COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023
This profile refers to persons who individually or in association with others act to promote or protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also addresses the broader topic of perceived criticism of the Taliban, including in relation to protests and other open criticism of the Taliban, such as criticism expressed via social media.
COI summary
After the takeover, Taliban made efforts to stifle debate and curb dissent and prohibited unauthorised assemblies. Individuals who made peaceful expressions of opinion or dissent were arrested and detained [Targeting 2022, 2.2, p. 36]. On 21 July 2022, the Taliban supreme leader issued a decree banning defamation and ‘unproven’ criticism of [de facto] government officials. The decree added to previous restrictions on media content issued during the months following the Taliban takeover in 2021 [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 3].
Human rights defenders’ and activists’ work can be considered dangerous throughout Afghanistan because human rights concepts are often seen as an alien, Western or a non-Islamic concept. Intimidation, harassment, threats and violence against human rights defenders and activists were committed by all parties in the previous conflict. Civil society representatives who expressed opinions and monitored and reported on human rights violations and abuses encountered an ‘environment of threat and intimidation’ [COI query on journalists, media workers and human rights defenders, 2, pp. 7-12; State structure, 1.8.1, p. 23; Conflict targeting, 1.2.9, pp. 48, 51; 1.5.1, p. 65; 2.3, p. 74].
Since the Taliban takeover, civil society actors and human rights defenders largely halted their activities in most provinces, out of fear of repercussions. As indicated by the former chairwoman of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) ‘the situation has become increasingly difficult for activists and human rights defenders inside the country’, with a trend of an increased Taliban focus on targeting and ‘hunting down’ activists and media workers since November 2021. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, among those ‘most at risk’ were human rights defenders documenting alleged war crimes, female criminal lawyers, cultural rights defenders, and defenders from minority groups [Targeting 2022, 8.1, p. 163].
Human right violations such as killings, arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, torture and ill-treatment, and threats or intimidation were attributed to the de facto authorities. Most of these incidents occurred in Kabul City, especially during the increased number of women protests in January and February 2022. In the period 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022, UNAMA recorded the killings of 5 civil society activists carried out by the Taliban and the abuses against 65 human rights defenders, including 47 arbitrary arrests (including 11 women), 17 cases of incommunicado detention (including 10 women), 10 cases of torture and ill-treatment (including one woman), and 17 cases of threats and intimidation (including 6 women). [Targeting 2022, 8.2, pp. 168-172; Security 2022, 3.3.1, pp. 71-74; 4.1.1, pp. 80-86].
Some deadly attacks on human right defenders were also attributed to ISKP. In other cases, the perpetrators were not known. According to the OHCHR, there were no reports indicating that the Taliban authorities have investigated the incidents targeting human rights defenders or have taken any action against the perpetrators [Targeting 2022, 8.2, p. 168]. Taliban specific tactics used against human rights activists included raiding offices of human rights and civil society organisations to search for contact details of people who worked there, conducting house searches. They were also reportedly making calls and sending text messages asking for personal details and to hand over organisations’ equipment and money. Questioning people at local mosques and using the former police’s resources and records to obtain personal information on activists, delivering threats by phone and harassment on social media were also reported [Targeting 2022, 8.1, pp. 163-164].
In November 2021, the Taliban reportedly issued a warning to human rights activists and civil society workers in the province of Panjshir, indicating their work as ‘illegal’ and that the Taliban were therefore ‘instructed to seriously find and pursue them and arrest them as soon as possible to stop their false and anti-religious activities’ [Targeting 2022, 8.1, p. 164].
Limited civil society activity in relation to women’s rights has been possible, such as a gathering for international women’s day in March 2022 and a two-day meeting of representatives of civil society, Islamic scholars, tribal elders, and war victim families which started on 31 March 2022 [Targeting 2022, 1.2.2, p. 40].
Protests on issues such as women’s rights, economic sanctions, unpaid salaries and the distribution of humanitarian assistance took place. Protests on endorsed issues coordinated with the de facto authorities, such as the lifting of economic sanctions, did not face restrictions. However, in other cases, the Taliban used force to disperse crowds, including by using live ammunition, electroshock weapons, tear gas, whips, and beatings. Some protesters were subjected to arbitrary detention, house raids, ill-treatment and torture. Protests on women’s rights were especially met with violence or intimidation by the Taliban. Many resorted to organising smaller protests in private homes, sharing videos on social media and writing messages on walls around Kabul City during night-time [Targeting 2022, 1.2, pp. 38-39].
Arrests following criticism on social media were also reported on several instances. This included a female comedian and aid worker who had uploaded satirical videos on social media, sometimes critical of the Taliban, and a university professor, allegedly for statements on social media that were against the Taliban government. On both instances, the individuals were subsequently released without charges. Another university professor was reportedly ordered by the Taliban Minister of Higher Education to apologise after posting content on social media seemingly critical of the Taliban. An Afghan human rights activist from southern Afghanistan also claimed that her relative had recently been murdered after questioning the Taliban’s ability to feed the people on social media [Targeting 2022, 1.2.1, pp. 37-38].
Moreover, there were some examples of individuals belonging to the well-educated class and members of the intelligentsia being targeted, arrested and killed. Some reportedly awaited trials and have been charged with promoting values not in line with sharia or violating ‘the principle of the Quran’ [Targeting 2022, 1.2, p. 37; 8.2, pp. 168-172].
Reports on arrests, detentions and/or abductions included family members of individuals perceived as critical of the Taliban. Reports particularly referred to the arrest of female activists together with their family members [Targeting 2022, 8.2, pp. 169-171; Security 2022, 1.2.5, p. 34].
Risk analysis
Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing, abduction, arbitrary arrest and detention, beatings, torture).
For human rights defenders and activists, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.
For others who may be perceived as critical of the Taliban (e.g. due to statements or content shared on social media), the individual assessment should take into account the visibility of the applicant, the sensitivity of the topic of criticism and the extent of its public nature. Other risk-impacting circumstances, such as gender and ethnicity, may also be relevant to the assessment.
Family members of individuals under this profile may also have a well-founded fear of persecution. Family members of female activists may particularly be at risk.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.