Türkiye was known to be the most important474 and ‘most steadfast’ external supporter of the Syrian opposition during the years of conflict that led up to the fall of the Bashar Al-Assad government.475 The Turkish government has maintained long-standing ties with HTS,476 the main armed opposition group.477 However, unlike with the SNA that is funded, trained and equipped by Türkiye,478 no patron-client relationship existed between Türkiye and HTS.479 For more information regarding Türkiye’s involvement in Syria prior to November 2024, see section 1.3.2. of the EUAA COI Report Syria – Security Situation (October 2024).
The exact role of Türkiye in the operation that led to the downfall of Assad has been unclear.480 While Turkish authorities denied any involvement in the operation,481observers suggested that the Turkish government, though unlikely to have been involved in the planning and timing of the operation,482 must have approved the campaign483 at least tacitly, given that the opposition forces likely could not have consolidated their armed capabilities and prepared the operation without Ankara becoming aware.484 At the same time, Steven A. Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (USA), noted that Ankara intended the operation to be of limited scope as it primarily pursued the aim of negotiating a normalisation of relations with Damascus. According to this source, it was only after the collapse of Assad’s forces that Türkiye revised its policy, embracing the victorious HTS and claiming that Türkiye had long planned to end Assad’s rule.485
Following the fall of Assad, Türkiye declared its support for the new Syrian Transitional Administration.486 The demise of Assad’s rule and the decline of Russian and Iranian influence was reported to have been perceived by Türkiye as an opportunity to advance its strategic interests and acquire an edge over Iran for regional domination.487
The presence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a force affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a core component of the US-supported SDF, remained a primary concern within Türkiye’s security strategy488 which has been aiming for a stable state that did not pose a threat.489 Indeed, simultaneously with the launch of the Syrian opposition’s military campaign against the Assad government on 27 November 2024, Turkish-backed armed factions in northern Syria resumed their fight against Kurdish forces.490 Turkish forces conducted artillery bombardments and airstrikes against SDF positions in areas of Aleppo,491 Raqqa492 and Hasaka493 while repeated Turkish strikes reportedly targeted civilians,494 villages495 and infrastructure496 in these regions. At the end of February, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan urged the organisation to disarm and dissolve, prompting the militant group to declare an immediate ceasefire. Despite this call, Türkiye continued operations against SDF in Syria497, albeit at lower levels.498 The PKK ceasefire does not seem to extend to SDF.499 YPG on its part ‘has said Ocalan’s message does not apply to them’.500
For information on activities of Turkish-backed armed factions, see section 4.2. of this report.
Another critical issue of concern for Türkiye has been Israel’s involvement on Syrian territory,501 including its escalating airstrikes against Syrian military installations502 and its seizure of the buffer zone that used to separate the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights from Syria.503 However, it was held that Türkiye had no interest in a military conflict with Israel. Thus, the Turkish authorities have reportedly made initial steps to set up a deconfliction mechanism with the Israeli armed forces. The Middle East Eye (MEE) also pointed to regular engagements between the two countries’ intelligence agencies and to sources indicating that the Turkish government encouraged HTS leaders to advocate calm with Israel.504
- 474
Barkey, H.J., What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War?, CFR,6 December 2024, url
- 475
Dalay, G., Turkey has emerged as a winner in Syria but must now use its influence to help build peace, Chatham House, 13 December 2024, url
- 476
Al Jazeera, Turkiye threatens military action against Kurdish forces in Syria, 8 January 2025, url
- 477
Suleymanov, R., Rebel Gains in Syria Put Russia on the Back Foot, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 6 December 2024, url
- 478
VOA, Future uncertain for Syria's Kurds amid potential Turkish offensive, 18 December 2024, url
- 479
Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url
- 480
Suleymanov, R., Rebel Gains in Syria Put Russia on the Back Foot, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 6 December 2024, url; Özkizilcik, Ö., What does Turkey gain from the rebel offensive in Syria?, Atlantic Council, 5 December 2024, url
- 481
Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url; Shahbazov, F., What Turkey Hopes to Gain From the HTS Offensive in Syria, Stimson Center, 5 December 2024, url
- 482
Barkey, H.J., What Role Is Turkey Playing in Syria’s Civil War?, CFR, 6 December 2024, url
- 483
Cook, S.A., Turkey Hasn’t Won Anything Yet in Syria, FP, 13 January 2025, url; Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url; Özkizilcik, Ö., What does Turkey gain from the rebel offensive in Syria?, Atlantic Council, 5 December 2024, url
- 484
Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url
- 485
Cook, S.A., Turkey Hasn’t Won Anything Yet in Syria, FP, 13 January 2025, url
- 486
Al Jazeera, Analysis: Turkiye’s road ahead in a post-Assad Syria, 7 January 2025, url
- 487
Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url
- 488
Al Jazeera, Analysis: Turkiye’s road ahead in a post-Assad Syria, 7 January 2025, url
- 489
MEE, Turkey doesn't seek conflict with Israel in Syria. Here's why, 11 January 2025, url
- 490
Al Jazeera, Turkiye threatens military action against Kurdish forces in Syria, 8 January 2025, url
- 491
SOHR, Amid Turkish artillery fire and clashes on different frontlines | SDF foil attack and shoot down kamikaze drone in Aleppo countryside, 23 February 2025, url; Etana, Syria Update #18: 15 February 2025, 14 February 2025, url; Etana, Syria Update #15: 28 January, 24 January 2025, url
- 492
Etana, Syria Update #18: 15 February 2025, 14 February 2025, url; Etana, Syria Update #15: 28 January, 24 January 2025, url
- 493
Etana, Syria Update #18: 15 February 2025, 14 February 2025, url
- 494
See, for example, Etana, Syria Update #15: 28 January, 24 January 2025, url; SOHR, New attack | Nearly 25 civilians injured and killed under Turkish shelling near Teshrin Dam, 22 January 2025, url; NPA, Turkish drone strikes kill 3 journalists, injure 8 in northern Syria, 19 February 2025, url; International Crisis Group, Crisis Watch – Syria: November 2024 – February 2025, n.d., url
- 495
SOHR, Artillery fire | Turkish forces bombard villages in rural Al-Hasakah and SDF attack Turkish base, 9 February 2025, url
- 496
SOHR, Attacking infrastructure | Turkish forces shell a town and electricity station in Al-Raqqa, 12 February 2025, url
- 497
Reuters, Turkey continues operations on PKK in Iraq, Syria despite Ocalan call, 6 March 2025, url
- 498
ISW and CT, Iran Update, 3 March 2025, url
- 499
ISW and CT, Iran Update, 3 March 2025, url
- 500
Reuters, Turkey continues operations on PKK in Iraq, Syria despite Ocalan call, 6 March 2025, url
- 501
Al Jazeera, Analysis: Turkiye’s road ahead in a post-Assad Syria, 7 January 2025, url
- 502
Badi, E., and Al-Jabassini, A., Turkey’s Syria and Libya strategies add up to a Mediterranean power play, Atlantic Council, 13 January 2025, url
- 503
Coşkun, A., Türkiye Has a Wish List in Syria. It Should Tread Lightly. [Commentary], Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 December 2024, url
- 504
MEE, Turkey doesn't seek conflict with Israel in Syria. Here's why, 11 January 2025, url