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COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

2.1.1. Taliban de facto authorities

After years as insurgency, on 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the creation of a ‘caretaker cabinet’ [Security 2022, 1.2.1, p. 23].  The Foundation for Defense and Democracies’ (FDD) Long War Journal assessed 7 districts as contested on 29 August 2022: Warsaj (Takhar Province), Khost wa Firing and Andarab (Baghlan Province), Shutul, Darah, Unabah, and Khinj (Panjshir Province), although cautioning that such assessments are ‘extremely difficult’ since the collapse of the former government [COI Update 2022, 1, p. 2].

After assuming power, the Taliban dismissed the previous judiciary and issued several decrees and general guidance regarding the implementation of sharia [Security 2022, 1.2.3, pp. 29-31]. The de facto authorities were described as seeing ‘any challenge to [their] policies as a challenge to the faith itself.’ [Targeting 2022, 6.3, p. 129].

The Taliban also issued a wide range of directives related to their interpretation of religious norms, including with regard to extramarital relationships, dress code, attendance at prayers and music. The enforcement of issued restrictions was reported to vary across Afghanistan. In June 2022, one source reported that the Taliban increased the enforcement of such directives [Targeting 2022, 1.3.1, p. 42].

Sources pointed at ideological differences between factions within the Taliban and tensions between an ‘older’ and a ‘younger’ generation, but nonetheless, the group has also been described as largely cohesive and unified. [Targeting 2022, 1.1.1, pp. 18-19; Country Focus 2022, 1.3, pp. 23-24].

It was also reported that sometimes influential individuals had more authority and impact on local level than the relevant ministry and that the enforcement of new rules often depended on individual Taliban soldiers and their personal views [Targeting 2022, 1.1.4. b, p. 26].

Taliban members sometimes used force towards the population, for instance in the implementation of sharia and when dispersing protests [Targeting 2022, 1.1.2, 1.3.1, pp. 38 - 39, 42]. In the period 15 August 2021 - 15 June 2022, The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 118 instances of 'excessive use of force', which mainly consisted of shootings at checkpoints when drivers failed to stop.

The Taliban Ministry of Interior instructed the de facto security forces to take precautions in their interactions with the civilian population. There were however reports, after these instructions were issued, of civilian deaths and injuries following excessive use of force by de facto security institutions [Targeting 2022, 1.1.4. e, p. 32].

Human rights violations by the de facto authorities or by Taliban members included arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, the reported use of torture in detention, killings, abductions and enforced disappearances. Corporal and capital punishments, including following a de facto court judgment, were also reported [Targeting 2022, 1.1.4. g, pp. 34-35; 1.2.2, pp. 38-39].

2.1.2. Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network has been described as the Taliban’s ‘best militarily equipped faction’. The network largely controls security in Afghanistan, including the security of the capital, Kabul, where Haqqani special forces operate military bases. Besides the post of de facto minister of interior, the Haqqani Network secured control of the de facto government’s intelligence, passports and migration portfolios [Security 2022, 1.2.1, pp. 24-25; 2.1.1. b, p. 39].

The Haqqani Network is on the UN Security Council’s sanctions list and is known for having carried out high-profile attacks and suicide missions in Kabul in the past. As of May 2022, the Haqqani Network was viewed to maintain the closest ties to Al-Qaeda among the Taliban [Security 2022, 1.2.1, pp. 24-25].

2.1.3. Al Qaeda

The Taliban denied Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan [Country Focus 2022, 3.1.2, p. 62], while the UN Sanctions and Monitoring Team claimed that Al-Qaeda was based in its historical areas of presence in the south and east, with a possible shift of some members to locations further west in the provinces of Farah and Herat. The same source estimated Al-Qaeda’s size to several dozen fighters affiliated to its core organisation, and its operational capabilities as limited to advising and supporting the Taliban [Security 2022, 2.4, p. 55].

Al-Qaeda continued to maintain a low profile, while the links between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban reportedly remained close and their relationship was underscored by the fact that Al-Qaeda’s core leadership, was residing in eastern Afghanistan [Security 2022, 2.4, pp. 54-55].

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), an organisation subordinate to Al-Qaeda’s core, has also been reported to keep a low profile inside Afghanistan, where most of its fighters are based. They include individuals from several south and southeast Asian countries. They were reportedly based in Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, Nimroz, Paktika and Zabul. Some AQIS fighters were embedded in Taliban combat units, and the group has been fighting alongside the Taliban, including during the sweeping takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 [Security 2022, 2.4, p. 55].

With regard to a more detailed description of human rights violations by the Taliban, see the following sections.

For further information on human rights violations committed by the Taliban and actors related to the Taliban, and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see 7. Exclusion.

See other topics concerning actors of persecution or serious harm: