COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

COI summary

Prior to the takeover, journalists, media workers, commentators and human rights defenders were targeted by anti-government armed groups as well as by former State actors, warlords, powerful local figures, and organised criminal groups. This was especially the case for those who expressed opinions and monitored or reported on human rights issues (especially women’s rights), critically covered activities of parties in the conflict, exposed corruption, criticised impunity, etc. There were reports of killing, beating, intimidation, detention and mistreatment of journalists [COI query on journalists, media workers and human rights defenders, 1, pp. 2-7; State structure, 1.8.1, p. 24; Conflict targeting, 1.2.9, pp. 48-51; 1.5.1, pp. 65, 67; 2.3, pp. 74-75].

After the Taliban takeover, numerous journalists fled Afghanistan or went into hiding, most female media workers lost their jobs and Afghan journalism has been facing challenges related to financial problems, the restrictions imposed by the Taliban, and violence [Targeting 2022, 7.1, pp. 156-159].

In September 2021, the Taliban issued guidelines for journalists, including rules against addressing topics in conflict with Islam or ‘insulting national personalities’, and instructing media to produce reports in coordination with the Taliban government’s media office. In February 2022, the Taliban stated that media coverage should consider ‘national interests, Islamic values and national unity’. The issued restrictions on media were vague, and difficult for media workers to follow in practice and they were reportedly enforced unevenly across the country. At the same time, the Taliban stated that they were working on re-establishing the Media Violation Commission to prevent ’misunderstandings’ and to take action against problems. The Commission was not established as of June 2022, according to UNAMA. [Targeting 2022, 7.1, p. 157]. On 21 July 2022, the Taliban supreme leader issued a decree banning defamation and ‘unproven’ criticism of [de facto] government officials. The decree added to previous restrictions on media content issued during the months following the Taliban takeover in 2021 [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 3].

The media that were still operating reportedly adjusted their reporting in general by decreasing potentially provocative content, while content praising the Taliban increased. The General Directorate of Intelligence established by the Taliban (GDI) tried to censor media content, including by using force, threats and psychological pressure. Many claimed to have been beaten while trying to cover subjects that ‘cast Taliban officials in bad light’, including anti-Taliban protests and arbitrary detentions. Some sensitive topics were difficult for media to cover, including religion and the situation of women, while others, such as women’s protests, human rights activities, resistance, and ISKP were reportedly ‘typical no-go areas’. Arrests and intimidation of journalists covering women’s protests were reported [Targeting 2022, 7.1, pp. 158-159].

On 21 May 2022, the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) issued instructions for women presenters to cover their faces while presenting on television and a spokesperson of the ministry stated that it was a final decision which they would not be willing to discuss. Female journalists reported that they experienced gender discrimination (e.g. being banned from attending Taliban-held press conferences, difficulties travelling due to male guardianship restrictions, officials refusing to participate in interviews with women journalists) and that they had received written, verbal and physical threats and abuse by Taliban officials. Compared to female journalists in the capital, female journalists on other parts of the country encountered more barriers, including security issues and sexism [Targeting 2022, 7.1, pp. 157-158].

Journalists and media workers reportedly faced violations by the de facto police forces and security service which included arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, torture and ill-treatment, threats or intimidation. Incidents were primarily reported in Kabul City [Targeting 2022, 7.2, pp.. 159-162; Security 2022, 4.1.1, p. 86].

Reports differ on whether the attacks against journalists were systematic or initiated by Taliban members ‘holding a grudge’. In some instances, journalists were detained while trying to cover women’s protests, after reporting on protesters or after hosting guests in television shows criticising the Taliban. A former owner of a radio station was reportedly detained by intelligence officials in Herat City on accusation of working as a journalist for NRF. Four radio stations were raided, and six journalists temporarily detained by GDI in Kandahar City, after violating a ban on music [Targeting 2022, 7.2, pp. 160-162]

In May 2022, a journalist was reportedly sentenced to imprisonment by the Taliban military court after criticising the Taliban on social media. This was however denied by the Taliban who claimed that he had been sentenced for criminal misconduct unrelated to his journalistic work [Targeting 2022, 1.2.1, p. 38].

Some incidents of attacks against journalists by unidentified armed groups were also reported in Kabul City, including beatings and one abduction/forced disappearance. The killing of five journalists (including two women) by ISKP within the period 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022 was also reported [Targeting 2022, 7.2, p. 162; Security 2022, 4.1.1, p. 86].

Risk analysis

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing, arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, beatings, torture, abduction/enforced disappearance).

For journalists and media workers seen by the Taliban as critical of them or as not complying with conditions set by the Taliban well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

For other journalists and media workers, the individual assessment should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: gender (i.e. women), origin from areas where ISKP have operational capacity, personal enmities, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.