2.1.1. Actors involved and territorial control

As of early June 2024, without taking into account the situation in the three cities of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman, Khartoum state was divided into territories in the east controlled by the SAF, central areas where control was contested between the SAF and the RSF and their respective allies, and areas in the west largely under the control of the RSF.549 The SAF coalition groups operating in the Khartoum area included the SAF’s conventional units and special forces, newly recruited mustanfareen battalions, Darfuri armed groups550 including SLM-MM and JEM,551 and other militias such as the Islamist Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade.552

The SAF made territorial gains in the city of Omdurman during an offensive in the first quarter of 2024.553 By mid-February 2024, the SAF had broken the RSF’s siege of its Engineers Corps base554 and residential quarters of Old Omdurman.555 Further SAF advances were reported in eastern and southern Omdurman, as well as around Bahri.556 As of autumn 2024, much of Omdurman was reported to be under the army’s control.557 The SAF had troops stationed at its Engineers Corps base558 in the city’s south559 and, in northern Omdurman,560 it retained control of the Karari locality, which now serves as its military operations headquarters.561 As a result of the military campaign, the SAF was able to link its forces in the city’s north with those stationed in the south.562 Despite the SAF’s territorial gains, the RSF remained in control of large areas in the western and southern parts of Omdurman,563 although it was affected by infighting over leadership issues and supply shortages in western Omdurman564 and faced some defections towards the end of the reference period.565 During the following months, the conflict in the Khartoum area continued566 but remained largely frozen567 with both sides firmly entrenched in their positions,568 although the SAF made continuous ‘incremental’ territorial gains in Omdurman.569

In Khartoum city, most of which has been under RSF control since April 2023,570 the SAF remained unable to dislodge the effective RSF ground units positioned in the city.571 RSF fighters were entrenched in residential areas, occupying homes, businesses, and key infrastructure installations such as healthcare facilities.572 Meanwhile, the SAF held on to a few strategic positions, including the General Command Headquarters in the city centre and the Armoured Corps base in the south,573 both of which were under RSF siege. Meanwhile, the Strategic Corps base remained under RSF control.574

Following multi-pronged attacks launched by the RSF in Bahri in early September 2024, including in the surroundings of the Weapons Corps and Reconnaissance bases in Kadaro and Hattab,575 the SAF launched a major offensive in late September 2024 against RSF positions in Khartoum and Bahri,576 conducting waves of infantry assaults supported by airstrikes and heavy artillery fire.577 During its offensive launched in late September 2024, the SAF gained control of arterial bridges and roads linking Omdurman with Khartoum city and gained a foothold on the eastern bank of the Nile578 in the al-Muqran district.579 After achieving rapid initial territorial gains between late September and mid-October 2024,580 the SAF’s advances slowed down.581

As of November 2024, control was fiercely contested in Khartoum’s al-Muqran district,582 although the SAF established a perimeter583 and held its ground in this strategically important area.584 Little change of control of territory was reported in the area as of late October 2024.585 Another embattled area was the surroundings of the Armoured Corps base further south.586 The SAF also took control of the Lamab neighbourhood, located north of the Armoured Corps base.587 In Khartoum, armed confrontations remained largely limited to areas within al-Muqran district.588

Most of the city of Bahri has been under RSF control,589 while the SAF held on to several strategic bases in the area.590 SAF troops were stationed at the besieged Signal Corps base in the city’s south, at the Weapons Corps base further north in the Kadaro area,591 and at the Reconnaissance Corps base in the Hattab area.592

During the offensive that began in late September 2024, SAF units captured a bridge connecting Omdurman to Bahri,593 infiltrated Bahri594 and ended the RSF’s sieges of the Reconnaissance Corps and Weapons Corps bases while capturing the neighbourhoods around the Weapons Corps base as well. The SAF also captured the city’s al-Izirgab595 and al-Halfaya neighbourhoods596 and later also retook some areas in the Al-Samrab neighbourhood east of al-Halfaya. Meanwhile, the RSF maintained its stronghold in the Shambat district597 on the route towards the still besieged General Command and Signal Corps bases.598 In November 2024, SAF units managed to seize some further ground in Bahri, although the momentum of the SAF’s ground offensive was waning. Well-trained RSF special units at Bahri’s Paratroopers Corps base were reported to have repeatedly obstructed the SAF’s advances.599 The RSF launched counterattacks in Bahri’s al-Halfaya district in an attempt to reverse the SAF’s territorial gains, pushing back the SAF and reportedly inflicting several casualties.600

According to a mid-November 2024 field report cited by the Sudan Tribune, the RSF only maintained a weak presence in several Bahri neighbourhoods, including Shambat, al-Sababi, al-Safiya and al-Shaabiya.601 In early December 2024, following SAF drone attacks, it was reportedly forced to retreat from some positions within Shambat as well as from the al-Safiya neighbourhood.602 

At the same time, the RSF had highly trained special units positioned at the Paratroopers Corps base in Khartoum Bahri603 and remained in control of the Al-Jaili oil refinery, a key source of fuel for RSF troops604 situated north of Bahri.605 However, the refinery was being surrounded by SAF troops as of October 2024.606

Moreover, the reference period witnessed a series of SAF attacks on the heavily defended RSF-controlled Al-Jaili oil refinery in late April/early May607 and August 2024,608 an area that has witnessed persistent armed confrontations during the current conflict.609

  • 549

    PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, url

  • 550

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, url, p. 2

  • 551

    ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, url

  • 552

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, url, p. 2; ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, url

  • 553

    ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., url

  • 554

    PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, url

  • 555

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, url, p. 2

  • 556

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, url, p. 4

  • 557

    Guardian (The), Airstrike on North Darfur market kills more than 100, says Sudan lawyers’ group, 10 December 2024, url; Asharq Al-Awsat, Clashes Renew Between Sudanese Army, RSF in Khartoum, 3 September 2024, url

  • 558

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 559

    PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, url

  • 560

    Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, url

  • 561

    Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, url

  • 562

    ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, url

  • 563

    PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, url

  • 564

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, url, p. 5

  • 565

    ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan’s al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, url

  • 566

    GPC, At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 29, 15 July 2024, url, p. 1; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 9 – 15 May 2024, 17 May 2024, url, p. 2; GPC, At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 26 15 April 2024, 18 April 2024, url, p. 1

  • 567

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, url, p. 2

  • 568

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 569

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, url, p. 3

  • 570

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url; Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, url

  • 571

    Al Jazeera, Sudan’s army launches major offensive on Khartoum, 26 September 2024, url

  • 572

    HRW, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women”: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan’s Capital, 28 July 2024, url, p. 1

  • 573

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 574

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 575

    International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., url

  • 576

    BBC News, Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, 26 September 2024, url

  • 577

    Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, url

  • 578

    Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, url

  • 579

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army seizes Khartoum bridgehead in surprise attack, 26 September 2024, url

  • 580

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, url

  • 581

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, url; New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 582

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 583

    Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, url

  • 584

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 585

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, url

  • 586

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 587

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 588

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, url

  • 589

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan army repels RSF attack on strategic base in Khartoum Bahri, 3 September 2024, url; Guardian (The), Airstrike on North Darfur market kills more than 100, says Sudan lawyers’ group, 10 December 2024, url

  • 590

    Sudan Tribune, Sudan army repels RSF attack on strategic base in Khartoum Bahri, 3 September 2024, url

  • 591

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 592

    ACLED, Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan, 16 September 2024, url

  • 593

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 594

    Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, url

  • 595

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 596

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url; ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url

  • 597

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 598

    Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army captures Halfaya Bridge, breaks Kadroo siege, 29 September 2024, url

  • 599

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 600

    International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., url

  • 601

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 602

    Sudan Tribune, Army retreats from north Khartoum Bahri under army drone attacks, 7 December 2024, url

  • 603

    Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, url

  • 604

    ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, url; Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, url

  • 605

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, url, p. 2

  • 606

    New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, url

  • 607

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, url, p. 2

  • 608

    Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, url, p. 3

  • 609

    ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, url; International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., url