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COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

This profile includes individuals working for national and international NGOs. Examples of relevant humanitarian work include participation in polio vaccination and demining programmes.

COI summary

Before the takeover, there were cases of NGO workers being targeted by actors in the conflict as a result of their activities being perceived as non-neutral or in violation of cultural or religious norms. Examples included targeting of people active in polio vaccination campaigns (sometimes considered as spies) or in de-mining programs (considered as an activity contrary to the military interests of the Taliban). ISKP also considered humanitarian workers as legitimate targets because of links with foreign organisations or donors [Security September 2021, 1.4.2, pp. 31-32; 2.23, pp. 101-102; COI query on humanitarian workers and healthcare professionals, pp. 1-16].

After the takeover, although the de facto authorities stated their guarantees for the ‘safety and security of humanitarian staff’ and freedom of movement of humanitarian workers, including women, the provincial de facto authorities were reportedly interfering in the work processes of humanitarian actors, including the selection of beneficiaries and/or distribution process. According to UNOCHA, ‘violence and/or threats against humanitarian personnel, assets, and/or facilities’ were reported in 57 % of Afghanistan’s districts [Targeting 2022, 10.1, p. 178].

Regarding the situation of women in the humanitarian sector, Taliban officials reportedly provided a written agreement that ‘unconditionally’ permitted women aid workers to fulfil their job ‘in only three provinces’ and as noted by Human Rights Watch, ‘in over half the country’ women humanitarian workers were restricted from fulfilling their work duties because of the requirement of male guardianship. UNOCHA noted that 2 of 17 directives issued by the de facto authorities enforced the requirements of wearing hijab and being accompanied by an adult male who is a close relative, a mahram, for female humanitarian workers [Targeting 2022, 10.1.1, pp. 178-179].

Sources recorded incidents in which humanitarian workers were targeted by the Taliban, the ISKP or unidentified armed group(s) [Targeting 2022, 10.1.2, pp. 179-180].

Incidents attributed to the Taliban included the beating of an Afghan UN staff member who was trying to reach Kabul airport, the insult and severe beating of five humanitarian employees and the temporary detention of others in Nili City in the Daykundi Province, the assault and arrest of four NGO workers at a checkpoint in Wardak Province, who were later released, and the temporary detention of four humanitarian workers, including a woman, in Kandahar Province [Targeting 2022, 10.1.2, p. 180].

Incidents attributed to unidentified armed groups included the abduction and interrogation of a UN agency worker in Herat City, three deadly attacks on the members of the polio vaccination teams in the provinces Kunduz and Takhar, the bombing of a UN vehicle in Kunar Province. During the attack on Kabul Airport in August 2021, ISKP reportedly fatally shot a woman staff member of an international NGO ‘while in her car on the road’ [Targeting 2022, 10.1.2, pp. 179-180].

Risk analysis

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. abduction, killing, arbitrary detention).

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: gender (i.e. women), nature of activities (e.g. activities for national/international NGO related to polio vaccination, demining, or other activities being perceived as non-neutral or in violation of cultural or religious norms), link with the former government or foreign donors, speaking out or acting against the Taliban or another armed group, origin from areas where ISKP have operational capacity, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.