In 2024, there was a significant increase in administrative charges for the ‘dissemination of extremist materials,’ with thousands of people fined or sentenced to up to 15 days in detention for subscribing to, liking, or sharing content classified as extremist, including content promoting the Belarusian language or ‘sharing a post about broken traffic lights.’242 In May 2024, the first criminal case was opened under article 361-4 for sharing information in messaging apps, an act previously subject only to administrative prosecution.243

In many cases, reposting or sharing of online content was made prior to the designation of the website or social media channel as extremist.244

Using the legal system, the authorities have criminalised acts of solidarity with human rights initiatives, using financial support and civic engagement as political disloyalty and evidence of involvement in extremist activity.245 Authorities have prosecuted individuals for financing terrorism246 and extremism for donations to civil resistance funds and organisations providing aid to political prisoners – as well as to civic initiatives, humanitarian projects, and media outlets247– after organisations were classified as extremist.248

Prosecution often involves the retroactive application of the law, where transfers made before an organisation was classified as extremist result in criminal charges. Punishments are often disproportional. For instance, an attempted donation of approximately 16 US dollars to Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, a Belarusian volunteer formation within the Ukrainian armed forces, resulted in three-year prison sentence for ‘attempting to facilitate extremist activity.’249

According to a human rights specialist interviewed by EUAA, the authorities can easily trace donations made through domestic banking channels. For this reason, people generally avoid using these channels, relying instead on external payment systems or cryptocurrencies, where traceability is much more limited.250

Law enforcement officers force individuals to pay bribes to avoid prosecution.251 Individuals identified as having made financial transfers to an extremist entity are reportedly summoned by the KGB and are pressured to admit guilt and ‘compensate the damage’ to avoid prosecution. This payment is typically set at ten times the original donation. However, those who pay this compensation can still be subsequently detained and convicted for the same donation.252

Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Belarusian authorities have used anti-extremist legislation to prosecute individuals for anti-war speech activism and speech.253 The suppression of anti-war opinions has become ‘one of the most widespread directions of criminal prosecution.’254 Concurrently, Belarusian courts adopted Russian state propaganda narratives, integrating phrases such as ‘special military operation,’ ‘denazification’, and ‘protection of civilian population’ into court judgements.255

The authorities perceive anti-war statements as ‘discrediting the state’ or ‘inciting hostility’256 and punish both expression of support for Ukraine257 and donations to organisations supporting Ukraine, which are classified as financing of extremism,258 including donations to the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment.259

According to Viasna, as of February 2026, at least 403 individuals, including Belarussian and foreign citizens, have been convicted for expressing support to Ukraine. This includes 213 individuals convicted for ‘facilitating extremist activities’, including through sharing of photos and videos about Russian military equipment movement, 41 for treason, and 34 for an ‘act of terrorism’ (Article 289 of the Criminal Code), including cases of sabotage, such as on the railway and the Mačuliščy airfield.260

In addition, as of February 2026, over 200 political prisoners were held in detention for expressing solidarity with Ukraine, comprising those who had fought or intended to fight on the side of Ukraine, persons who carried out sabotage on the railway to prevent military equipment movement, persons who made donations or spoke publicly against the war, and persons who shared information about military equipment movement.261

Since summer 2025, the authorities have increasingly used so-called ‘charitable contributions’,262 offering individuals who have made donations in support of Ukraine the opportunity to avoid criminal prosecution by making payments to state-designated organisations. The practice is formalised through the Prosecutor’s decision to decline initiating criminal proceedings ‘upon voluntary disclosure of the offense and compensation of damages.’263 Payments are requested before trial or during detention, ‘in exchange for a lighter sentence or dropped charges’ and release.264 While the payments and an expression of repentance are considered mitigating circumstances at trial, they reportedly not always result in lighter sentences, such as home confinement. In some cases, there have been reports of individuals making such payments and, nevertheless, being convicted.265

The Belaruski Hajun project, a Telegram-based initiative, was established to collect open-source data266 regarding the movement of Russian troops267 and military equipment,268 including railway transportation and aircraft flights.269 The project had reportedly around 345 000 subscribers and the collected information was accessible to the public, journalists, and analysts.270 In early February 2025, security forces gained access to the project’s chat and part of its users’ personal data,271 leading to detentions of individuals who had shared photos and videos under charges of ‘aiding extremism’272 and forcing the project to terminate its activities.273

Detentions related to the Belaruski Hajun case continued throughout 2025 and into 2026, serving as a primary tool for the punishment of anti-war positions and support for Ukraine.274 According to a human rights specialist, individuals who sent information to the project became targets of searches and prosecution: in such cases, even a single message sent via the channel is reportedly sufficient to attract the attention of the authorities.275 As noted by Viasna, these cases indicate the growing pattern of ‘digital repression’, with criminal proceedings grounded on digital evidence, such as messages and data retrieved from Telegram.276

As of February 2026, at least 183 individuals were reportedly detained or convicted in connection with the Belaruski Hajun case. Detentions and trials remained ongoing as of February 2026 and were held almost weekly,277 with defendants prosecuted for ‘assistance to extremist activities’ (Article 361-4 of the Criminal Code), carrying a maximum penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment.278 Also in these cases, the authorities reportedly offered detainees to make ‘voluntary donations’ to public institutions in exchange for the termination of criminal proceedings.279

  • 242

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 34

  • 243

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 61

  • 244

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 34

  • 245

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16

  • 246

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url

  • 247

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 9

  • 248

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url; Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report – Belarus, 2026, url, p. 11

  • 249

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 15

  • 250

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 251

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url

  • 252

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 15

  • 253

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 28

  • 254

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 14

  • 255

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 17

  • 256

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 6

  • 257

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url; Human Constanta, Online interview with EUAA, 25 February 2026

  • 258

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 259

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url

  • 260

    Viasna, The fourth year of the war and the fourth year of repression: Belarusians persecuted for supporting Ukraine, 24 February 2026, url

  • 261

    Viasna, Eight stories of Belarusians convicted for solidarity with Ukraine, 23 February 2026, url; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 262

    Viasna, "Refuse, and you'll go to detention": Belarus forces political detainees to pay "charity" for freedom, 2 February 2026, url

  • 263

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 264

    Viasna, "Refuse, and you'll go to detention": Belarus forces political detainees to pay "charity" for freedom, 2 February 2026, url

  • 265

    Viasna, "Refuse, and you'll go to detention": Belarus forces political detainees to pay "charity" for freedom, 2 February 2026, url; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 266

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16

  • 267

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2025, 4 February 2026, url

  • 268

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. January 2026, 4 February 2026, url

  • 269

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16

  • 270

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16

  • 271

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16; Viasna, The fourth year of the war and the fourth year of repression: Belarusians persecuted for supporting Ukraine, 24 February 2026, url

  • 272

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2025, 4 February 2026, url

  • 273

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 16

  • 274

    Viasna, The fourth year of the war and the fourth year of repression: Belarusians persecuted for supporting Ukraine, 24 February 2026, url; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 275

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 276

    Viasna Human Rights Center, Online interview with EUAA, 12 March 2026

  • 277

    Viasna, The fourth year of the war and the fourth year of repression: Belarusians persecuted for supporting Ukraine, 24 February 2026, url

  • 278

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, pp. 16-17

  • 279

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. January 2026, 4 February 2026, url