HTS was the largest component of the operation ‘Deterrence of Aggression’334 with an estimated 30 000 fighters.335 A Syrian economist gave a lower figure of 10 000 for the number of HTS fighters.336 HTS was reportedly divided into six brigades, special forces and an elite force known as the ‘Red Bands’.337 The International Crisis Group assessed HTS forces to be stretched thin following their offensive to overthrow the government, being in urgent need of more personnel and resources.338 A notable allied faction joining the offensive was the Türkiye-backed National Liberation Front (NLF), a component of the SNA.339 For more information on the SNA, see section 2.2. Jaish Al-Izza, an opposition group present in northern Hama and parts of Latakia, with 2 000 to 5 000 fighters according to 2019 estimates, also reportedly joined the push into government territory.340 The pan-Arab daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi estimated the overall size of HTS and its allied factions to be about 43 000, with more than half of those troops maintaining their presence in their original areas of operation after pushing the government troops out, especially in northern Hama countryside, southern Idlib countryside, and western and southern Aleppo countryside.341
HTS and its allied factions, who had previously coordinated in Idlib under the Fateh Al-Mubin Operations room, formed the Military Operations Administration (MOA)342 in light of operation Deterrence of Aggression.343 It is made up of high-ranking members of the SSG that previously operated in Idlib.344 Following the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad, troops comprising the MOA became the primary military force on the ground.345 On 24 December 2024, the MOA announced the dissolution of all military factions and their integration under the Ministry of Defence.346 HTS itself announced that it would lead by example, dissolve as an armed group and integrate into the armed forces.347 Among the first steps of establishing a new army was to promote some leaders of the individual factions as well as some defected officers into certain military ranks.348 Among those promoted were purportedly several foreign Islamist fighters of Albanian, Tajik and Uyghur origin.349 Following the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad, most soldiers as well as policemen either fled or were suspended.350 HTS has relied on its General Security units formerly active under its administration in Idlib as well as units under the MOA to support and supplement local police forces.351 Furthermore, recruitment centres were opened in provinces formerly under Assad’s control to rebuild the police force.352
As of January 2025, the HTS-led coalition was in control of most areas previously held by the Assad government until early December 2024,353 amounting to just over 60% of Syrian territory.354 During its December offensive, the HTS further took control of the city of Deir Ez-Zor previously held by the SDF.355 At the end of January 2025, the MOA seized a strategically important area near Zamla oil field south of Raqqa in the Syrian desert, a deployment that was assessed to aim at containing ISIL activity while also putting pressure on SDF troops stationed on the southwestern bank of Lake Assad.356 In the country’s south, the MOA as of mid-January was still in talks with the former Fifth Corps and specifically its Eighth Brigade regarding their dissolution (see section 2.3), but managed to deploy its own troops in Jadal, Mseika, Mismiyeh and Lajat.357 In Afrin city in northern Aleppo governorate, troops from the Syrian Transitional Administration at the beginning of February 2025 arrived to take over control from the SNA.358
Since the fall of Assad, HTS has relied on its own units and close allies to secure governorates predominantly populated by minorities. Thus, unlike in other areas such as Homs, the SNA has been largely absent from coastal areas with Alawite populations359 where support for Assad has reportedly been strong.360 Etana noted that Idlib’s security landscape in particular had considerably changed following Assad’s fall, with much of the military presence relocated to key strategic areas in Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Latakia and Tartous.361
During operation ‘Deterrence of Aggression’, HTS reportedly took over weapon depots and armoured vehicles from the Syrian Arab Army.362 Following Al-Asad’s ouster, hundreds of Israeli airstrikes reportedly resulted in the destruction of the country’s military stocks and defence infrastructure, as well as most of its missile systems and tanks.363 The newly appointed interim Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra in an interview recounted how HTS had established its own military industry in Idlib, building drones for reconnaissance, drones armed with explosives and suicide drones as well as manufacturing armoured vehicles. They further developed their own artillery systems.364
During its offensive, HTS reportedly made efforts to avoid harming the civilian population.365 Furthermore, some areas that were previously held by the SDF were taken over based on agreements.366 Even so, six students were killed by rockets fired by the rebels which landed on a student dormitory in Aleppo city.367 Following its takeover of power, there were several reports of abuse being committed by HTS forces during security operations in Alawite areas, such as individuals killed in raids368 and detainees being held incommunicado.369 Especially foreign fighter groups under the MOA as well as the HTS elite forces ‘Red Bands’ were accused of committing violations during raids such as harassment and intimidation and in a few instances killings.370
- 334
Al Jazeera, Who are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian groups that took Aleppo?, 2 December 2024, url
- 335
Al Jazeera, Who are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian groups that took Aleppo?, 2 December 2024, url; International Crisis Group, Promoting a Stable, Peaceful Transition in Syria, 30 January 2025, url
- 336
Al-Estiklal, SDF’s Dilemma: Autonomy or Integration in a New Syria?, 6 January 2025, url
- 337
Al-Quds Al-Arabi, سبعة جيوش وجماعة: تحديات الشرع في بناء الجيش السوري [Seven armies and a group: the challenges for Al-Shara in building a Syrian army], 11 January 2025, url
- 338
International Crisis Group, Promoting a Stable, Peaceful Transition in Syria, 30 January 2025, url
- 339
MEE, The Syrian National Army: Rebels, thugs or Turkish proxies?, 7 December 2024, url
- 340
Al Jazeera, Who are Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Syrian groups that took Aleppo?, 2 December 2024, url
- 341
Al-Quds Al-Arabi, سبعة جيوش وجماعة: تحديات الشرع في بناء الجيش السوري [Seven armies and a group: the challenges for Al-Shara in building a Syrian army], 11 January 2025, url
- 342
Some sources also refer to this entity as the Department of Military Operations (DMO), see Waters, G., Security in Alawite regions in post-Assad Syria, MEI, 21 January 2025, url; Lister, C., Syria Weekly: Jan 14-21, 2025, 21 January 2025, url
- 343
Al Jazeera, "إدارة العمليات العسكرية".. قادت عملية ردع العدوان التي أسقطت بشار الأسد [The Military Operations Administration – leaders of the Deterrence of Aggression that overthrew Bashar Al-Asad], 31 December 2024, url
- 344
Enab Baladi, Damascus – SDF negotiations await the “deal”, 30 January 2025, url
- 345
Enab Baladi, Factionalism threatens unification of Syrian army, 17 January 2025, url
- 346
Enab Baladi, Military Operations Administration announces dissolving of opposition factions in Syria, 24 December 2024, url; Shafaq News, Syrian factions to integrate into Ministry of Defense under new deal, 24 December 2024, url
- 347
AFP, Syria ex-rebel military chief says to dissolve armed wing, 18 December 2024, url
- 348
Enab Baladi, Factionalism threatens unification of Syrian army, 17 January 2025, url
- 349
RFE/RL, Foreign Fighters Promoted In Syria's New Army Have Their Governments Concerned, 8 January 2025, url
- 350
France24, Syria’s new HTS-led regime reinforces police force with the help of its fighters, 19 January 2025, url
- 351
Waters, G., Security in Alawite regions in post-Assad Syria, MEI, 21 January 2025, url
- 352
Rudaw, Syria’s new government recruits more policemen amid security challenges, 25 December 2024, url
- 353
Carter Center (The), Exploring Historical Control in Syria [Map], n.d., url. Set filters to January 2025
- 354
Sharifa, A., Will Syria's myriad militias unite under one national army?, Al Majalla, 4 February 2025, url
- 355
DW, Fighting in Syrian Kurdish-held areas: What you need to know, 13 December 2024, url; Rudaw, Syrian rebels claim control of oil-rich Deir ez-Zor from SDF, 11 December 2024, url
- 356
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, January 23, 2025, 23 January 2025, url
- 357
Etana, Syria Update #14: 17 January, 16 January 2025, url
- 358
Kurdistan 24, Uncertain Future in Rojava: Syrian Public Security Forces Assume Control of Afrin, 6 February 2025, url
- 359
Waters, G., Security in Alawite regions in post-Assad Syria, MEI, 21 January 2025, url
- 360
Al Jazeera, مقتل قيادي عسكري باشتباكات مع "فلول النظام" باللاذقية [Military leader killed in clashes with "regime remnants" in Latakia], 7 January 2025, url
- 361
Etana, Syria Update #14: 17 January, 16 January 2025, url
- 362
Al Jazeera, Dozens killed as armed groups attack Syrian military in northern Aleppo, 28 November 2024, url
- 363
Etana, Syria Update #10: 12 December, 12 December 2024, url
- 364
Al Majalla, Syria defence chief Murhaf Abu Qasra on the plan to oust Assad, 23 January 2025, url
- 365
Le Monde, Syria: Turkey wants to extend its buffer zone by pushing back Kurdish forces, 12 December 2024, url; VOA, Rights groups cautious about Islamist rebels’ pledges to protect Syrian minorities, 6 December 2024, url
- 366
Enab Baladi, Thousands return to Afrin after Assad regime’s fall, 28 January 2025, url; Le Monde, Syria: Turkey wants to extend its buffer zone by pushing back Kurdish forces, 12 December 2024, url
- 367
SOHR, Dramatic escalation | Six students killed and wounded in rocket fire by rebels on university student dormitory in Aleppo city, 29 November 2024, url
- 368
National (The), HTS forces kill two people in former regime loyalist areas of Syria, 5 January 2025, url, SOHR, Security vacuum | Alawite sheikh and his wife killed in Al-Salamiyah countryside and goldsmith killed in Deir Ezzor countryside, 9 January 2025, url
- 369
MEE, HTS raids and forced disappearances fuel fear in Syria’s Alawi heartlands, 17 January 2025, url
- 370
Waters, G., Security in Alawite regions in post-Assad Syria, MEI, 21 January 2025, url