2.2.2. Anti-extremism and anti-terrorism laws

Table of contents

The scope of anti-extremism and anti-terrorism laws was amended in 2021.189 These laws have been described as overbroad190 and vague,191 and are reported to be used to suppress dissent192 and punish actual or perceived political opponents193 as well as journalists, human rights defenders,194 and civil society members.195 The authorities have used anti-extremism laws against civil society representatives, including by the designation of public initiatives, their information resources, and social media accounts as extremist materials.196 The use of anti-extremism laws to punish persons expressing dissent197 has resulted in the situation where even reading media sources declared extremist by the authorities can lead to short-term arrest.198

The authorities maintain multiple lists that designate organisations, information resources, and individuals as extremist or terrorist.199 These lists are regularly expanded, laying the grounds for continued repression.200

The National List of Extremist Publications and Content is maintained by the Ministry of Information.201 Sources on the list are blocked. In April 2024, the presidency-controlled Operation and Analysis Center issued a directive allowing it to remove websites classified as extremist from the national domain system, effectively closing them.202

As of 31 March 2026, the list consisted of around 9 100 items,203 comprising publications, webpages, and social media channels,204 including by independent media and webpages of human rights groups.205 This figure indicates a continued upward trend: as by 5 December 2025, Belarusian courts classified 8 172 materials as extremist,206 including 1 444 in 2024207 and 2 107 in 2025.208 In 2024, such designation was applied for the first time to an LGBTIQ+ website as well as websites providing guidance to conscripts for military service.209 In May and June 2024, the authorities dismantled independent legal services which assisted conscripts, treating their work as a threat to national security after the Prosecutor General labelled these resources – particularly due to their advice on military service exemptions – as extremist and contrary to the national interest.210 In January 2025, the civil platform ‘Convenient City/Petitions.by’, which enabled citizens to submit petitions to the authorities on local issues, was also classified as extremist.211 In March 2026, a local court designated the Instagram account of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) as extremist content.212

Following, sharing, or reacting to publications and online sources designated as extremist can lead to prosecution,213 resulting in administrative detention, heavy fines, and confiscation of personal devices.214

This list of extremist formations is maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs since October 2021 and is regularly updated on its website.215 The decision to designate an organisation as extremist is made by the KGB or the Ministry of Internal Affairs.216 The list includes civic groups and human rights groups, media outlets, and humanitarian projects,217 serving as a mechanism for criminalisation of a wide range of activism.218

There is no clear or typical profile of entities designated as extremist. In addition to major political actors, small civil society groups and even Telegram channels with low numbers of subscribers have been designated as extremist formations.219 As of 16 April 2026, the list comprised 353 entities,220 most of them civil society organisations and initiatives.221 In March 2026, the KGB designated the Belarussian Helsinki Committee (BHC) – a human rights organisation which has been working in Belarus since 1995 – as an extremist formation, listing webpages, social media accounts and email addresses related to BHC as extremist materials.222

As explained by human rights specialist interviewed by EUAA, designation as an extremist formation particularly affects organisations, which are based abroad and work for democratisation of Belarus, including journalist associations and human rights groups. In practice, this legal framework is used to sever contacts between persons inside Belarus and those abroad, especially those who are engaged in human rights advocacy work abroad. Once designated, such entities are effectively unable to operate in Belarus, as their registration in Belarus may be revoked, bank accounts frozen, and individuals inside Belarus may face criminal prosecution for any cooperation or communication with such entities.223

Interactions with entities or individuals designated as extremist or terrorist constitute a criminal offense.224 The authorities carry out widespread prosecution of individuals who create, lead, or participate in activities of such organisations.225 Criminal prosecution can also follow for any financial support to these entities, regardless of its amount.226

The List of Belarusian Citizens, Foreign Nationals, and Stateless Persons Associated with Extremist Activities is maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and consists of individuals who were convicted under extremism-related articles.227 However, in practice, persons who have already served their sentences, those subjected to compulsory psychiatric measures, or those who cannot be held criminally liable due to the expiry of the five-year statute of limitations of Article 342 of the Criminal Code can also be included on the list. In such cases, ‘courts may still issue a conviction-like ruling without imposing criminal liability or formally establishing guilt,’ in violation of formal legal requirements.228

The scope of activities considered extremist has expanded to include any form of interaction with civil society organisations designated as extremist.229 As of February 2026, the list contained the names of 6 353 individuals,230 including 1 188 added in 2024.231 In January and February 2026, as reported by Viasna, 155 individuals were added,232 most of whom were convicted under Article 361-4, probably in connection with the Belarusian Hajun project (Belaruski Hajun).233 For information on the case, refer to chapter 2.2.3 Criminal and administrative prosecution, d) Prosecutions related to Belaruski Hajun case.

Inclusion on the extremist list entails wide-ranging restrictions, such as ‘the freezing of bank accounts and transfers’ and a ban on employment in public administration, education, military, healthcare, and social services. These measures remain in place for up to 5 years after a criminal record is expunged and, in practice, might be extended to 13 years after a sentence has been served.234

The list of individuals associated with terrorist activities is maintained by the KGB235 and is published on its Telegram channel.236 As of February 2026, it contained 1 417 individuals, including 700 Belarusian citizens. In February 2026, the list was updated twice, with one of those added being the former head of the Belarusian Republican Youth Union (BRSM), who faces charges for ‘incitement of hatred.’237

As noted by a human rights specialist in an interview with EUAA, the distinction between ‘the extremist’ and ‘terrorist’ lists, is primarily procedural and relates to investigative responsibility under the Code of Criminal Procedure.238 While the lists are regularly expanded239 and formally public, updates are not always published immediately. Consequently, ‘announcements of new designations may circulate before consolidated and updated lists are fully accessible, which creates uncertainty for those trying to determine what has been designated extremist.’240

Compared to those on the ‘extremist list’, individuals included on the ‘terrorist list’ face more severe financial, social, and property restrictions and are also subjected to freedom of movement restrictions. In detention, the individuals included on the ‘terrorist list’ are prohibited from receiving bank transfers.241

  • 189

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 71; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 28

  • 190

    International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus, Definitional Overreach: Belarus’s Expansive Definitions of “Terrorism” and “Extremism” as a Basis for Systemic Human Rights Abuses, 1 December 2025, url

  • 191

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 34

  • 192

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 71; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. January 2026, 4 February 2026, url; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 28

  • 193

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, paras. 3, 71

  • 194

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 3; HRW, Belarus: Political Retaliation against Businesses, 9 May 2025, url; Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 21

  • 195

    HRW, Belarus: Political Retaliation against Businesses, 9 May 2025, url

  • 196

    Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report – Belarus, 2026, url, p. 11

  • 197

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 28; UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 71

  • 198

    AP, An incessant crackdown in Belarus hurls dozens of independent journalists into harsh prisons, 20 April 2025, url

  • 199

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 200

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. March 2026, 7 April 2026, url

  • 201

    UN OHCHR, Belarus misuses counter-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation to stifle dissent: UN expert, 23 October 2023,url; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 202

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url

  • 203

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. March 2026, 7 April 2026, url

  • 204

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 205

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2024, 16 January 2025, url

  • 206

    UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Belarus, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 6 February 2026, url, para. 44

  • 207

    Viasna, 40.5% of all the "extremist" rulings were issued in 2024. What was recognized as "extremist" last year, 17 January 2025, url

  • 208

    UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Belarus, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 6 February 2026, url, para. 44

  • 209

    Human Constanta, Results of the fight against “extremism” in Belarus in 2024, 13 February 2025, url

  • 210

    Human Constanta, Email correspondence with EUAA, 13 March 2026

  • 211

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April 2025, url, para. 62

  • 212

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. March 2026, 7 April 2026, url

  • 213

    HRW, Belarus – Events of 2025, 4 February 2026, url

  • 214

    Human Constanta, Email correspondence with EUAA, 13 March 2026

  • 215

    News.by, Ministry of Internal Affairs posts list of extremist formations on its websites, 18 October 2021, url. To access the list, see Belarus, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, О мерах противодействия экстремизму и реабилитации нацизма [On measures to counter extremism and the glorification of Nazism], 6 February 2026, url.

  • 216

    Viasna, In 2024, 89 "extremist formations" were recognized, including media, a theater troupe, and public organizations, 10 January 2025, url

  • 217

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 14

  • 218

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 219

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 220

    Belarus, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, О мерах противодействия экстремизму и реабилитации нацизма [On measures to counter extremism and the glorification of Nazism], 6 February 2026, url

  • 221

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 222

    Belarusian Helsinki Committee, About us, n.d., url

  • 223

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 224

    HRW, Belarus: Political Retaliation against Businesses, 9 May 2025, url

  • 225

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 226

    Dissidentby and Human Constanta, From streets to screens: digital repression in Belarus (2020-2025), 12 December 2025, url, p. 14

  • 227

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url. To access the list, see Belarus, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, О мерах противодействия экстремизму и реабилитации нацизма [On measures to counter extremism and the glorification of Nazism], 6 February 2026, url.

  • 228

    Viasna Human Rights Center, Online interview with EUAA, 12 March 2026 and Email correspondence with EUAA, 17 April 2026

  • 229

    UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Group of Independent Experts on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 7 February 2025, url, para. 28

  • 230

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 231

    Human Constanta, Results of the fight against “extremism” in Belarus in 2024, 13 February 2025, url

  • 232

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 233

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. January 2026, 4 February 2026, url; Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 234

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 235

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 236

    BYSOL, «Пробиваем» себя по базам. Как узнать, ищут ли вас в Беларуси [Checking Yourself in Databases: How to Find Out if You're Wanted in Belarus], n.d., url.To access the list, see Belarus, The KGB of the Republic of Belarus, Telegram, n.d., url

  • 237

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 238

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 239

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url

  • 240

    Human rights specialist, Online interview with EUAA, 20 March 2026

  • 241

    Viasna, Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2026, 3 March 2026, url