but communal violence has led farmers to abandon their lands in certain areas.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Anambra state.

The situation in Ebonyi state has been described as marked by some level of insecurity. Drivers of insecurity included incidents linked to herder-farmer conflicts, cult clashes and intra-community land disputes. Long-standing land disputes between various communities resulted in abductions and deadly clashes. Dozens of fatalities resulted from attacks on communities attributed to armed herdsmen and unknown gunmen. Incidents involving forest-based criminal groups, as well as ‘escalating attacks’ by suspected armed bandits and herdsmen on local communities, have been reported. In July 2025, ESN appears to have reduced the Fulani presence in the forests of the South-East with considerable success, apparently contributing to a reduction of kidnappings by Fulani elements in this area. However, attacks still take place. Ebonyi has the lowest figure of Pro-Biafra violence in South-Eastern Nigeria, with seven fatalities recorded in relation to separatist violence in 2024. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 66 security incidents (0.6 security incident per week) resulting in 126 fatalities (4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on the exact numbers affected by conflict-induced displacement. Nevertheless, intra-communal conflicts in Ohaukwu LGA were reported to have displaced thousands of residents during the past four years. Conflicts and other armed attacks resulted also in damage to buildings and property.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ebonyi state.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering the relatively limited number of incidents, some of them deriving from criminal activity not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Enugu state.

The security situation in Imo has been described as marked by rising insecurity. Drivers of insecurity consisted of conflicts between separatist militants and security personnel, attacks on communities by armed herdsmen or unidentified armed groups, kidnappings, clashes with security forces, vigilante and mob violence, and cultism. Multiple deadly clashes between separatist militias and security forces particularly affected Orsu and Ehime Mbano–Oyo LGAs. Many of those killed were members of IPOB and ESN, and there were also reports of alleged lethal attacks on civilians. Criminal violence in Imo state resulted in one of the highest numbers of fatalities in the Niger Delta, with over 50 fatalities in 2024. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 162 security incidents (1.6 security incident per week) resulting in 292 fatalities (5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information on conflict-related displacement or returns could be found during the reference period.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering their not high number as well as that some of them stemmed from criminal activity not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Imo state.

Akwa Ibom has been reported to be among the five most peaceful states of the country. Insecurity is mainly driven by cult groups’ violence, kidnappings, robberies and targeted killings. Intra- and inter-communal violence was also reported. Incidents frequently involved clashes between rival cult groups, killings related to cult targeting, for instance suspected cult members, incidents of mob violence against thieves and security forces, robberies, and abductions-for-ransom targeting particularly travellers and children. Sporadic violence by unidentified gunmen was also recorded. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 52 security incidents (0.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 63 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Fatalities mostly resulted from cult-related shootings and targeted killings. There were also reports of attacks on police officers, destruction of property during cult clashes, and violence linked to criminal gangs operating along transport routes. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Akwa Ibom state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Akwa Ibom state.

Bayelsa was one of the least violent states in the Niger Delta region, with violence largely driven by criminal activity, such as abduction and ambushes and cult groups’ violence. Cult related violence involved clashes between cult groups, robberies and thefts, targeting both cult members and civilians. While instances of lethal clashes among communities over land ownership were reported, unlike states in the North-East or Middle Belt, Bayelsa did not face large-scale insurgency or widespread communal conflict. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 39 security incidents (0.4 security incidents per week) resulting in 44 fatalities (approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Bayelsa state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Bayelsa state.

Cross River experienced violence primarily driven by cult-related activities, including abductions and killings, as well as clashes, criminality and localised communal disputes. Criminal activities involved especially sea pirates’ abductions for ransom and targeting of passengers. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 40 security incidents (0.4 security incidents per week) resulting in 53 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Cross River state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Cross River state.

Communal, herders and farmers tensions, criminal violence (including killings, armed robberies and kidnappings), gang/cult-related violence and clashes were the main drivers of insecurity in Delta state. Clashes between security forces and bandits were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 216 security incidents (2.1 security incidents per week) resulting in 228 fatalities (approximately 4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Delta state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Delta state.

The insecurity in Edo state is largely driven by cult groups, unidentified armed groups and Fulani ethnic militias. The most prevalent types of violence included clashes between cult gangs, criminal activities, including killings and kidnappings for ransom, as well as communal violence, which included killings and abductions by suspected herders, mob violence and attacks by different actors. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 230 security incidents (2.2 security incidents per week) resulting in 208 fatalities (approximately 4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Residents were fleeing ‘en masse’ following violent clashes with suspected Ijaw militias affecting farming communities, but no further information on conflict-induced displacement in Edo state during the reference period could be found.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Edo state.

In Rivers state, the primary drivers of insecurity included clashes between rival cult gangs, confrontations involving security forces and local vigilantes, kidnappings for ransom, as well as vigilante and mob violence triggered by criminal activity and clashes between cults and armed gangs. In the period between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 136 security incidents (1.3 security incidents per week) resulting in 118 fatalities (approximately 2 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Rivers was one of three states in the Niger Delta region with the highest level of lethal violence and was among the three most affected states in terms of cult-related fatalities and the fifth most affected state in terms of fatalities related to kidnappings in 2024. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Rivers state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Rivers state.

In Ekiti state, the main armed actors were criminal groups, cult gangs, and unidentified armed men. Reported incidents included kidnappings for ransom, killings sometimes taking place in the context of abductions, and incidents involving cult groups’ activities. There was no insurgent presence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 30 security incidents (0.3 security incidents per week) resulting in 16 fatalities (approximately 0 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Ekiti state during the reference period.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ekiti state.

Lagos state has been described as a hotspot for cultism and criminality. Cult-related violence and clashes were reported and occurred in various LGAs. Criminal activities also included robberies, kidnappings for ransom, violent clashes and killings. There were also several cases of mob justice targeting suspected criminals, as well as attacks by unidentified gunmen. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 178 security incidents (1.7 security incidents per week) resulting in 174 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Lagos state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Lagos state.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ogun state.

In Ondo state, the main actors were unidentified armed groups, suspected (Fulani) herders and cult gangs. The incidents included clashes between communities, numerous incidents of kidnappings and killings, lethal attacks on farmers and farmer-herder conflicts, as well as incidents of cult-related violence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 86 security incidents (0.8 security incidents per week) resulting in 73 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Many farmers were abandoning their farms due to ongoing kidnappings and attacks by suspected herdsmen. As of August 2025, no further information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Ondo state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ondo state.

In Osun state, the main drivers of insecurity were reported to be gang-related criminality, armed robberies, kidnappings, lethal clashes between cult groups, communal violence over land disputes and political clashes. No insurgent activity was reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 61 security incidents (0.6 security incidents per week) resulting in 51 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). As a consequence of the violent clashes between Ilobu and Ifon communities, more than 100 000 residents were displaced. No further information could be found on conflict-induced displacement.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Osun state.

In Oyo state, the main drivers of insecurity were banditry, kidnappings, armed robberies, attacks by unidentified gunmen as well as cult-related clashes and violence, including ritual killings. Violent conflicts with herders and bandits were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 68 security incidents (0.7 security incidents per week) resulting in 59 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Oyo state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Oyo state.