

## **(b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per state**

COMMON ANALYSIS


Last update: March 2026

The map below summarises and illustrates the assessment of indiscriminate violence per state:

**Figure 5: Level of indiscriminate violence in Nigeria (based on information up to 31 December 2025)**

To visualise all States, please zoom in (Hold down CTRL + mouse scroll to zoom).

Not a high level No real risk High level



Source: [Simple maps \(regions\)](#), [Simple maps \(points\)](#)



**Mere presence** would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

Indiscriminate violence reaches a **high level** and a lower level of individual elements is required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

Indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level**, and a higher level of individual elements is required to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

There is **no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

## Mere presence

## High level of indiscriminate violence

## Indiscriminate violence not at a high level

## No real risk

### **Mere presence**

Areas where the degree of **indiscriminate violence reaches such an exceptionally high level** that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant area, would, **solely on account of their presence there**, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) QD/QR.

Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

**No such areas were identified in Nigeria.**

### **High level of indiscriminate violence**

Areas where 'mere presence' would not be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR, but where, **indiscriminate violence reaches a high level**. Accordingly, **a lower level of individual elements** (see [Serious and individual threat](#)) is required to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

**North-East Borno**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Borno state has been the centre of the 15-year-long insurgency by Boko Haram. ISWAP has assigned parts of the state to its three main provinces (Buhaira, Faruq and Krenowa) and ten LGAs across Borno were identified as being part of the 'Northeast Belt of Insurgency'. In March/April 2025, a resurgence of ISWAP militancy was reported, allowing the group to make some territorial gains in the state. Boko Haram repeatedly conducted attacks on security installations and civilians, involving the use of explosives, bombs, drones, suicide attacks and mass kidnappings, particularly against civilians. Fighting between Boko Haram factions and government airstrikes also caused civilian fatalities. IDPs were also targeted and abducted by insurgents which are also suspected to have killed farmers and fishermen. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 1 126 security incidents (10.8 security incidents per week) resulting in 5 973 fatalities (approximately 98 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Boko Haram insurgents also targeted critical infrastructures including roads, hospitals, schools and buses, leading to the obstruction of humanitarian aid. As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Borno state at 1 704 175, exclusively because of insurgency.

Considering the long-standing conflict with Boko Haram, the high number of security incidents, the number of fatalities as well as its significant general impact on civilians, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Borno state, at a high level.**

#### **North-West: Katsina**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2., 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Katsina state continues to experience high levels of violence, driven primarily by armed banditry, mass abductions and attacks on rural communities. The state experiences significant activity by armed groups including communal militias, bandit gangs and criminal networks engaging in inter-group clashes, killings, kidnappings, extortion, cattle rustling, attacks on villages and destruction of infrastructure. A faction of Boko Haram was also present in the state. Government forces carried out security operations

against bandits, including airstrikes. IED explosions were also reported. In the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 1 028 security incidents (9.9 incidents per week) and 2 578 fatalities (approximately 25 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated 270 968 IDPs in the state, mainly due to armed banditry/kidnapping and communal clashes. Road security remains a concern and violence has resulted in dilapidated schools and health centres, with such infrastructure often destroyed or taken by armed groups.

Considering the high number of security incidents largely affecting civilians as well as the high displacement and infrastructure destruction, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Katsina state at a high level.**

#### **North-West: Zamfara**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.7.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The security situation in the state is characterised by persistent and widespread armed violence with long-standing tensions between ethnic, religious and communal groups leading to clashes, attacks and banditry. Armed actors including the Lakurawa groups were active across multiple LGAs, conducting attacks on villages and engaging in clashes with local vigilantes and state security forces. IED explosions were reported and some government airstrikes against bandits also resulted in civilian deaths. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 1 023 security incidents (9.8 incidents per week) resulting in 3 275 fatalities (approximately 56 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimate the number of IDPs in Zamfara state at 216 885, mainly due to armed banditry/kidnapping, insurgency and communal clashes. Hospitals and schools have shut down in Zurmi, Maru, Bungudu, Tsafe, Birnin Magaji, Gusau East, and Shinkafi LGAs for almost two years as a result of insecurity.

Considering the high number of security incidents largely affecting civilians as well as considering the high displacement and infrastructure destruction, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Zamfara state at a high level.**

## **Indiscriminate violence not at a high level**

Areas where indiscriminate violence is taking place, however **not at a high level.**

Accordingly, **a higher level of individual elements** (see [Serious and individual threat](#)) is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the area, would face a real risk of serious harm in the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

#### **North-Central: Benue**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2., 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Benue was frequently affected by intercommunal clashes, primarily fuelled by disputes between herders and farmers. Besides attacks by Fulani militias and unspecified armed men, other types of violence included abductions and clashes between rival militias or cult groups, such as Eiyé, Vikings, Buccaneers, Red Axe and Chain. Gang activities often intersect with farmer-herder clashes. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 467 security incidents (4.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 1 439 fatalities (approximately 23 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Gunmen also destroyed boreholes, clinics, schools, religious sites and grain reserves following attacks, while agricultural activities have been obstructed by armed groups. As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Benue state at 457 666 mainly because of communal and farmer-herder clashes.

Taking into account the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of herders and farmers armed conflict, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Benue state, however not at a high level.**

#### **North-Central: Abuja/ Federal Capital Territory**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The main security issues in the FCT involved kidnappings often occurring in its suburbs, attacks by gunmen, and clashes between them and police officers, as well as deadly clashes involving herders. IED explosions at a school and outside an army barrack in the centre of Abuja capital city were recorded. Deadly clashes between members of the proscribed Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and security forces were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 183 security incidents (1.8 security incidents per week) resulting in 151 fatalities (approximately 5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Concerning the road security on the Abuja-Lokoja Highway, a significant reduction in criminal activities along the road was reported. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the nature of violence as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in the Abuja/Federal Capital Territory, however not at a high level.**

#### **North-Central: Kogi**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Deadly attacks by bandits, herders, criminal groups, unidentified armed groups and Kogi communal militias were reported in Kogi state, as well as violence linked to conflicts between herders and farmers and to inter-tribal crisis. Kogi was also highly affected by kidnappings. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 202 security incidents (1.9 security incidents per week) resulting in 216 fatalities (approximately 5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Kogi state at 20 793, mainly because of disasters. Farm produce and properties were destroyed during bandits' attacks and conflict between communities.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Kogi state, however not at a high level.**

#### **North-Central: Kwara**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 1.1., 2., 2.1., 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Kwara is the state, along with Niger, where Mahmuda and Ansaru are most active, financing its operations through a combination of attacks, kidnappings, forced labour and illegal taxation of herders and farmers. A Boko Haram faction, known as Wulowulo, has established a presence in Kwara State. Kwara was also frequently affected by disputes between herders and farmers, especially in Kaiama LGA. Besides attacks by unspecified armed men and communal militias, other types of violence included ambushes and kidnappings, mainly along roads, and clashes between cults. In May 2025, the Nigerian army launched an operation to fight bandits and other criminal elements hiding within the Kainji Lake National Park and surrounding border areas between Kwara and Niger States. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 225 security incidents (2.2 security incidents per week) resulting in 253 fatalities (approximately 7 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Kwara state, however not at a high level.**

#### **North-Central: Nasarawa**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Nasarawa was frequently affected by intercommunal clashes, primarily fuelled by disputes between herders and farmers. Besides attacks by Fulani militias and ISWAP, kidnappings and banditry were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 109 security incidents (1 security incident per week) resulting in 183 fatalities (approximately 6 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Nasarawa state at 23 913 mainly because of communal clashes and insurgency. During disputes between herders and farmers, properties and farm produces were damaged.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents and fatalities, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Nasarawa state, however not at a high level.**

## □ **North-Central: Niger**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.6.](#); [COI Update 2026, 1.1., 2., 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Niger is the state, along with Kwara, where Mahmuda and Ansaru are most active, including through attacks on communities, (massive) abductions, clashes with troops. Violence from bandits/armed groups were also reported in Niger state. Boko Haram cell also attacked security forces and civilians, including through the abduction of women, in Shiroro, Munya and Rafi LGAs. Nigerian forces clashed with and conducted airstrikes against bandits or 'terrorists'. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 316 security incidents (3 security incidents per week) resulting in 1 058 fatalities (approximately 16 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Niger state at 47 215 mainly because of banditry and insurgency.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Niger state, however not at a high level.**

## □ **North-Central: Plateau**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.1.7.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2., 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Plateau was fuelled by disputes between herders and farmers. Besides attacks by gunmen (in some instances identified as members of herder and farmer communities) and armed groups, other types of violence included kidnappings and clashes between bandits and vigilantes, in some cases involving security forces. Extrajudicial killings by state security services during operations to tackle insecurity were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 328 security incidents (3.1 security incidents per week) resulting in 981 fatalities (approximately 21 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Plateau state at 55 053 mainly because of communal clashes and farmer-herder clashes.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Plateau state, however not at a high level.**

## □ **North-East: Adamawa**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Adamawa is one of the main bases of Boko Haram in Nigeria. ISWAP has assigned the state's north to its Faruq province (wilaya) and has expanded its operations there. Northern LGAs in Adamawa are part of what it called the 'Northeast Belt of Insurgency.' As of July 2025, the situation in the north of Adamawa state was described as marked by insecurity. Boko Haram (ISWAP) repeatedly conducted attacks on villages, carried out by gunmen on motorbikes and involved the use of explosives against vigilantes and police, resulting in local residents' fatalities. Meanwhile, deadly communal clashes erupted and armed robberies and kidnappings were also reported, with villagers and Catholic clergymen among those targeted. Between 1 January 2024 and 15 December 2025, ACLED recorded 86 security incidents (0.8 incidents per week) resulting in 148 fatalities (approximately 3 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). The conflict has led to the destruction of multiple civilian structures. As of November 2024, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Adamawa state at 200 211, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Despite the long-standing activities by Boko Haram and the communal clashes, and considering the relatively low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Adamawa state, however not at a high level.**

## □ **North-East: Taraba**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Intercommunal clashes, primarily fuelled by long-standing land disputes between ethnic Tiv and Jukun communities, disputes between herders and farmers and attacks by Fulani herdsmen on farming communities were reported in Taraba state. Kidnappings and banditry, including by criminals working for Boko Haram, were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 157 security incidents (1.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 242 fatalities (approximately 7 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Taraba state at 62 564, mainly because of communal clashes and insurgency. Houses were set on fire in herders attacks and communal clashes, and road security remained a concern.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the relatively low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Taraba state,**

however not at a high level.

### □ **North-East: Yobe**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.6.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Alongside Borno and Adamawa states, Yobe is one of the main bases of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Moreover, the state's south has been integrated into ISWAP's Faruq province and is part of the 'Northeast Belt of Insurgency'. Boko Haram conducted deadly attacks against several communities and villages, carried out by gunmen on motorcycles. Insurgents also kidnapped civilians during those attacks and targeted NAF troops, including by bombings and a suicide car attack. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 153 security incidents (1.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 271 fatalities (approximately 7 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Yobe state at 167 320, mainly because of insurgency.

Despite the long-standing activities by Boko Haram, and considering the not high number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Yobe state, however not at a high level.**

### □ **North-West: Kaduna**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2., 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The security situation in Kaduna was characterised by persistent and multi-dimensional insecurity, driven by ethnic and religious tensions, banditry, kidnappings, farmer-herder conflict, clashes between bandit groups and attacks on civilian settlements. Bandits and other armed groups carried out attacks on smaller towns, schools, hospitals, travellers and farming communities, resulting in civilian fatalities, abductions, property destruction and the looting of villages. In addition, long-standing communal and ethnic tensions, particularly in Southern Kaduna fuelled cycles of retaliatory violence leading to the destruction of villages such as Jika da Kolo and Tudun Biri. Attacks by Boko Haram, Ansaru and government counter-operations, including drone attack and airstrike in 2024,

have also resulted in civilian fatalities. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 543 security incidents (5.2 incidents per week) resulting in 1 048 fatalities (approximately 12 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). The conflict in the north-western region has worsened leading to widespread displacement and as of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Kaduna state at 117 989, mainly due to armed banditry/kidnapping and communal clashes. Some medical facilities have shut down as a result of insecurity. Households were reported as being heavily affected by increasingly violent rural banditry, with Nigeria Watch identifying the state as the third worst affected by rural banditry in 2024.

Considering the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of the armed conflict between herders and farmers, as well as between Islamist groups and the Nigerian state forces, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Kaduna state, however, not at a high level.**

#### **North-West: Sokoto**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.6.](#); [COI Update 2026](#) 1., 2.1, 2.2.; Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The state experienced insecurity driven largely by farmer-herder conflict, banditry, and armed Islamist groups, such as Lakurawa, which carried out attacks across several communities. Incidents resulted in civilian deaths, abductions and destruction of property. Vigilante forces also existed in Sokoto state. Government operations against armed groups, such as Lakurawa, including airstrikes by the US, were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 497 security incidents (4.8 incidents per week) resulting in 867 fatalities (approximately 14 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Sokoto state at 99 729, mainly because of armed banditry /kidnapping.

Considering the relatively moderate number of security incidents and fatalities in the context of the armed conflict between herders and farmers, as well as between Islamist groups and the Nigerian state forces, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Sokoto state, however not at a high level.**

#### **North-West: Kebbi**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Kebbi State continued facing elevated levels of insecurity, primarily driven by the activities of armed groups, bandits and Islamist groups, such as Lakurawa, operating across the wider North-West corridor. Security operations, including government raids and airstrikes were conducted against armed groups. Vigilante forces also existed in Kebbi state and have clashed with state forces. Between 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 118 security incidents (1.1 incidents per week) resulting in 291 fatalities (approximately 5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the nature of violence, as well as the low number of security incidents, it can be concluded that **indiscriminate violence takes place in Kebbi state, however not at a high level.**

## No real risk

Areas where, **there is no real risk** for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.

This may be because the criteria for an armed conflict within the meaning of this provision are not met, or because no indiscriminate violence is taking place.

The areas assessed as belonging to this category as well as the main elements leading to this assessment are highlighted below.

### **North-East: Bauchi**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2., 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Security incidents in Bauchi state are mainly linked to clashes between bandits and local security forces, such as vigilantes. In the meantime, deadly communal clashes between herders and farmers and kidnappings were also reported in Darazo LGA. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 53 security incidents (0.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 164 fatalities (approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Security incidents were recorded in approximately half of the LGAs of the state. As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Bauchi state at

65 876, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Bauchi state.**

#### **North-East: Gombe**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.2.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Gombe state was described as the most peaceful state in 2024 and the one with the lowest number of insecurity incidents. Most of the incidents reported arose from clashes between herders and farmers, kidnappings linked to cattle rustling, and attacks by Fulani militias. Other types of violence, including an assault by suspected Kalare Boys (a gang in Gombe) and an attack against a Christian procession, were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 14 security incidents (0.1 security incidents per week) resulting in 13 fatalities (approximately 0 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Benue state at 52 202, mainly because of insurgency and communal clashes.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Gombe state.**

#### **North-West: Jigawa**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The situation in Jigawa was generally described as marked by low but persistent levels of violent conflict, primarily driven by herder-farmer clashes, communal violence and protests linked to economic hardship and political demands. Clashes between herders and farmers were reported across several LGAs including Miga, Jahun, Dutse, Kiyawa and Birnin Kudu. Some of these clashes resulted in civilian deaths, injuries and burning of

houses. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 23 security incidents (0.2 incidents per week) resulting in 45 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is very limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Jigawa state.**

#### **North-West: Kano**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.3.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The security situation in Kano is characterised by episodic unrest, mob violence, isolated explosions and criminal activity. Kano state police conducted security operations and raids, tackling armed robbery, thuggery, abductions, and criminal activities. JAS has maintained a long-standing presence in Kano state, employing tactics similar to those of bandits, including coercion. The state also experienced protest-related violence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 52 security incidents (0.5 incidents per week) resulting in 69 fatalities (approximately 0 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). As of February 2025, IOM estimated the number of IDPs in Kano state at 12 555, mainly due to insurgency.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is very limited in scale and intensity and, while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that **there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Kano state.**

#### **South-East: Abia**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.4.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Abia state had been described as one of the safest states in Nigeria during the period from 2011 to 2024. Drivers of insecurity included incidents linked to separatist militias attacking security forces, criminality (including kidnappings), communal violence and cult/gang-related clashes. In 2025 there was a resurgence of communal violence involving communities in Arochukwu, Ikwuano, Isuikwuato and Obi Ngwa LGAs and escalating attacks by suspected Fulani armed bandits and herdsmen on local communities, resulting also in kidnappings and farm destructions. Raids by security forces against IPOB/ESN were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 98 security incidents (0.9 security incident per week) resulting in 160 fatalities (4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Abia state.**

#### □ **South-East: Anambra**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.4.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Anambra state has been described as marked by insecurity. Drivers of insecurity included incidents linked to cultism, criminality (armed robbery, kidnapping) and separatist militias. Anambra witnessed more fatalities from cult-related violence than any other state in Nigeria, with incidents often occurring near premises of institutions of higher education and several clashes between rival cults recorded in the state capital of Awka. Anambra recorded one of the lowest numbers of deaths linked to ethnic and communal violence, although an escalation of attacks on local communities related to suspected armed bandits and herdsmen has been reported for 2025. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 223 security incidents (2.1 security incident per week) resulting in 313 fatalities (5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on numbers of individuals affected by conflict-induced displacement in Anambra, but communal violence has led farmers to abandon their lands in certain areas.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Anambra state.**

## □ **South-East: Ebonyi**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.4.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The situation in Ebonyi state has been described as marked by some level of insecurity. Drivers of insecurity included incidents linked to herder-farmer conflicts, cult clashes and intra-community land disputes. Long-standing land disputes between various communities resulted in abductions and deadly clashes. Dozens of fatalities resulted from attacks on communities attributed to armed herdsmen and unknown gunmen. Incidents involving forest-based criminal groups, as well as 'escalating attacks' by suspected armed bandits and herdsmen on local communities, have been reported. In July 2025, ESN appears to have reduced the Fulani presence in the forests of the South-East with considerable success, apparently contributing to a reduction of kidnappings by Fulani elements in this area. However, attacks still take place. Ebonyi has the lowest figure of Pro-Biafra violence in South-Eastern Nigeria, with seven fatalities recorded in relation to separatist violence in 2024. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 66 security incidents (0.6 security incident per week) resulting in 126 fatalities (4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on the exact numbers affected by conflict-induced displacement. Nevertheless, intra-communal conflicts in Ohaukwu LGA were reported to have displaced thousands of residents during the past four years. Conflicts and other armed attacks resulted also in damage to buildings and property.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ebonyi state.**

## □ **South-East: Enugu**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.4.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Enugu state has been described as experiencing increasing insecurity. Drivers of insecurity consisted of incidents linked to herder-farmer clashes mainly characterised by suspected herdsmen's attacks, separatist agitation, forest-based criminal activity, communal clashes, and kidnappings, resulting in fatalities. In July 2025, ESN appears to have reduced the Fulani presence in the forests of the South-East with considerable success, apparently contributing to a reduction of kidnappings by Fulani elements.

However attacks continued to take place. Unidentified gunmen carried out multiple deadly attacks targeting police forces and vigilantes. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 135 security incidents (1.3 security incident per week) resulting in 140 fatalities (3 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Attacks on communities in Uzo Uwani LGA and Eha-Amufu by suspected armed herdsmen have prompted displacements, although exact information on numbers of individuals affected in Enugu during this period could not be found.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering the relatively limited number of incidents, some of them deriving from criminal activity not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Enugu state.**

#### **South-East: Imo**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.4.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The security situation in Imo has been described as marked by rising insecurity. Drivers of insecurity consisted of conflicts between separatist militants and security personnel, attacks on communities by armed herdsmen or unidentified armed groups, kidnappings, clashes with security forces, vigilante and mob violence, and cultism. Multiple deadly clashes between separatist militias and security forces particularly affected Orsu and Ehime Mbano–Oyo LGAs. Many of those killed were members of IPOB and ESN, and there were also reports of alleged lethal attacks on civilians. Criminal violence in Imo state resulted in one of the highest numbers of fatalities in the Niger Delta, with over 50 fatalities in 2024. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 162 security incidents (1.6 security incident per week) resulting in 292 fatalities (5 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information on conflict-related displacement or returns could be found during the reference period.

While some incidents caused harm to civilians, considering their not high number as well as that some of them stemmed from criminal activity not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Imo state.**

#### **South-South: Akwa Ibom**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Akwa Ibom has been reported to be among the five most peaceful states of the country. Insecurity is mainly driven by cult groups' violence, kidnappings, robberies and targeted killings. Intra- and inter-communal violence was also reported. Incidents frequently involved clashes between rival cult groups, killings related to cult targeting, for instance suspected cult members, incidents of mob violence against thieves and security forces, robberies, and abductions-for-ransom targeting particularly travellers and children. Sporadic violence by unidentified gunmen was also recorded. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 52 security incidents (0.5 security incidents per week) resulting in 63 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Fatalities mostly resulted from cult-related shootings and targeted killings. There were also reports of attacks on police officers, destruction of property during cult clashes, and violence linked to criminal gangs operating along transport routes. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Akwa Ibom state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Akwa Ibom state.**

#### **South-South: Bayelsa**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Bayelsa was one of the least violent states in the Niger Delta region, with violence largely driven by criminal activity, such as abduction and ambushes and cult groups' violence. Cult related violence involved clashes between cult groups, robberies and thefts, targeting both cult members and civilians. While instances of lethal clashes among communities over land ownership were reported, unlike states in the North-East or Middle Belt, Bayelsa did not face large-scale insurgency or widespread communal conflict. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 39 security incidents (0.4 security incidents per week) resulting in 44 fatalities (approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Bayelsa state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of**

## Article 15(c) QD/QR in Bayelsa state.

### □ **South-South: Cross River**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Cross River experienced violence primarily driven by cult-related activities, including abductions and killings, as well as clashes, criminality and localised communal disputes. Criminal activities involved especially sea pirates' abductions for ransom and targeting of passengers. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 40 security incidents (0.4 security incidents per week) resulting in 53 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Cross River state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Cross River state.**

### □ **South-South: Delta**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Communal, herders and farmers tensions, criminal violence (including killings, armed robberies and kidnappings), gang/cult-related violence and clashes were the main drivers of insecurity in Delta state. Clashes between security forces and bandits were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 216 security incidents (2.1 security incidents per week) resulting in 228 fatalities (approximately 4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Delta state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Delta state.**

## □ **South-South: Edo**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.1, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

The insecurity in Edo state is largely driven by cult groups, unidentified armed groups and Fulani ethnic militias. The most prevalent types of violence included clashes between cult gangs, criminal activities, including killings and kidnappings for ransom, as well as communal violence, which included killings and abductions by suspected herders, mob violence and attacks by different actors. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 230 security incidents (2.2 security incidents per week) resulting in 208 fatalities (approximately 4 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). Residents were fleeing 'en masse' following violent clashes with suspected Ijaw militias affecting farming communities, but no further information on conflict-induced displacement in Edo state during the reference period could be found.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Edo state.**

## □ **South-South: Rivers**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.5.6.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Rivers state, the primary drivers of insecurity included clashes between rival cult gangs, confrontations involving security forces and local vigilantes, kidnappings for ransom, as well as vigilante and mob violence triggered by criminal activity and clashes between cults and armed gangs. In the period between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 136 security incidents (1.3 security incidents per week) resulting in 118 fatalities (approximately 2 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Rivers was one of three states in the Niger Delta region with the highest level of lethal violence and was among the three most affected states in terms of cult-related fatalities and the fifth most affected state in terms of fatalities related to kidnappings in 2024. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Rivers state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state seems of more criminal nature rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of**

## Article 15(c) QD/QR in Rivers state.

### □ **South-West: Ekiti**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.1.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Ekiti state, the main armed actors were criminal groups, cult gangs, and unidentified armed men. Reported incidents included kidnappings for ransom, killings sometimes taking place in the context of abductions, and incidents involving cult groups' activities. There was no insurgent presence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 30 security incidents (0.3 security incidents per week) resulting in 16 fatalities (approximately 0 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Ekiti state during the reference period.

Considering the very limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ekiti state.**

### □ **South-West: Lagos**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.6.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

Lagos state has been described as a hotspot for cultism and criminality. Cult-related violence and clashes were reported and occurred in various LGAs. Criminal activities also included robberies, kidnappings for ransom, violent clashes and killings. There were also several cases of mob justice targeting suspected criminals, as well as attacks by unidentified gunmen. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 178 security incidents (1.7 security incidents per week) resulting in 174 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Lagos state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Lagos state.**

## □ **South-West: Ogun**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.2.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Ogun state, the main actors involved in security incidents were unknown gunmen, cult groups, Fulani herdsmen and unidentified armed groups. Cult violence, kidnapping, armed robbery and ritual killings were described as source of insecurity. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 131 security incidents (1.3 security incidents per week) resulting in 121 fatalities (approximately 2 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants). The roads of Ogun state are considered dangerous due to the risk of kidnappings. No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Ogun state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ogun state.**

## □ **South-West: Ondo**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.3.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Ondo state, the main actors were unidentified armed groups, suspected (Fulani) herders and cult gangs. The incidents included clashes between communities, numerous incidents of kidnappings and killings, lethal attacks on farmers and farmer-herder conflicts, as well as incidents of cult-related violence. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 86 security incidents (0.8 security incidents per week) resulting in 73 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). Many farmers were abandoning their farms due to ongoing kidnappings and attacks by suspected herdsmen. As of August 2025, no further information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Ondo state during the reference period.

Considering that the recorded violence in the state is limited in scale and intensity, and while some incidents caused harm to civilians, it is noted that these were generally isolated and not indicative of indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Ondo state.**

## □ **South-West: Osun**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.4.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Osun state, the main drivers of insecurity were reported to be gang-related criminality, armed robberies, kidnappings, lethal clashes between cult groups, communal violence over land disputes and political clashes. No insurgent activity was reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 61 security incidents (0.6 security incidents per week) resulting in 51 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). As a consequence of the violent clashes between Ilobu and Ifon communities, more than 100 000 residents were displaced. No further information could be found on conflict-induced displacement.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Osun state.**

## □ **South-West: Oyo**

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Security 2025, 2.6.5.](#); [COI Update 2026, 2.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

In Oyo state, the main drivers of insecurity were banditry, kidnappings, armed robberies, attacks by unidentified gunmen as well as cult-related clashes and violence, including ritual killings. Violent conflicts with herders and bandits were also reported. Between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025, ACLED recorded 68 security incidents (0.7 security incidents per week) resulting in 59 fatalities (approximately 1 fatality per 100 000 inhabitants). No information could be found on conflict-induced displacement in Oyo state during the reference period.

Considering the limited number of incidents, as well as the predominance of criminal rather than indiscriminate violence in the context of an armed conflict, it can be concluded that there is **no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Oyo state.**



Please note that in areas where there would be ‘no real risk’ for a civilian to be affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR, depending on personal circumstances, an applicant may still be exposed to a risk of persecution (see [3. Refugee status](#)) or a risk of serious harm under [4.1. Article 15\(a\) QD/QR: death penalty or execution](#) or [4.2. Article 15\(b\) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment](#). Hence, this assessment of ‘no real risk’ should in no way be misconstrued as the designation of ‘safe areas’ for return or any other purposes.

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